💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 05

’Tis the final purge…

May 2023. The axe falls. The AMF fines Apicap €400K, Alain Esnault €50K and his predecessor Jérôme Lescure €25K. The charges are damning and reveal the scale of the disaster, but above all they tell a sordid story. The most serious: the charging of undue management fees estimated at €1.256M. Apicap had changed the calculation method on several funds (OTC Entreprises, Chorus, Duo), taking fees on artificially inflated interim net asset values. 15,000 unitholders harmed, who paid unjustified fees for years.

The timing is no accident. These undue charges coincide exactly with the period when Apicap had to repay the debt from the 2015 LBO. The company was already short of equity in 2018 and 2020. When the AMF inspection starts in early 2021, panic sets in: Apicap has to recapitalise to the tune of €1.7M in June 2021 to avoid insolvency. The €1.5M of wrongly charged fees? They went to repay the LBO, not to invest in SMEs. The depositary, BECM Strasbourg, saw these transactions go through, as did the outside compliance officer (Agama Conseil), but only the executives are sanctioned. The AMF also finds an equity shortfall of nearly €1M, regulatory ratios breached on numerous occasions, the firm’s own funds placed in insufficiently liquid assets, and a defective anti-money-laundering procedure with no risk map at all.

EDIT 18 November 2025, 12:15: mention of Agama removed. The firm points out
that, while AGAMA may have carried out delegated compliance work in the company’s final period, it was not involved at the time of the alleged facts and was not in charge of controls.
Its assignment, it adds, began in mid-2020, just before the AMF inspectors arrived, notably to help put things straight and keep watch over the identified risks.

The defence had cried foul, speaking of unfair manoeuvres, pressure from the AMF’s staff and forced self-incrimination. It asked for an administrative settlement, the AMF’s negotiated out-of-court procedure. To no avail. The representative of the AMF’s board had initially sought a €1.6M fine, a penalty that would wipe the firm out, according to the defence lawyer, who predicted 20 employees out of work, 7,000 clients left to fend for themselves and insolvency. She was right on every count. The final penalty, cut to €400K to take account of the company’s fragility, merely delayed the inevitable. It is the first public sanction of this size for Apicap. The veneer is cracking.

Lenoël, who is not directly targeted by the sanction (he was not a corporate officer, and arrived after the most problematic events), nevertheless sees his house of cards wobble. Investors take fright. Assets under management drop from €700M to €400M in a few months. Trust, that intangible but essential asset in fund management, evaporates like water on a hotplate.

October 2023. Apicap is placed in court-supervised receivership. The company that promised the earth finds itself insolvent. But the saga doesn’t end there. A sale plan is approved for the holding company Apicap Group (formerly Douz’Capital). The buyer? Altex, an accounting firm from the Gard, in southern France, based in Caveirac, which wants to diversify into asset management. Benoît Forestier, managing partner of Altex, orchestrates the deal: a €3M capital increase to take 100% of Apicap.

Behind this rout stands a surprising figure: Henri Gagnaire, a graduate of the École polytechnique, majority shareholder of Financière A with 68% of the capital. His partner Karima Issaad holds 46% of Apicap thanks to a gift from him. A set-up oddly reminiscent of the CITI Technologies affair of 2011, in which Gagnaire already featured17. That engineering company had raised money from Tocqueville Investissements Privés and Backbone-Agregator Capital before collapsing into receivership a year later. The Paradise Papers would reveal in 2017 that Gagnaire owned a Maltese company, Daladim Investments Ltd, capitalised at €6M.

Altex arrives with big ambitions. Pierre-Alban Texier, the chairman, talks of enriching the quality of its financial services offering18. Forestier speaks of SME bosses facing loneliness, who need support as they grow. The Gard group (€66M of revenue and €8M of EBITDA in 2023) believes it can save Apicap. An amusing twist, given that Altex is exactly the kind of provincial firm Apicap would have targeted to place its tax-reducing funds. The hunter becomes the prey.

This is the moment Lenoël chooses to leave the ship. In February 2024, he quietly resigns as chairman of Apicap Développement. But before the dust has even settled on the ruins of Apicap, he launches Santareim with Olivier Coustet, signing the articles of association while he has not yet officially left Apicap. New management company, new AMF licence, new promise: this time, it will be niche hotels.

In the end, Apicap will limp on until a court orders its liquidation in June 2025, followed by the withdrawal of its licence last August. Meanwhile, we learn that Apicap Valo 5 (the miracle fundraising of 2020) had already been insolvent since April 2024. The property deal had turned into a nightmare well before the final collapse.

Apicap’s 35,000 clients, for their part, are left with orphaned funds, hastily transferred to other managers or painfully wound up. Staff lost their jobs. Creditors are still waiting. And then there is the collateral damage, far from Paris. In Réunion, where Apicap had invested in some thirty local companies through the regional council’s Essor PME scheme, there is dismay. Green Skin, a specialist in green façades, finds itself stranded midstream, as its boss Stéphane Boudrandi puts it. Exsel, Hub 2, Crowdaa, Océinde Thermodynamics: so many companies discovering that they have, in a local boss’s blunt phrase, “a dead body” on their cap table.

Apicap’s epilogue is also the story of regulation that always arrives too late. The AMF sanctions in 2023 practices that had been going on for years. It withdraws the licence in August 2025, when there is nothing left to save. On 4 July, the AMF’s board notes that Apicap no longer met the conditions of its licence as a portfolio management company. The administrative coup de grâce. The withdrawal will only take effect on 31 December 2025, time enough to transfer the remaining AIFs to other managers who have volunteered, a word that says it all about the enthusiasm for taking over this toxic legacy.

But the managers at the controls are, as always, already doing business elsewhere.