💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 03

A rising yield lifts all boats

When an investor buys a property, they want to make money. But in reality that notion is fairly vague, because depending on the period, you don’t make money with the same level of risk.

Let’s take a simple example. In 2020, I invest in a studio flat in an average town, with average demand and average risk. Those terms are vague, but in reality there’s no absolute way to pin them down. So, arbitrarily, let’s say the risk is 5/10. And for that, the market reckons it needs to be paid 5% to take on that risk. In Saint-Étienne, on the other hand, it’s closer to 10%, because vacancy is high, and so is unemployment, etc.

So I have the choice between a Livret A, France’s state-regulated savings account, at 0.5% with a risk of 0/10, and a flat at 5% with a risk of 5/10. My 5 levels of risk are therefore paid 4.5% (5-0.5): that’s the risk premium (which I’ve already talked about here, here and here (in French)).

When the Livret A (or, more broadly, any guaranteed investment) reaches 3%, my risk premium shrinks dramatically. My 5/10 is now only paid 2%. That’s why in commercial property, when rates rise and the guaranteed return goes up with them, prices fall: it keeps the yield stable.

It’s also why, for years, plenty of people selling SCPIs, French property funds sold to retail savers, lied by saying rents were indexed to inflation. It’s partly true, but we’ve clearly seen that when inflation was high, it wasn’t the case. Same in residential property, where landlords couldn’t keep up with inflation even as defaults were rising.

Except that those same (private) landlords, when selling, refused to sell for less so as not to lose money, because they’ve been told for decades that property only ever goes up. All the more so as struggling estate agents, facing more and more competition in a market where the number of transactions is falling back to its 20-year average, fought to win listings, even if it meant overvaluing properties to please sellers, who will therefore never sell.

That reminds me of a conversation with an agent I’d made an offer to. His answer: oh no, it’s clearly not worth that, and obviously if he listed it at that price, it would go straight away. Right, so it is worth that, then.

Because on the other side, buyers have a constraint of their own: their monthly repayment.

  • Over 20 years, at 1%, I borrow €220K;
  • At 3%, either I pay €1,220 a month, or I borrow €180K.

So whatever happens, higher rates SHOULD bring prices down in an efficient market. Except that in reality, the market never really is. And in this case, for three main reasons:

  • The situation is temporary, and as many people as possible are gritting their teeth and waiting for the right moment (which can’t last forever);
  • The rental stock is too tight in most big cities (despite France’s 2M empty homes);
  • Landlords find ways to increase their income and so stabilise the yield (higher rents, house shares, short lets, etc.).

The problem is that selling an occupied property, even more so if it’s occupied by a tenant on a controlled rent, knocks 27% off the price, both because it’s sometimes hard to evict a tenant, because it means lost income, and because most buyers want to live in it.7

To sort out this mess, there actually aren’t many long-term solutions:

  • Boost supply by enlarging the rental stock;
  • Get people to move to where rental housing is available.

But since no government is capable of thinking ahead to a real regional policy, and each one only thinks about the next election, it’s half-measures that get rolled out every time.

In principle, the role of housing policy is to provide people with affordable, decent and sustainable housing, according to a commonly accepted definition.8 To do that, states have quite a few tools at their disposal.

In France, the most common one is to boost sales… by throwing subsidies in every direction: cuts to property transfer taxes, to VAT, interest-free loans for first-time buyers, etc. Except that every single study shows that it’s crap. It ONLY pushes up margins and prices, and it has not the SLIGHTEST impact on households. The less targeted a subsidy, the more people it covers and the less useful it is. That’s very true for VAT and, inevitably to a lesser extent, for housing benefit (I talked about it here).

Finally, there’s one radical solution left when a market won’t do what you want it to: force it to. In other words, control rents.