At the end of 2022, the unit's reconstitution value came out at €203.7628. The subscription price, for its part, stayed at €208. About 2% above the value. That's perfectly legal, the rules tolerate a gap of 10% either way. The price was only lowered in September 202340. It took the AMF baring its teeth before the summer and forcing every manager to commission valuations reflecting the market reversal.
In between, €51.6M of subscriptions came in at €208. People bought above the reconstitution value while the manager had the valuations in hand. Dates, amounts, nothing more. Nobody found anything to object to.
But inevitably, 2023 was a dead year.
Zero acquisitions, zero disposals. The market value of the portfolio went from 3.17 to €2.50bn. -21% in a year. At the end of 2023, 1.2M units were waiting to be redeemed, about 6% of the capital. The technical term is a liquidity crisis. To hold on, the SCPI drew €50M of extra debt, notably to fund €49.6M of works40. A desperate attempt to save an ageing portfolio.
In vain: 2024 made things worse. Market value went from 2.50 to €1.92bn, which cost the portfolio another 23% in a single year41. The unit price followed:
The unit price runs after its value
The subscription price must stay within 10% of the reconstitution value, above or below. At the end of 2025, at €115 for €91.95, it falls outside. On 26 March 2026, the first price on the secondary market was €45 net to the seller.
Primopierre annual reports 2022 to 2025; quarterly bulletin for the first quarter of 2026.
And now 1.7M units are waiting for a miracle. That's how Primopierre crossed to the other side of the table: 7 buildings sold for €118M, including Duguesclin in Lyon, bought for €60M in 2021, sold for €44M 3 years later. The SCI Nanterre Immo left the balance sheet at a negative value of -€126K. Debt reached 38.6%, for a ceiling of 40%41. Which, as we say round here, is properly dodgy.
2025 scraped the bottom of the barrel: 6 disposals for €81M38. Top of the list, Le Between, the big ticket of 2016: contributed to the SCI Preim Odyssey C in 2022, exited in May 2025 at a negative value of -€434K. An asset paid €169M 9 years earlier. Bloom, bought at the end of 2022 on an asset value of €81.3M, came out at €17.2M for 45.8% of the units. Le Garamond in Malakoff went to Arkéa, €8.1M. Only one line in the batch came out a winner: Rochefoucauld, 2,132 m² in the 9th arrondissement, bought for €20.1M in 2015, sold for €26.7M, +33%. A cracking performance of 3.3% annualised return. Splendid. For the only small asset, bought before the big tickets.
Bought, sold
Purchase price excluding costs, for Primopierre's share. Bloom does not appear: its exit concerns 45.8% of the units of an SCI, with no comparable purchase price.
Primopierre annual reports 2014 to 2025.
See all the KPIs on the Zero Bullshit website (in French)
Record works carried on (€61.5M), debt hugged the ceiling (39.4%).
Left in the cellars: the SCIs.
Losing seems to be such a sport at Primonial that they could start charging admission. Because, of course, Primopierre is not alone in the mass grave.
And then, the stroke of genius. On 7 January 2026, an extraordinary general meeting voted to suspend Primopierre's variable capital, for 2 years, renewable50. Translation: no more subscriptions, no more withdrawals. The requests entered in the register, the queue of units, were cancelled. Those who want out will go through an organised secondary market, a monthly order-matching session. The first was held on 26 March 2026. 171 units changed hands there, at an execution price of €45 net to the seller51. Forty-five euros, when the displayed subscription price is €115, the withdrawal value €105.51, the reconstitution value €91.95 and the realisation value €78.45. And so far from the subscription price of 3 years ago…
What a Primopierre unit is worth, depending on who's counting (€)
Subscription price, withdrawal value, reconstitution value and realisation value at 31 December 2025; price at the matching session of 26 March 2026, net to the seller.
Primopierre 2025 annual report; quarterly bulletin for the first quarter of 2026.
The first price the market was willing to pay is 57% below what the manager was still paying out in January 2025. Out of 2.2M units waiting to get out, 171 got out. The management company points out that this price does not prejudge the future equilibrium price and does not measure the value of the portfolio. Phew. Granted, that's accurate. It measures something else: what a buyer is prepared to pay once they no longer have to go through the counter. The redemption fund, whose creation had been agreed in October 2024, was never activated52. One calendar detail deserves to be set alongside: at 31 December 2025, the reconstitution value came out at €91.95, for a subscription price still displayed at €11538. The gap falls outside the regulatory corridor of 10%: under variable capital, a fifth cut would have had to be made50. Under fixed capital, there's no longer a price to cut. Primopierre isn't inventing anything: Paref had suspended Novapierre Résidentiel in April 2025, and at the first matching sessions the price formed 40% below the old withdrawal price53. Others will follow.
The queue, and those who got out of it
Units waiting to be redeemed, end of 2025
Units traded at the first matching session, 26 March 2026
Primopierre 2025 annual report; quarterly bulletin for the first quarter of 2026.
As for measuring the extent of the damage, it's complicated: there's no single right figure, because an SCPI isn't experienced on average: it all depends on the year you subscribed. But overall, the IRRs are bad.
Annual return by year of entry, exit at 31 December 2025
Internal rate of return, gross, entering on 1 January at that year's price, all distributions received, and exiting at the withdrawal price of €105.51.
Zero Bullshit calculation based on the Primopierre annual reports 2009 to 2025.
Four caveats about this table
1. The convention used is the most favourable one: subscription on 1 January, rents from the first year. Under a cautious convention, first rents the following year, each line slips down a row and the best vintage drops to +2.40% a year.
2. The exit is theoretical, and the table is an upper bound. It has the member exit at the withdrawal price of €105.51, the one the manager was still displaying at the end of 2025. The only real price, that of 26 March 2026, is €45. All the returns in this table are therefore better than what a member would get by exiting today.
3. These figures are gross, before income tax and 17.2% of French social charges.
4. The 2009 vintage is not comparable with the others: the first financial year ran from August 2008 to December 2009, i.e. 17 months, hence the €17.81 paid out.
Primonial confirms it with its own calculations:
Which clearly shows that the tipping point isn't 2022, but 2015. A member who came in in 2015, 7 years before the reversal, comes out at zero after 11 years of holding. And after 17 years of holding, tops out at +3.04% a year. Gross. But… net of fees. Because yeah, it wasn't free.