For almost 2 years, the bondholders get nothing but good news: a coupon every month, 10% a year. For a €1,000 note, €100 of interest a year, a little over €8 a month. At maturity, in October 2024, the bondholder is due to have received €200 of gross coupons and to get back their €1,000: €1,200 in all. All is well. But it is a bullet loan: for 2 years, the group pays only the interest, and must return all the capital in one go, at maturity. All the bondholders' risk is concentrated on that day. If the group has found neither a bank to take over the debt nor a buyer for the mall, it does not have the means to return the €1,000, and the coupons already received cover only a small part of the stake. Suspense worthy of John Carpenter.
Then comes 20 October 2024, (theoretical) payday for the investors. Except that Merlin's financial position is no better than before, he is no more solvent. Since he bought Roubaix, in 2019, Covid has emptied town centres, and investors have lost faith in retail property. The market turnaround finishes the job: valuations fall, offices first, closely followed by shops. No bank has taken over the debt, the mall has not been sold. Instead of the transfer, the bondholders receive an amendment from ClubFunding: push back the maturity, in exchange for a rate raised to 11% from 21 October, then to 12% in January.7 For a €1,000 note, the coupon rises from €100 to €110, then to €120 a year: €10, then €20 more each year. In return, the €1,000 stays locked up, and the risk of never seeing it again grows with each extension. They accept. The amendments will pile up, and the maturity will slide all the way to 31 December 2026. On paper, each extension improves the deal: with higher rates and a longer term, a €1,000 note should bring in nearly €490 of coupons by then, and return nearly €1,490 in all, instead of the €1,200 planned. Provided the group pays.
Les Mille Cheminées: a higher rate at every extension
Annual coupon rate
Refusing would mean calling in the collateral. But the 2022 promise only becomes a real pledge if the group is declared in default. By agreeing to wait, the bondholders spare the group that default: as long as they sign the amendments, their collateral sleeps. It will only wake up in June 2026. And even if they could be seized, these shares would not be worth much: the Nîmes valuation dates from before the market turned, and what is left of it is still shared with Mulhouse.
That leaves the personal guarantees of Merlin and Dufour, each for half the loan: if the group does not repay, they have to pay. But Dufour's wealth already backs other debts: on ORION's bank loans, Dufour has already guaranteed €5.3M.
To know whether to accept or refuse an amendment, you would at least need to see the group's accounts. Other lenders to Merlin got that: when his holding company borrowed €2M in 2018, at the same 10% rate, its bondholders demanded 3 of the 5 seats on a strategy committee, including that of the bondholders' representative, the agent who defends all the holders of a given loan against the borrower, access to the general ledger and to the subsidiaries' accounts, an audit right and a veto on large investments. The private investors of 2022 got nothing of the kind: no seat, no audit right, no access to the subsidiaries' accounts, not even the detail of the transactions between the group's companies. They depend on what the platform chooses to tell them.