💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 04

Snapback to reality

In April 2025, a few days after Koregraf's failure, WiSEED throws a cat among the pigeons in a statement to its investors.

WiSEED explained that it had historically covered legal costs (lawyers, court officers, property seizure costs) and repaid itself from the sums recovered. […] From now on, for new projects offered on the platform from May 2025, a percentage of the amount raised would be set aside at the time of the raise to cover possible litigation, and for existing projects, WiSEED was introducing progressive calls for funds to finance the legal action to come.

No more free lunch.

Investors, already shaken by Koregraf's lunatic measures (covered here), are flabbergasted. It's all the more brutal because the discussions on the Discord where a few hundred crowdfunding investors gather show how far removed they are from reality, swinging between the idea that a few registered letters don't cost that much and the conviction that issuers know they must repay.

The reality is that debt recovery is a profession.

It isn't WiSEED's, nor that of its little friends. And they are learning it as best they can, while paying for it with money they no longer have.

Because at the same time, WiSEED hired an investment bank in December, which approached nearly 300 players of every kind, after six years of looking for a backer. The idea, at this stage, is to find a deal in bonis, while still solvent and while the company is still running properly, even at a knock-down price, according to someone close to the matter. Especially since the company was broadly profitable until 2023.

Results of WiSEED

Nearly twenty potential buyers come forward, and three LOIs (letters of intent) are submitted: two for a full takeover, one for the equity business only, which would put the property projects into run-off.

But a major sticking point quickly emerges.

Because in 2012, during a capital increase, WiSEED granted preference shares to Vincent Markus through his holding company FJ Investissement.

Extract from a general meeting of WiSEED

To put it simply, these preference shares give the shareholder, even a minority one, a right of veto, for a total outlay of around €300K according to several consistent sources. Even though he never set foot in the company, never got involved, never attended a general meeting and completely lost interest in his investment, the shareholder keeps his veto… in 2025.

While he isn't against selling, the valuation he asks for when approached looks insane: €2M for his 5%, which values WiSEED at €40M, 2 to 4 times the prices circulating for the platform, or for two other intermediaries going through a sale process at the time, with similar KPIs.

No negotiation will succeed. No mediator will make him budge. And yet WiSEED will soon run out of cash, and his investment could end up… at zero.

For WiSEED's management, the situation becomes untenable, since of course all the LOIs come with conditions precedent. In February, a court-appointed administrator is named as part of a conciliation, France's confidential pre-insolvency negotiation, finally opened on 1 August.

But to try to see the process through, WiSEED contacts its long-standing shareholders in September 2025 with another plan: a prepack cession, a pre-packaged sale. In other words, the company prepares a plan right now in case of subsequent safeguard, receivership or liquidation proceedings. The deadline for offers is set for 15 September.

At the same time, the call to the long-standing shareholders raises €700K in a capital increase, a bridge to give a possible LOI time to go through, with insolvency close at hand.

Email sent by the court-appointed administrator.
Note: the confidentiality required at the time no longer applies, since the conciliation has ended.

In the end, the outcome comes a few weeks later, in October. Several players seem interested, including a well-known investment firm (PSI) that ultimately drops out, and the recent buyer of a financial media outlet whose offer doesn't seem suitable. But negotiations focus on a regulated player well known to the AMF and the ACPR, which seems to be everyone's favourite.

Meanwhile, WiSEED declared itself insolvent to the commercial court on 25 September and asked to be placed in redressement judiciaire at the hearing on 7 October. In reality, WiSEED was unable to pay a loan instalment due on 1 September and now owes €777K, against just under €4M in total liabilities and only €150K in its accounts.

At the hearing, WiSEED went over its difficulties:

  • delays by property developers;
  • more resources needed to recover funds;
  • falling inflows;
  • fewer (and weaker) projects.

WiSEED wants to move fast and, unlike the public prosecutor, who wants to adjourn the case, the company knows it has no time, especially as it has not met its regulatory requirements since June 2025. The various parties all back the offer that looks the most credible.

Which led the court to grant the court-supervised restructuring yesterday.

Extract from the redressement judiciaire ruling of 20 October 2025

What next? It will be long, and probably painful once the buyer is officially announced in a few weeks.

  • All of WiSEED's investors (in the company, not in its projects) will lose their money, starting with the minority shareholder who entered an irrational war of principle with the founders;
  • Investors in the bridge, whose money is held in an escrow account, will be repaid;
  • WiSEED's managers will leave the company, after a handover period;
  • The buyer, if confirmed, will take over almost all the jobs, apart from two people who had said they wished to leave, as well as the remaining assets, in a new entity pooling everything that isn't regulated (sourcing, management, customer service, etc.);
  • While everything regulated, notably the licences, will stay in the WiSEED company until the buyer obtains its own from the AMF, which is fully up to speed on the matter.

At least we can be glad the platform isn't going into run-off, given how badly prepared these procedures are, and how catastrophic for investors.