💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 04

EraserCoin

Because a few months after Fire NFT launches, the FTX affair hits and the market collapses. The end of one crypto cycle among many. But as in every economic cycle, the biggest players come through and most of the small ones are left by the wayside. Even if Lora claims performance of “more than 10% a week at launch”.

By June 2022, six months after the fundraising, the NFT market dissolves and vanishes. The portfolio is down 60%, which sends the management fees up to 10%, since they are not indexed to net asset value. A little piece of madness that Noxavia had made its speciality (we’ll get back to that one before the end of the year too).

Of course, at the end of 2022, when BTC drops below $20K, dragging down with it ETH, where most NFTs live, it’s hard to say when and how it will recover. But nobody is really worried, either about BTC or about most of the big cryptos. On the other hand, apart from those who invested massively, everyone has understood that NFTs in the cartoon-ape sense, and similar delights, are finished. So much so that, in hindsight (and even at the time), you really have to wonder how anyone believed for a single second in the JPEG market.

Not that there’s no point in using the blockchain to record ownership. But because no collection has managed to keep the hype going for several years… And certainly not without a story or a use.

Right, I’m not going to retell the last three years of crypto, but to keep it simple: NFTs are worth nothing now. Fire NFT’s are no exception.

Because while the crypto market collapsed and partly recovered, the same can’t really be said of the NFT market. Nor, more broadly, of Fire NFT’s investments, including an NFT by Ludovic Baron, a photographer whose media fame flickered briefly around 2021-2022.

The Fire NFT team tries to reassure by rebalancing, then reinvesting in other cryptos, including a few shitcoins. Notably the famous Pepe.

But between the community spirit replaced by an all-powerful manager, the lack of clear reporting and performance in free fall, trust evaporates and investors go on the offensive. Especially as Niksic fairly soon leaves the project for personal reasons. Yet Lora closes ranks and defends his fees:

Having read the feedback, and an approach that goes against the project’s spirit (community, moving forward together, supporting each other), they have decided, he writes, to stay at 4% fees for the project, which he says is justified.

So 4% on the money raised. And still not on the NAV13, which is showing -60%. Which actually takes the management fees to 10% a year. Even though performance is disastrous.

Looking back, Lora stands by his strategy.

For him, he says, it was either x0 or x30. But since he isn’t the majority holder, he couldn’t decide.

Reading between the lines, Lora explains to me that this limp half-hearted management prevented a rebound and the pursuit of more performance. As for the transparency and decentralisation promised for months, they drown in a murky dispute between the partners.

Indeed, questioned several times about the fees, the exact investments and the performance, Lora is very evasive. Pressed by the investor community, he makes do with a table that opens by announcing what they are able to tell them.

Because off the record, the partners have apparently signed a financial deal with a non-aggression pact, which Lora half-heartedly confirms. But which the investors will never hear about.

Still, in 2024, Fire NFT goes all in on the DAO project Tapioca, yet another microcap whose investors understand nothing about the project (and couldn’t care less), and simply hope it will one day land on a small DEX14 and some time later on a big CEX15, so they can gorge on the gains.

Except that in October 2024, Tapioca suffers a $4.4M hack16, and the €153K invested by Fire NFT are said to be lost. For the record, the problem came from a stablecoin (whose problems I explained here (in French)), USDO, whose smart contract was hijacked. The hackers minted 5 quintillion (yes, really) USDO, which let them attack liquidity pools. According to several investigations, Tapioca had in fact been attacked several times before, notably by Lazarus, the North Korea-linked hacking group.

But the Fire NFT managers remain confident, even though the token is worth nothing. Then again, they never really had much. Because Fire NFT never bought tokens, only a right to claim tokens.

In June 2025, Tapioca’s founders say they’ll be back. Nothing. Same in September. Then they promise December. So Fire NFT launches the great clearance sale.

On 7 September 2025, Lora drops the deal on the 20K subscribers of his newsletter Fire France. In between his new courses, he auctions off what is left of Fire NFT on a Google Doc.

In the end, the Baron NFT goes for €1K and the Tapioca position for €4K. Enough for a transfer of €19.94 per €10K invested. On top of a payout of €7.4K per €10K invested in January 2025.

A 25% loss, then.

On €3.8M raised + €200K from Lora, that makes a €1M loss.
Of which just under €500K in management fees alone.
Or nearly 17% of the amount returned.

Money is neither created nor destroyed.
It just changes hands.