On 24 February 2022, at 5.53am, Vladimir Putin announces a “special military operation” in Ukraine. On trading floors, the Bloomberg screens turn red. Nobody knows it yet (or really wants to admit it), but it is the end of fourteen years of free money.
Along with the Russian tanks, inflation is back. 8.6% in the euro area in June. On 21 July, Christine Lagarde does what nobody really expected: the ECB raises rates by 50 basis points, its first hike since 2011. In the glass towers, a whole generation of professionals discovers what “tight monetary policy” means. They cut their teeth in a world where borrowing cost nothing. Some funds borrowed at 0.5% to buy buildings yielding 3%. The spread was so obvious it was almost suspicious.
But in the summer of 2022, nobody wants to see the wall. On the VC side, the same blindness. Tiger Global, the New York fund that was showering Europe with hundreds of millions, is still signing cheques until January. It puts €486M into Qonto at a $4.4bn valuation. Six months later, fintech valuations will have halved. Same story for Masteos, which closes a round to make investments on a production line, just as the market can only turn (in French).
Yet the signals were there. From May, property transaction volumes fall by 30%. Listed property companies don't lie: Unibail loses more than 30% between January and October. Klépierre falls by much the same. But in investment committees, unlisted assets are still valued at yesterday's prices. The line repeated on a loop: markets are overreacting.
It's an old rule of finance: liquid markets tell the truth before illiquid ones. But it's also an unpleasant truth when you manage billions in property assets valued at yesterday's prices. Which doesn't stop SCPIs, France's retail property funds, from deploying billions for months on buildings bought at sky-high prices, even though they are already no longer worth it. Except the money has already been raised: not putting it to work would cost returns dearly.
In early 2023, reality hits. Rates are at 3.5%. Business plans built on free money become obsolete. In property, prime Paris yields go from 2.75% to 4% in six months. Mathematically, that means a 30% drop in value. But nobody wants to be the first to put it in their accounts. Including developers and property dealers, who carry on with their projects as if nothing had happened.
Crowdfunding, that little miracle of financial disintermediation that had grown without a break since 2015, records its first decline in 2023. Money raised falls by 11.3% to €2bn. Since 2015, amounts had risen twelvefold. €9bn raised in total since the sector emerged. And then, splat. Property, the backbone of French crowdfunding, takes a dive.
Or almost. Because while EVERYBODY knows the sector is bound to collapse, nobody dares tell retail investors (mind you, all they had to do was read me). And platforms keep funding deal business plans that still assume zero interest rates.
Despite the relative decline, the market stays lively, partly thanks to renewable energy, like Lendosphere, which parades its €80M raised and a 7.12% return. But family offices and wealth advisers keep financing these assets sold as having a very limited risk profile, as if risk had magically vanished by changing sectors. All while giving the illusion that none of this is risky, since it's property, when almost all the borrowers are small businesses carrying property projects. Or some bigger ones, like Réalités, with the success we all know about.
At the end of the year, Mathilde Iclanzan of WiSeed4 mused that we would have to learn again to live with the interest rates that prevailed ten years earlier.
Except 2024 makes nothing better. Money raised falls again by 17.1%, to €1.7bn. The symbolic mark of €10bn raised since 2015 is passed, but what irony to celebrate it in free fall. Property crowdfunding keeps sinking: down 25.9%, now only 49.7% of the total raised against 68.2% in 2022. A spectacular collapse in two years.
Late payments jump by 30% at the end of March 2024. Investors run for the exit. Of the market's 60 platforms, some of the biggest throw in the towel and turn to more profitable businesses. A third remain profitable, including 10% that capture more than 50% of the money raised. The sector consolidates faster. The big eat the small, the small disappear.
All the more so because, while the property slump is glaring, since it is tracked by the KPIs set by Financement Participatif France, the French crowdfunding trade body (since absorbed by France Fintech, with no notable change), the figures completely ignore equity: nobody publishes those numbers, apart from the very rare deals that end well.
Despite a few faint signs of recovery, the platforms themselves start to crack. After Unilend in 2018, SmartAngels the same year and MyMajorCompany in 2016, October shuts its lending business in 2024 (while dressing it up as a pseudo exit), then WeShareBonds in December. Then comes the coup de grâce: Koregraf, a pioneer of French property crowdfunding since 2014, shuts up shop in April 2025 (in French). On 20 May, the Bordeaux commercial court orders its compulsory liquidation, with no continuation of business. The AMF, France's financial markets regulator, withdraws its licence on 30 June, officially sealing the platform's death. €160M outstanding, 198 live projects, thousands of investors chasing their dough. All within a shambolic business continuity plan that nobody understands. And that nobody had apparently prepared.
Even the biggest players are gasping for air. Some try to pivot: ClubFunding now focuses on structured products, dropping classic crowdfunding. Anaxago tried to distribute just about anything while looking for a buyer: talks reportedly dragged on with three potential candidates, (apparently) without result.
Others get bought on the quiet, trying to make people forget the failed takeover of Koregraf by InterInvet, like Enerfip, which is finalising the purchase of Lumo, the renewable energy platform of Société Générale. Or Lendosphere (123 IM), which bought Lendopolis when KissKissBankBank, a French crowdfunding platform, was broken up by La Banque Postale, the French postal bank.
Abroad, the picture is the same: The House Crowd in the UK, PledgeMusic, Ioby in the US, Crowdestate in Europe. All down.
After ten years of euphoria, crowdfunding discovers gravity. Platforms fall like dominoes. And everyone is going to have to learn to count again.