💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 03

Plenty of conflicts, one interest

I’ve often talked about the problem of CGPs, France’s independent wealth advisers, who are paid through retrocessions from fund managers (a share of the fees passed back to them). They are the ones who massively sold Pinel buy-to-let tax-break schemes that were never profitable, or the SCPIs that collapsed, because these are packaged products, easy to sell, on which they take a big commission for little work. When, contrary to what I’ve often been told, anyone willing to spend a few hours on it could predict in 2021 or 2022 which SCPIs were going to collapse.
But who had an interest in doing so? Not the managers, and not the CGPs, who are paid… on the money raised.

The reality nobody wanted to see is that the managers raised far, far, far too much. Because once you’ve got the dosh you have to spend it (in the trade, we call that deploying), otherwise… it costs you.

💡 Let’s say I have a fund worth €100, yielding 10% a year, so €10, with 10 investors.
Every year, I give 1 to each, easy.
The following year, I raise €20 from 20 investors.
I now have a fund worth €120.

I find a great investment at 10%, like the others, for €10.
I still have the €10 I had before, and my new investment brings in €1 more.
So I have €11 to distribute.
That’s a yield of 9.2%.

Because I didn’t deploy the €10 I raised, my headline yield has fallen, even though the quality of my fund hasn’t changed.

That’s what happened between 2018 and 2022 with SCPIs: the managers spent any old how, sometimes competing against each other for assets worth tens or even hundreds of millions, and they spent big and paid dear.

Well, crowdfunding is the same.

Between 2017 and 2020, the market is doing well. There aren’t many lenders, but there are lots of deals needing finance. So the platforms get to pick the deals. But over time, the market grew bigger and bigger, and the platforms raised more and more. Even as the property market was overheating for the same reasons as SCPIs, partly thanks to very, very low interest rates.

That particular point should have set alarm bells ringing for the most rational.

Why, when everyone was borrowing at between 0.5% and 3%, would property professionals come to crowdfunding to pay 10, 12, 14 or even 15%?

Quite simply because these were the most fragile, riskiest deals… the ones the banks didn’t want. Which isn’t abnormal: a return is always proportional to the risk. Except that this risk was massively played down, notably by passing these investments off as property investments, with everything everyone imagines that means.

But also by making the risks disappear altogether. Even today. Even after all this. Even in this context, you still find platforms that knowingly leave out the risks, or hide them very far from investors’ eyes.

Which, by the way, isn’t specific to crowdfunding: playing down (or leaving out) the risks is a constant among small players, I wrote a dedicated newsletter about that too (in French).

Baltis talks about a 12% return, about securing your money, further down about an attractive return, and even displays an average return of 10.7% and then a 0% default rate, without ever mentioning the risks. Like many others, you have to go aaaaall the way down to the bottom of the page, in the footer, to read unreadable lines that nobody will ever read.

Same at La Première Brique, which sticks it all in the footer

Even Bricks, which was nonetheless one of the most aggressive platforms in its marketing, has toned it down (and I’m pleased to have had something to do with it 😅)

Granted, it’s not 100% in line with the AMF’s position, which would like risks to flash and make noise, but it’s consistent in spirit.

Same at Homunity:

Add to that media outlets that are very cosy with the system, and you end up with savers who never understood what they were investing in, not much helped by the regulatory status the regulator put in place.