Because in reality, the very principle of crowdfunding is problematic. At least the way it was designed, and the regulators bear a serious responsibility, because they designed a system in defiance of common sense.
As we’ve seen, the platforms are paid on the amounts raised, by the borrowers. The savers, for their part, don’t pay. And as the saying goes:
If it’s free, you’re the product.
And yet a client costs a platform money. On average, the acquisition cost is between €25 and €75 in marketing spend2 to get a client to start investing. Then add salaries, the cost of KYC checks and so on. If these clients pay nothing, there’s clearly a catch… Except this isn’t one catch, it’s the whole net.
To see it, you only need to ask one question. Just one.
Why turn down a bad deal that will earn me x euros if I’m able to fund it?
Because in fact, every platform knows how much it can raise, and how fast. Especially since a small ecosystem of influencers (the biggest of whom earn between €250K and €500K in commissions a year) relentlessly promote the deals with more or less in-depth analyses, which you only need to reread after the fact to see they made no sense.
To put it simply, the regulatory path (which I’ve already told here (in French)) ended with everyone having to take PSFP status (the French name for the European crowdfunding service provider licence, ECSP), and use bonds to finance projects.
When Bricks moved from royalties to bonds, some strange discussions took place in the community. The truth is that nobody had understood the old model, and nobody understood the new one. I even saw a message saying that, from now on, Bricks was bound to repay. Well, yes: it’s a bond.
Obviously, if you read Zero Bullshit, that makes you smile because you know the subject. But for the vast majority of people, it’s actually pretty hazy. And the consequences for the model itself are quite profound.
Let’s start with the basics. A bond issue is a financial mechanism through which a company borrows directly from investors, by issuing debt securities (the bonds) that will be repaid at maturity with interest. It is nothing more and nothing less than a loan formalised as a tradable security.
So far, so good.
But there is a central element in this system: the bondholders’ representative (in French law, the representative of the “masse”, the body of bondholders). This legal figure, provided for by the French Commercial Code3, is responsible for defending the bondholders’ collective interests. He is the one who monitors whether the issuer keeps its commitments, runs the bondholders’ general meetings, and can take legal action in the event of default.
In the traditional world, this representative is an independent player: a specialist law firm or an external management company. Their independence is the very guarantee of their protective role.
But bond crowdfunding turned this usual logic upside down, since the platform licensed as a PSFP combines three roles that are normally separate:
And the conflict of interest is enormous. Not only because it is paid by the issuer of the bond it sells, but because it represents the investors before that very issuer that paid it. In a dispute, notably over a failure to disclose information, the investor will have to go through... the platform itself to assert their rights against that same platform.
To understand the scale of the problem, let’s look at a recent case that has just set a precedent. CAPSSA4 had invested in bonds issued by the company HA UN 18, a 100%-owned subsidiary of HEM. After investing, CAPSSA found that the information initially provided had significant gaps and decided to sue the parent company HEM directly for failing to provide pre-contractual information.
The Versailles Court of Appeal5 declared CAPSSA’s action inadmissible, holding that it concerned an interest common to all the bondholders. Under the law6, only the bondholders’ representative can act to defend that common interest. This position was fully upheld by the Cour de cassation, France’s highest court for civil and criminal matters, at the end of 20247, definitively confirming that an individual investor cannot act alone over a general failure to inform.
In short: even if the harm is individual, the case law considers that an initial failure to inform necessarily affects the bondholders’ common interests, preventing you from acting alone. The Court stressed that as soon as the fault is common (because the information is identical for everyone), the action becomes collective, even if individual losses may vary. So an investor cannot bring an action on their own:
This case law makes it clear that as soon as a failure to inform potentially concerns all the bondholders, defending their interests must be done collectively.
If the CAPSSA vs HEM case illustrates the dead end of individual action against the intermediary, a recent ruling by the Paris Court of Appeal8 sheds even more light on the problem by clearly setting out the nature and legal limits of the bondholders’ representative’s obligations.
In that case, a private investor had lost nearly €2M in risky bond investments incompatible with his initial risk profile. He then sued several parties, including the bondholders’ representative, Absolute Capital Partners.
The Paris Court of Appeal then set out, in a particularly instructive way, the legal obligations of the bondholders’ representative:
In substance, the Court held that these provisions place no duty to inform or advise on the bondholders’ representative; that the representative cannot be given more obligations than the holders of the securities he represents; and that, in any case, he is forbidden from interfering in the management of the company.
In plain English:
The Paris Court of Appeal therefore explicitly rejected the claim against the representative Absolute Capital Partners, clearly confirming that he has no duty to inform or advise.
This ruling is extremely important, because it shows concretely why any action against a platform acting as bondholders’ representative in bond crowdfunding would be doomed to fail:
There are nevertheless situations where the breach is so flagrant that the courts step in directly, as the Paris Court of Appeal reminded us in 20249, in a case involving Ayomi, a CIP intermediary10 specialising in equity crowdfunding.
In that case, two investors had invested through the platform. Ayomi was responsible for organising an equity fundraising through a holding company. But it seriously failed in its obligations by transferring the funds raised directly to the company being financed, without following the required legal procedure beforehand11.
The result: the capital increase could never be legally completed, leaving the investors without shares and without adequate legal protection.
Faced with this obvious breach, the Paris Court of Appeal left no doubt about Ayomi’s liability:
The Court found it established, with the clarity required in summary proceedings, that Ayomi was liable to the investors, who were entitled to claim repayment from those holding the funds, since the capital increase had not been completed within six months. It noted that Ayomi had set up the escrow account to receive the funds, then released them without the prior certificate of deposit of funds required by law, which it never obtained, even though it had undertaken to carry out every legal formality until the end of the operation.
In plain English, the Court:
Although Ayomi is not a bond platform (and its website doesn’t let you work out what its legal framework is), this ruling sheds light on exactly what is missing from the current legal framework for bond crowdfunding: a clear, explicit obligation, directly enforceable against PSFP platforms, to rigorously follow the legal procedures for issuing bonds and safeguarding the funds raised, with immediate legal consequences in the event of a breach.
So if bond crowdfunding adopted a legal logic similar to the one clearly established by the Ayomi ruling for equity crowdfunding, investors would at last have a genuinely effective legal lever against platforms that fail in their fundamental obligations of security and transparency. As is clearly the case in several funded deals, where money was sent without signed guarantees or without checking that the projects were real.