Looking back on 4 years of crisis to sort the wheat from the chaff (and the IRR from the BS)
€88bn. 230 vehicles. 4 million investors. And roughly as many ways of calculating a “yield”.
That’s the market for SCPIs, France’s non-listed property funds. Something huge, everywhere in French people’s portfolios, and yet nobody really understands how it works. Not savers. Not always advisers. Sometimes not even the journalists who write about it.
Am I exaggerating? Barely.
Between entry fees that are supposedly paid on exit and SCPIs that are supposedly fee-free, it’s hard to find media that cover the subject properly, in between two rankings of so-called yields, churned out by distributors looking for the easiest way to bag their commission.
In reality, over the past two years, the market has split in two. On one side, SCPIs showing 7-8% yields, raising hundreds of millions, with no units waiting to be sold. On the other, giants losing 15% of their value, blocking withdrawals for years, and whose CGPs, France’s independent wealth advisers, who sold them, are now trotting out the classic “who could have seen it coming?”. Answer: anyone.
Because the 2023-2024 crisis didn’t invent anything. It just revealed what had been there from the start: a market where conflicts of interest are everywhere, where performance indicators change according to the political interests of ASPIM, the industry’s trade body, and where the average saver has no chance of finding their way without a PhD in decoding financial bullshit.
A few figures for context. Primopierre, one of the biggest SCPIs in France: €240M of units waiting to be sold. Theoretical exit time: several decades. Pierrevenus (roughly “property income”: such a sense of humour at Aestiam): 14% of its capitalisation stuck in the queue. Meanwhile, Iroko Zen and Transitions Europe pulled in €800M of inflows between them in nine months. Zero liquidity problems.
Two markets. Same product. Same name.
The problem is that few people explain the difference, let alone the reasons. Bankers sell Épargne Foncière because it’s the in-house SCPI. Your adviser recommends the one that pays them 7% commission. Online comparison sites rank by “yield” without mentioning that the TD (distribution rate) of a young SCPI raising money hand over fist is artificially inflated. And the client, trusting, signs.
Hence this newsletter.
Those who’ve followed me for a while know this subject comes up a lot here. On LinkedIn too. For four years I’ve been talking about SCPIs, conflicts of interest in distribution, rigged indicators. Not by chance: I worked at an asset manager, which kicked me out for pushing back a bit too hard on the internal sausage-making, notably in debates where SCPIs were compared to a Livret A, France’s state-regulated savings account, with the risk played down as far as it would go.
So this newsletter, sponsored by Louve Invest, which distributes SCPIs and passes part of its commission back as cashback, is ultimately the logical sequel to almost 4 years of picking the market apart, now that the biggest shocks of the crisis are behind us.
Conflicts of interest
Conflict of interest disclaimer:
- From 2020 to 2021, I was employed by an SCPI manager, which dismissed me on grounds of professional inadequacy, and which is mentioned rather negatively in this newsletter.
- In that job, I notably worked on a direct competitor of Louve.
- Between 2023 and 2025, I advised SCPI managers on several occasions, for a fee, at least three of which are mentioned, rather positively, in this newsletter.