💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 06

The fee choreography

The most striking case illustrating this problem is that of Koregraf. Founded in 2015, the platform obtained CIP status before switching to PSFP. Based in Bordeaux, the company was quickly backed by two banks, Arkéa and BNP Développement.

In 2023 the situation was critical after the market reversal. Arkéa refused to put more money in, but the founders convinced Inter Invest to take a majority stake. A specialist in Girardin (a French tax break for investment in the overseas territories) and in bare-ownership property investment, managing €4.5bn, the company had been watching the property crowdfunding market for a while in search of a player that was already established, according to an executive at the group. Thereby avoiding going back through the licensing process. The plan was to refocus the investment thesis on France’s overseas territories, a subject the group has known well for 40 years.

The problem is that Inter Invest was buying a zombie. The company was quickly restructured, to try to get it out of the red (-€3M in 2023) by cutting costs, while strengthening some support functions, and keeping the CEO who knew the history well. While Inter Invest was not unaware of Koregraf’s difficulties, an executive confirmed to me without hesitation that it was a mistake and that the real situation was largely underestimated.

  • In the quality of the deals financed, which went from 10% to 50% in default or late payment during 2024;
  • In the platform’s ability to stay dynamic in a sharply shrinking market.

Barely a year after the takeover, at the end of 2024, the decision was made to pull the plug, as Koregraf was heading for a second year in a row at -€3M. Total cost of the losses for Inter Invest: €3M to €4M. Around the same time, the manager was to hand over its PER (a French retirement savings plan) to Shares, in exchange for exclusive distribution of Shares Pro products.

But the death of a platform does not mean the death of its projects, since each loan is a contract between the developer and the investors, arranged through the platform, which doesn’t even see the money pass through.

First, you have to take stock of the outstanding loans. To say that tracking performance indicators isn’t taken seriously is an understatement. On the website, the summary even shows the Windows screenshot.

Today, 201 projects are being repaid on the platform12:

  • 83 (41.3%) are healthy, for now;
  • 40 (19.9%) are less than 6 months late;
  • 33 (16.4%) more than 6 months late;
  • 45 (22.4%) are in insolvency proceedings.

All that for €161M, or 54% of everything the platform ever raised.

  • €28.9M (18%) with no delay;
  • €18.3M (11%) less than 6 months late;
  • €48M (30%) more than 6 months late;
  • €65M (41%) in insolvency proceedings.

Oh. And Koregraf is one of those platforms that still display a 0% default rate, despite delays of several years. Because how can anyone imagine that the €20M+ owed on projects from before 2021 will ever be recovered?

Especially since the situation isn’t frozen. A project 5 months late will quickly move into the 6 months category, and the more time passes, the slimmer the chances of getting the money back. Granted, an investor told me a few days ago that of the €28.9M of healthy loans, two thirds were financed in 2024, so the risks were lower. Still, need I remind you that last summer, Bricks raised €4M for a guy who was in default on Tudigo (in French), and cancelled the fundraising at the last minute? Given how poor the due diligence was in previous years, how can anyone believe that of 2023 and 2024 was more serious?

Granted, Inter Invest was at the controls, and granted, the property market is more stable. But several 2024 projects are in trouble. And for good reason: a 10% return is not guaranteed. If only because the developers who borrowed at such high rates, and who were therefore no longer eligible for bank loans, are necessarily the riskiest ones. Something few investors understood. Because few platforms really explained it.

Take Community, a project by Carrere that arrived on the platform in early 2024. The company was already behind on several projects, notably on Wiseed and Fundimmo. It reported a -€15.8M year for €22.6M of debt. Almost all of its stakes in property companies were also in the red. A regular on Koregraf (16 deals), the €545K project was fully funded in a few days. In June, when it was due to repay €1.3M and €1.8M on two projects financed two years earlier, safeguard proceedings (a French court-supervised restructuring) were opened.

Looking closely at the deals, and above all at the borrowers, you quickly realise that some have dozens of deals financed on the platforms. Most of them repaid, or on schedule, it’s true. But when the market turns, it all looks like a huge house of cards, since most of the guarantees can’t cover the debts: so a single project can bring down the others. Including on other platforms.

And all of this has to be managed by Koregraf… which no longer exists.