💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 07

Lights out

In the summer of 2022, the European Commission made it mandatory for PSFPs to have a PCA13, or wind-down plan, so that investments can still be managed if the platform fails. All new players must present one to the AMF. For older ones, it is sometimes requested, sometimes not. But the AMF doesn’t approve the procedure itself, only the fact that it exists.

On the face of it, every player complied. Some even advertised it, to add a bit of trust to their marketing. The problem is that we find exactly the same problem as with the very idea of the PSFP: interests are not aligned at all, for the reasons explained earlier.

Some, like Baltis, say nothing about the procedure, although they put out a press release to say it existed14. Same for Homunity, WiSeed and Raizers. For its part, ClubFunding appoints CF Gestion, a wealth adviser. Enerfip relies on its payment partner, Lemonway.

But a number of platforms have something in common:

  • Lita
  • Bricks
  • Finple
  • Tudigo
  • Koregraf
  • Anaxago
  • Happy Capital
  • WeShareBonds etc.

They entrusted their run-off to Capsens. Originally, it’s a web agency that builds the websites and provides the technical solution. But since the obligation of summer 2022, Capsens has offered its clients (and not only them) run-off, its solution for unplugging platforms, with both a monthly fee of a few hundred to a few thousand euros, depending on the funds to be covered, and a percentage of the run-off activity.

The problem is that Capsens is not a lawyer, a court-appointed administrator, a legal expert, licensed by anyone at all, a debt collector, etc. It’s a web agency. With a fairly simple method which, once again, clearly doesn’t work in investors’ favour… and they discover the reality when it happens.

Because even when platforms mentioned the PCA, it was vague… and unclear. On Koregraf, for example, the site says the procedure is in Appendix 1, probably because the terms and conditions are a botched copy-and-paste of a contract that nobody ever reread.

The same mention appears in several bond contracts. Which apparently nobody ever reread either, since in the dozen or so I consulted, the appendix is never there, and of the dozens of investors I asked, none was able to find the procedure.

Because in a wind-down, the platform has 3 jobs to handle:

  • The technical/operational platform;
  • Monitoring, and potential litigation;
  • El famoso bondholder representation.

Here (again) you can obviously see the conflict-of-interest problem of having all this handled by the same people, but I’m not going to rewrite it for the 1,000th time.

On Koregraf, it is therefore clearly stated that Capsens is appointed, but it is only a technical operator, which won’t know how to do the other jobs. It is nonetheless stated that Capsens will be paid as follows:

  • 2% excluding VAT will be deducted by the Manager from amounts repaid to investors;
  • 0.5% excluding VAT will be deducted by the Manager from amounts collected from borrowers.

But of course, that doesn’t cover the costs of the other jobs. And the regulator imposed nothing specific on the subject. Because obviously these fees aren’t enough to run a wind-down.

Let’s stick with Koregraf. And let’s imagine the portfolio is frozen, so it doesn’t get any worse. There are 201 deals to take over.

83 healthy deals worth €28.9M make €722K in management fees. But in reality, if the deals stay healthy, there isn’t much managing to do. All for €8.7K per project.

The problem is the 118 other deals worth €131M. Granted, there’s €3.3M in fees up for grabs, but at what price? Because for that money to come in, the companies have to pay. Given the state of the portfolio, less than 50% of it has the slightest chance of survival, if all goes well. So let’s say Capsens can count on a little over €1.5M in fees. That means barely €13K per project, since even deals that are dead in the water will need a minimum of handling.

And for that price, it will have to:

  • Manage the mass of investors;
  • Restructure the deals;
  • Negotiate with the developers and possibly the court-appointed administrators;
  • Launch legal and debt-recovery proceedings.

Suffice to say that amount won’t be enough, especially since these fees are only potential, and while waiting for them, Capsens has to advance the costs.

So why put much energy into it?

A few months ago, a platform boss whom I criticised for not calling on a personal guarantee told me, in substance:

That the person was ill, and probably insolvent, and that launching proceedings would cost a few tens of thousands of euros, out of his own pocket, with a slim chance of recovering part of the sum, which would make little difference to investors’ returns.

That’s probably true. The only reason a platform wants to go to war to recover the money is to protect its numbers, to try to keep investors’ trust, and therefore its fundraising momentum. Once you’re past 20 or 30% defaults, what’s the point? Because clearly, the platforms with dreadful rates will end up dying, even if they’re still vaguely raising money… And yes, the costs are supposed to be borne by the issuer, but if it doesn’t pay its instalments, it won’t pay the costs either. Especially since, in insolvency proceedings, that provision of the Commercial Code no longer applies.

To handle the management, Capsens calls on two companies in the case of Koregraf:

  • 15-63, for debt recovery;
  • PS Trustee, as bondholders’ representative, as a bond contract requires.

These service providers were chosen unilaterally by Capsens, and the choice may raise questions, even if at Inter Invest I’m told they were the best-value options.

Because 15-63 was co-founded by Maxime Pallain, who is also a co-founder of Raizers. Even if the company has since been sold to Empruntis, and he has no longer run it since February 2023, it’s a mixing of roles that may raise questions. Especially since the company seems very recent, and a good share of the people working there are former employees or bosses from crowdfunding, according to a source close to the matter. But hey, after all, why not. At least they know the subject. And crowdfunding in particular.

As for PS Trustee, now that’s more debatable. The company was set up from scratch by a wealth adviser and a property specialist, to handle the management. Why? It’s not always very clear. First, the money, obviously. Because, as we’ll see, there are nice fees to be had. But according to a source close to one of PS Trustee’s founders, it would also be a way of seeing property deals go past that are about to be sold off at fire-sale prices. And so of possibly picking up a bargain. Not exactly reassuring about the will to really defend the bondholders.

Still, Capsens has to organise 201 general meetings for the 201 projects, in order to replace Koregraf. And take the opportunity along the way to… raise its fees. And try to scrape together a few extra charges.

At Inter Invest, they deny that the fees are exorbitant. Obviously, in absolute terms, they run into millions. But as a percentage, we’re talking 7-8% over the period, or 2 to 3% a year on the capital, which is 50% more than a fund manager.

For investors, these are big sums. We’re talking about people who put in a few thousand or a few tens of thousands of euros. And who see fees higher than those amounts, on projects of €500K, €700K or €900K. With no point of comparison. No yardstick. And without really understanding what it corresponds to. Because the communication is clearly a real problem.

For the tens of thousands of investors, these three names came out of nowhere, and are asking for fees they had never heard of, just as they discover the reality of their investment. Enough to enrage a few hundred investors, gathered in a forum and on Discord, who are trying to make themselves heard by posting negative reviews of Inter Invest, talking to journalists, setting up an association or dreaming up legal action.

Many then fantasise about getting Koregraf convicted. Or Inter Invest. Or the AMF. People pull out half-understood articles of law, or argue over legal points that won’t change much. Because the reality of this kind of case is that the silent majority of bondholders, who aren’t the noisiest fringe, end up accepting what they’re offered. Like at Tudigo, in fact, where the general meeting of the SPV approved the proposals that had been made and were already in place, despite credible alternatives.

On that subject, I also see a few lawyers buzzing around these cases, promising class actions while billing nice fat fees. Because they say they can see the platforms were at fault, and that there’s an insurer who can pay.

All of this seems very wrong, or at the very least greatly exaggerated. In the hundreds of cases I’ve seen, at Koregraf or elsewhere, the failings are often the borrowers’, and less the platforms’. As for the platforms’ liability, it is only rarely obvious, and the reality is mostly that investors made bad investments, and nobody is going to pay them back for that. Especially since these trials are long. Very long. 5 years. 10 years. On the other side, it won’t be the platforms any more, which will be dead, but insurers who will do everything not to pay. And it could also cost investors dearly, if it ends like the case brought by UPRA against the auditors of Atos, the French IT group: the investors, acting in good faith, were ordered to pay nearly €2M in legal costs15.

That’s why I advised the investors who had contacted me to negotiate the fees rather than imagine taking a case to court that has little chance of leading anywhere.

Conflict of interest note: I acted as a mediator (unpaid) between several representatives of Koregraf’s investors and the managers of Inter Invest, so that they could negotiate all or part of the proposed fees.

Because indeed, the fee schedule16 seemed a bit high, and above all poorly suited to individual cases.

  • For projects described as healthy
    €20K excluding VAT for the bondholders’ representative (PS Trustee)
    4.20% of the sums recovered (15-63)
    0.48% in transfer fees (Capsens)
  • For projects described as in difficulty
    €2K per quarter for the bondholders’ representative (PS Trustee)
    €5K + 2.5% of the sums recovered (15-63)
    0.48% in transfer fees (Capsens)

Several problems quickly surfaced:

  • The amounts are very high for small projects
  • The notion of a project in difficulty is vague, when a project that is 15 days late and another in liquidation cannot be treated the same way.

The investors then sent hundreds of messages and organised themselves to vote against the proposals for each of the projects. Others wanted outright to have the votes cancelled or postponed, or even to become bondholders’ representatives themselves… for free. You only need to spend a few minutes reading the mess on the Discord to understand that an amateur bondholders’ representative can only end badly.

That said, it’s not entirely incomprehensible either, because for the projects in difficulty, investors were invited to send money to finance the debt recovery. Money that would earn interest and be repaid first, which once again prompted a great many comments, because none of this was very clear17.

Still, after a negotiation between two representatives, Inter Invest (which no longer has anything to gain in the affair) and the various players, a new fee schedule was proposed, along with concessions on certain projects so that the whole thing would make more sense.

Two days after this U-turn, it was WiSeed’s turn to change the terms of its debt recovery. Yet for days the platform (like WeShareBonds) had been cited as having covered all the costs, and was held up as a model by investors.

WiSEED explained that it had historically covered the costs of proceedings (lawyers, court officers, property seizure costs) and recouped them from the sums recovered, an approach that worked as long as such cases remained exceptional.

So you have to wonder what these platforms are for… If they only take money on the fundraising, and every single euro that isn’t in the business plan has to be advanced by the investors… then what is the point of these platforms?

Especially since we haven’t heard the last of these fees, given the astronomical scale of the losses to come.