💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 02

The Dream

On the ClubFunding website, the project page asks private investors for €3.75M, promises a coupon every month, and an exit: within 2 years, by October 2024, a bank will take over the debt, or the group will sell the mall, and everyone will get their money back with interest. The perfect plan. The borrower is then called L'Avenue Développement Immobilier, Frédéric Merlin's holding company, since renamed Groupe SGM. On the page, ClubFunding presents Merlin, 30, with more than €100M of personal wealth, then a partner with no name and no photo, “Partner 1”, a property dealer from 1992 to 2015, said to be worth more than €400M. That is Jean-Paul Dufour. The 2 men stand as guarantors before a notary, each for half of the loan.

ClubFunding sales brochure, October 2022, p. 3

ClubFunding grades the project out of 10, like a third-grader's homework. The paperwork gets 10, the top mark. The letting, that is the group's ability to rent out the shops, gets 7.5, the lowest. The platform does not justify its marks, but its page gives the reason: the 97% occupancy shown in 2022 includes leases only just signed and tenants still moving in.

The SGM galaxy: who owns, who lends, who guarantees

Source

ClubFunding sales brochure, October 2022, p. 2

As collateral, the bondholders receive the shares of ORION, one of the group's property companies, the companies that each hold one or more buildings. ORION is 42.5% owned by Merlin's holding company, 42.5% by Dufour and 15% by YESON, the Dufour family's holding company. Its shares are placed with a fiduciary, a third party in charge of managing them, with the promise to turn them later into a real pledge, a “security trust commitment”. The difference matters. In a management trust (fiducie-gestion), the third party holds the shares on behalf of the group: if the coupons stop, the bondholders can neither take them nor have them sold. In a security trust (fiducie-sûreté), the third party can sell them, or hand them over, to repay the bondholders. Lawyers present it as the strongest security in French law: the shares leave the group's assets, and in a bankruptcy, they largely escape the other creditors. The management trust, for its part, guarantees nothing: it only stops the group from selling the shares or pledging them elsewhere. In between, the bondholders have only a promise. Until it is carried out, they have no pledge, and if the group files for bankruptcy first, it may be too late: the court can cancel a security given at the last minute for an old debt. And the shares still have to be worth something. ORION owns nothing in Roubaix. Its only asset is a mall in Nîmes, with 10 of its 51 units empty, which the platform mentions on page 13 of its sales file. The group's valuer puts it at €19M, of which €12.5M is owed to the banks, repaid first. That leaves €6.5M for the €3.9M finally lent: on paper, the margin is comfortable. But that €6.5M is not reserved for Roubaix. The same shares secure, equally, another group loan, in Mulhouse, and the 2 loans together exceed €8.5M. Even if the valuer is right about Nîmes, the collateral does not cover both. The empty units are known to the platform, and so is the sharing with Mulhouse. Yet it rates the collateral 8.2 out of 10. Among the risks, the platform cites “bank refinancing risk”: that at maturity, no bank agrees to take over the group's debt to repay the bondholders. That is what will happen in 2024.

ClubFunding sales brochure, October 2022, p. 13

In August 2022, 2 months before the fundraising, the valuer hired by the group puts the mall at €35.3M, nearly 5x the price paid 3 years earlier, when almost half the units were empty. To reach that figure, the valuer does not start from the rents collected, but from those the mall “will generate” once the new tenants are in and their rent-free months are over: €3M a year. He then divides this future rent by the yield a buyer would accept, 8.6%. Alea jacta est, as Caesar would say. In other words: the random is cast.

Except that the property market is turning. In July 2022, the European Central Bank raises its rates for the first time in 11 years, then again in September, a month before the fundraising. When money costs more, buyers of buildings demand a higher yield, and prices fall. The brochure itself puts a figure on it: if buyers demand 9.8% instead of 8.6%, the mall loses about €4.5M in value, without losing a single tenant. The whole exit promised to the bondholders, a bank taking over the debt or a sale, rests on a valuation made just before money became expensive. What happens next will surprise you (it won't).

ClubFunding sales brochure, October 2022, p. 10