💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 03

The Owls Are Not What They Seem

At the end of 2021, Lora uses his image and the crowdfunding boom to open several investment opportunities, teaming up with various people:

  • Fire NFT, meant to invest in crypto and NFTs, as the name suggests, with:
    Aloïs Jaboulet-Vercherre, then 23, co-founder of NFT France, a short-lived media outlet of sorts, who describes himself as an investor for €12K10;
    Martin Boulanger, who talks at length about his M&A expertise in conversations with investors;
    Nikola Niksic, described as an NFT expert.
  • Fire Invest, meant to take stakes in companies, set up with Martin Boulanger, to whom he leaves 49% of the capital, at the start of 2022.

In all these structures, Martin Boulanger is a corporate officer, but he is a shareholder only in Fire Invest.

To round up investors, Fire NFT goes for aggressive marketing, quite far from Lora’s original positioning, in a booming market.

The message says they are having a lot of success, really a lot, so much that they will have to select profiles because of regulatory constraints, and that the first to sign up will get access to the opportunity.

The usual FOMO11 marketing. In January 2022, as Fire NFT’s fundraising nears its close, he writes to an investor:

He says they have €17M in pledges but unfortunately cannot take the full €17M: first so that they can deliver the best performance, and second because they are limited, not yet being a fund but simply a structure for investing together.

A few days later, Fire NFT closes its €4M round with 313 investors, with a three-year investment horizon that can be extended by two years in the interest of all subscribers.

Nobody raises any regulatory issue, but the fees still raise several questions. Because by investing a minimum of €10K, investors accept carried interest of 35%, meaning a cut of the gains, but also fees of 4%… a year. That’s €160K a year, so €480K over the investment horizon, or 12% of the amount invested.

Asked about it, the Fire NFT team says the 4% is not meant to pay the manager a salary, but only to fund the structure.

Which makes no sense at all.

Because structuring fees are paid upfront. On a fund, they usually run between 5 and 10%, and they pay for distribution, lawyers, compliance and so on. Annual fees, on the other hand, pay for work done. They can be charged on the income generated, as in an SCPI (a French non-listed property fund), or on the value of the portfolio, as in private equity.

Except that the Fire NFT contract couldn’t be clearer.

  • These are clearly management fees, not structuring fees;
  • The fees are calculated not on the value of the asset but on the amount subscribed.

In plain English: 12% in fees whatever happens.

As for the investors, they will have to make do with the trust they place in the managers (that’s what the Fire NFT team calls itself) who are about to pocket their money. Because what they sign is neither a bond contract nor shares in an SPV, but a royalty contract, an instrument the AMF would decide to restrict heavily in December 2022, notably after the affairs surrounding Bricks, a French fractional property platform12.

That trust looks fragile from the outset, too. According to my information, Jaboulet-Vercherre and Niksic were paid €45K on invoice in the first year. Niksic quickly left the project in March 2023, but Jaboulet-Vercherre is still involved.

So what happened to the half-million in management fees? Like all of Lora’s companies, Fire NFT has never filed its accounts. So the mystery remains complete. Or at the very least murky.