Because, as the reports say, French savings add up to €6,000bn. And there isn’t a single strategy slide from an asset manager or fintech pitch deck that fails to mention this figure, which has everyone dreaming.
Especially when you look in detail at what it is made of14:
Breakdown of financial investments
Flows in billions, Q4 2024
To sum up:
So it is plain that the players in the room account for a minority of these investments, and that a big chunk of savings could still be steered towards other products. Higher-yielding ones. For the client, perhaps. For managers and intermediaries, above all.
The problem is that this, broadly, is the report’s starting point. And it may explain why the MPs missed the point so badly.
In the first part, they spend some twenty pages explaining the difference between the various regulated savings products, because, indeed, there are 618 of them! Each working differently, with different ceilings, guarantees and so on.
In it, they explain in particular that distributing them does not pay the banks enough, notably when interest rates are low, while adding that they were not convinced that banks should be paid more.
And they conclude that we need to:
The problem is that in all the history the rapporteurs give of these regulated products, they never explain why they are in this state. Worse: they haven’t understood it.
Because the philosophy behind these regulated savings is twofold:
And this misunderstanding is summed up in 2 recommendations:
The problem is that the rate broadly protects against inflation, in normal times, thanks to a formula (which I explained here (in French)), which was not respected (I wrote about it here (in French)) and which cost the French €74bn in 4 years. According to my information, the two rapporteurs did ask about it, notably of the Banque de France, which stayed very vague about why the formula had been changed, at savers’ expense.
But not a single question on the exemptions that led Bercy, the French finance ministry, to set a lower rate than the one the formula gave at the time. According to someone close to the authors… the issue was not even raised.
And yet the answer was sitting in the panel of guests, since according to a senior civil servant who asked to remain anonymous, the idea was put forward by the FFB before being taken up by the authorities. On several occasions, I asked the ACPR, the Banque de France and Bercy, as the law obliges them19, to send me the communications between the banks’ lobby and the administration. Every single request went unanswered by the administrations’ CADA20. Which is an offence, incidentally.
Because in reality, had the law been applied, the Livret A would broadly have kept pace with inflation.
As for how the money is used, the rapporteurs explain that the problem is that it is supposedly badly used by the Fonds d’épargne (the Savings Fund run by the Caisse des Dépôts, the French state-owned financial institution, which receives part of the money held in these accounts), which they say finances assets with no return, whereas the CAC 40 has supposedly returned 13% a year since 1990.
Exclamation mark, again.
According to my information, this figure was whispered by one of the speakers, and you hear it regularly, even though it is wrong. And problematic.
Wrong. Because an average real return, as the phrase goes, doesn’t mean much. And according to France Inflation, the figure is rather between 5.5% and 8.8%, depending on how you calculate it.
CAC 40 performance since its creation, France Inflation
13% looks more like the average of annual returns.
And average is the whole point.
Problematic, because average is the whole point. Otherwise it shows a serious misunderstanding of markets, on the one hand, and of managing a guaranteed product, on the other. Had the Savings Fund bet everything on the CAC 40, it could indeed have paid out big returns, but how do you guarantee liquidity and capital in 2008 when the CAC posts -43%, or in 2022 when it posts -10%?
Had they listened a little more to the AMF, France’s financial markets regulator, the rapporteurs would have learned that return goes hand in hand with risk. And that the Savings Fund therefore cannot deliver 13% (or even 8%) while staying liquid and risk-free. That is not what it is asked to do.
What’s more, the reports never once get to the fund-amentals of the issue:
Still, concluding that the Savings Fund should invest like a private manager while guaranteeing against inflation makes no sense.
Nonsense, mind you, that doesn’t really serve the interests of the finance pros. Unlike what comes next.