And inevitably, whenever the talk turns to dipping into household savings, there is one term nobody has been able to escape for the past 2 years: private equity.
This story, too, got off to a heavy start, in the Senate Finance Committee in 2023, during the vote on the Green Industry Act. At first reading, senators Christine Lavarde (LR) and Paoli-Gagin (Horizons) got amendments24 to article 17 adopted, making it compulsory to include unlisted assets in the PER, France’s retirement savings plan. According to my information, corroborated by a senator’s aide, the amendment came out of a discussion between several senators and MPs and the AFG. The change was so minor that it was not even debated. According to the same aide, most of those speaking in committee did not even grasp what lay behind this small change, which was supposed to finance the real economy. Although the law was enacted at the end of 2023, it took until summer 2024 for the ministerial implementing order25 of what had become article 35 to oblige savers to invest part of their contributions in unlisted assets, including PE26. And October 2024 before everyone really started talking about it. Roughly27, it looks like this:
The big difference is that a euro fund costs 0.5-1.5% in fees, while a UC can climb to 2%, PE easily reaches 2.5%, and entry fees are rarely free.
The other side effect is that the term is vague. And just as with 150-0 B ter, a French tax-deferral scheme, you end up finding just about anything eligible. Including property PE. That is how we are now witnessing a PE fund set up by one of France’s biggest managers, which will buy struggling assets from one of its other property funds (and provide a bit of liquidity, no doubt). And these toxic assets nobody wants will end up at the bottom of the barrel, in the PERs of retail investors who never asked for any of it…
Because managers and insurers were asked to do private equity. Not to do it well.
All because, and it is yet another figure doing the rounds on slides, PE delivers 13 to 14% a year on average. El famoso on average. Because a little after the story came out, I analysed several hundred FCPIs (in French), France’s tax-advantaged innovation funds, and found absolutely dreadful statistics for these vehicles, whose performance rests solely on the tax break. Not to mention the countless equity crowdfunding platforms that all advertise these same figures, when according to early estimates, based on 30 to 60% of the ongoing or completed deals on the platforms, average performance is negative for a large majority of players.
And according to a National Assembly staffer, much the same happened with this report. The professionals insisted heavily, notably to Tanguy, that the poorest never invested in shares, and that you had to wait until the 6th decile28 for them to exceed 15% of wealth. Which leads him to write, without ever explaining the problem with averages, or the fact that, as the AMF says, past performance is no guide to future performance:
That in the long run, shares are therefore the most profitable investment.
Reasoning he carries over to PE:
That French households’ access to private equity products is held back by several factors, first among them a general lack of knowledge of this asset class and how it works technically, and the high minimum investment required to get in.
Without the slightest mention of any figure on FCPIs (neither on performance nor on costs), and still less on all the equity crowdfunding platforms that have (by their own account) democratised access to the asset class.
And so the conclusion is to stuff PE into every life insurance policy. And Bob’s your uncle.