💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 03

This is the end, my friend

But let's dwell for two minutes on this market reversal and its consequences, because it wrecks the very heart of crowdfunding.

Setting aside renewable energy and Bienprêter, which has a model of its own, the market was built around:

  • crowd-equity, mostly for start-ups;
  • property crowdfunding, almost exclusively for property dealers' projects.

One of the main reasons for the collapse (even though nobody publishes the equity figures) is that the deals are structurally risky.

Let's be clear:

  • When you have the choice, you'd rather be funded by Partech or Kima. If you end up on a crowd-equity platform, it's because your deal didn't get through anywhere else.
  • If you have a solid deal and a solid company for your property project, you get funded by a bank, and you don't come to a platform to borrow at 12%, before arrangement fees.

That said, in crowdfunding's case, it's fair: it's riskier, so it pays more. Provided you tell clients so clearly.

But as I have explained many times in previous newsletters, crowdfunding's other big problem is that it was built (like online culture 20 years ago) on the illusion that it's free: clients pay nothing, have no fees, and so on.

In reality, the vast majority of platforms take fees of between 8 and 12% on the money raised. Granted, it's paid by the borrower, but it affects everyone:

  • The platform may tend to raise as much as it can, even if it means fewer checks, since if it doesn't offer enough rounds, it doesn't eat;
  • The investor has the illusion of paying nothing, except that in reality, when he invests €100, only €90 goes into the project. So whether he pays or not, it affects him as much as the borrower, and adds risk.

This model is very attractive for platforms, since they take the money upfront, unlike many fund managers with high structural costs, for whom entry fees often pay for distribution. In exchange, most platforms charge no management fees. Except Blast, which charges an investor subscription, an upfront fee to companies, management fees and carried interest. A model several players have started moving towards, like Tudigo, which has added management fees.

The problem… is precisely when there's a problem.

Because, and I can't understand why this has never shocked anyone, intermediary platforms also act as the representative of the bondholders (the “masse”). It's a role set out in France's Commercial Code for bond issues, so that all investors are represented before the issuer by a single intermediary. Obviously, the conflict of interest is gigantic, since the intermediary is asked to go after its own client (the one who paid it). Which:

  • Can expose due diligence failures by the platform itself, which it has little interest in seeing come out;
  • Costs an insane amount of money: the slightest security enforcement runs to thousands, even tens of thousands of euros, which by law will be passed on to the issuer, but which in practice must be paid upfront without anyone being able to predict how the debt will end.

This misalignment of interests has created a number of situations where platforms made completely crazy decisions. Or sometimes the opposite, depending on your point of view.

Take April 2024, for example, when Mon Petit Placement raises just over €4.1M on SoWeFund from 2,700 individuals, the vast majority of them its own clients, at a €22M valuation. Barely six months later, and despite a tough climate, Malakoff comes forward with a €25M offer. A nice +13-14% in a few months.

Except SoWeFund was rather counting on a x2, allowing it to pocket some nice fees, whereas it would have to settle for only €800K €80K in fees, mainly thanks to its 20% carried interest. On one of the rare deals with a positive exit. Between 5 and 8 by my estimates, out of just under 150.

EDIT 21 October 2025, 2.36pm: correction to the amount of SoWeFund's fees

According to several sources, SoWeFund stirred up trouble over the deal, arguing that the takeover was not in the community's interest. So much so that several people at Malakoff, exasperated by the situation, reportedly considered calling off the deal altogether.

In the end, the deal goes through at the last minute, but several people close to the matter describe a consolation prize for SoWeFund: an offer of €1.5M in bonds at 6% to Mon Petit Placement. A deal that will not be public on the platform and is reserved for its investors only. Enough to lock in some fees (10% of the interest for SoWeFund) and bring investors a bit more return, by twisting Malakoff's arm with the risk of the deal blowing up, while making Mon Petit Placement pay financing costs for a useless (and expensive) credit line.

That said, some will argue that in this particular case, the investors' interest came first in the end.

But more broadly, platform bosses have told me on several occasions that they didn't launch heavy proceedings when they knew in advance there was nothing left to recover. And sometimes simply because it was too uncertain. Because the models are fragile, and recovery proceedings are complex and very expensive. For each case, the platform has to advance large sums (which it no longer has) that the Commercial Code says must be paid by the issuer… which is in difficulty and which, if it ends up in liquidation, will therefore never pay. All that to earn €0.

All the more problematic because the massive drop in money raised has concentrated the market on five players (Enerfip, Bricks, ClubFunding, Bienprêter, La Première Brique), leaving the others far behind. Except there is a strong correlation between poor performance and falling inflows, while those with late payments have to spend their own money to chase the debts.