Granted, the CAPSSA vs HEM case was not directly linked to a crowdfunding platform. But the case law set by the Cour de cassation would apply directly to these platforms, exposing a big structural problem, because in the case of a PSFP player:
So to act against the issuer for failure to provide pre-contractual information, or even against the platform that selected the project and prepared the documents shown to investors, you have to go through... the platform itself.
This case law tends to give the platforms broad protection:
This legal combination creates a genuine “lock”, making the representative almost untouchable in the event of an initial breach, even if the Ayomi case is a reminder that the most serious breaches can be punished.
It’s no accident, in fact, that in the classic bond system the bondholders’ representative is usually an independent body: a specialist law firm or an external management company. Its sole role is to protect the bondholders’ interests. As a lawyer specialising in financial law recently explained to me.
Independence, he told me, is the very foundation of the bond system, and without it the whole chain of trust collapses.
Yet it is precisely this independence that was sacrificed on the altar of crowdfunding. In the name of simplification, and probably of cost savings, we created a system where the conflict of interest is not the exception, but the rule.
For the average investor, the situation is hopeless:
Granted, individual actions remain possible in theory in the case of a fault specific to one investor (such as faulty personalised advice). But in the vast majority of cases concerning the general information about the project, which makes up most of the risk in crowdfunding, the case law blocks individual action entirely.
And if the problem is only visible now, it’s because when everything’s fine… well, everything’s fine.