💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 04

The Grand Illusion

It is against this backdrop that Lenoël arrives in June 2017, with Bernard Baret, another property veteran who had worked alongside Lenoël at BNP, where he was in charge of property from 1982 to 2007, before moving to SoGé AM, Société Générale’s asset management arm, then Amundi and Advenis. Their mission is clear: build a real estate division from scratch, able to generate cash quickly and give a second wind to this coughing machine.

The timing is perfect. French property is enjoying a bright spell, rates are still low, and investors are desperately looking for alternatives to traditional savings. Lenoël and Baret arrive with an ambitious plan: reach €500M of AUM by 2020 for Apicap’s new business.

Lenoël wastes no time. In December 2017, six months after arriving, he launches his first professional private-equity fund, of €20M: a collective vehicle dedicated to “Opportunités Immobilières Dynamiques” [Dynamic Property Opportunities]. The name alone is worth its weight in corporate PowerPoint. The promise? Farm-to-table property, that magic formula suggesting you will cut out the middlemen and their juicy commissions and go straight for the goal: creating value, fast.

At Apicap, Lenoël builds his little property team. Two or three analysts, a dedicated committee. Talk turns to urban logistics and the conversion of office assets. Headcount stays thin but the ambitions are boundless. Still, the man has a network, no doubt about it. The private investors he brings in his luggage push up the assets under management. In 2018, the OPPCI (an OPCI reserved for professional investors) Apicap Euro Property Fund is born, aimed this time at institutions. The stated ambition turns heads: €1bn of property investment in 5 years.

The Lenoël method? Property club deals sold with a commercial aggressiveness that is still remembered by those who were pitched them. His teams scour the big M&A deals, where there are premiums, carried interest and juicy bonuses. They turn up with their tax-reducing products, their 150-0 B ter funds (named after a French tax rule that lets business sellers defer capital gains tax by reinvesting the proceeds), their promises of fabulous returns. A managing partner at a big Paris M&A firm still talks about it today, bitterly.

They bought badly and they paid too much, he says. Many lost money.

The rout was so brutal that some professional investors still refuse to hear the words property club deal.

To finance this headlong rush into property, Apicap needs cash. Because the debt from the 2015 LBO now has to be repaid. Which is why, in September 2019, the company sacrifices its cash cow: the five Corse Croissance FIPs (Apicap Corse Croissance 1 to 5), worth €50M of AUM. Yet these funds generated recurring fees, steady cash: the lifeblood of a fund manager. Apicap and Lescure knock on every door, including Doré’s, but in the end Vatel Capital wins for €4M, cementing its lead in Corsica with €150M managed on the island. Apicap has just sold the family silver to pay its debts, while staking its future on Lenoël’s property mirages. And Vatel, incidentally, has been persona non grata on the island ever since15.

Between 2018 and 2020, Lenoël multiplies investment vehicles like a conjuror pulling rabbits out of a hat. The Apicap Valo companies pile up: Valo 1, Valo 2, all the way to Valo 5. Each dedicated to a specific deal, each raising millions with disconcerting ease. Investors queue up to place their money, even while the whole world holds its breath over Covid, as with Valo 5, which raises €10M during that period.

The miracle works, at least on the surface. On 31 December 2020, the official figures reveal the reality of the mirage. Apicap now manages only €64.4M in its 27 legacy AIFs (alternative investment funds). Alongside them, the five Apicap Valo property structures, Lenoël’s babies, capture most of the attention and of the new money. Property’s share of total assets explodes, and in 2022 it represents more than half of assets under management. Lenoël has won his bet: turning an ageing SME-focused fund manager into a property player that counts. At least on the surface.

Because the numbers tell another story. In 2017, when Lenoël arrives, Apicap posts €11M of revenue and nearly €500K of EBIT. Five years later, in 2022, despite all the Valo vehicles and the promises of exponential growth, the company generates only €8M of revenue and less than €100K of EBIT. A methodical slide, year after year. Lenoël’s property business did not save Apicap: it masked its death throes.

Because behind this success story lies a less shiny reality. While Lenoël builds, Apicap’s foundations are cracking. The management of the old SME funds racks up failings. Valuations are approximate, conflicts of interest poorly handled, monitoring of holdings deficient. The AMF starts sniffing around in 2020 and launches an in-depth inspection that will last two years.

Because the legacy inherited from OTC, which nobody is steering any more, is literally poisoning the structure. Take OTC Entreprises 4, the time bomb mentioned earlier, which should have been wound up in 2018, ten years after its creation. A negative net asset value for several years, unsellable holdings, successive extensions granted by the AMF. At the end of 2019, Esnault has to write to clients to explain the inexplicable: Apicap paid out €6.80 per unit… without having the cash. An overpayment of €1.30 per unit, or more than €3M16, the equivalent of Apicap’s equity. The company prefers to absorb the error rather than claw it back from unitholders, freezes all redemptions, and goes to war with Crédit Mutuel, the depositary, and its outside service providers. In the end, the insurance excess will limit the damage to €100K, but the image is disastrous. In the autumn of 2020, a dozen of these zombie tax funds are still waiting to be wound up, toxic relics of Lescure’s vision of marrying OTC Agregator and Ardens.