€19.80. That's what Primopierre paid, on 31 May 2018, for its share of the capital of a company that owns an office building in Issy-les-Moulineaux, just outside Paris, valued the same day at €73M29. This price is not a typo. But it is, of course, a bit more complicated than that.
And to understand it, you have to switch sides of the table. Until now, everything has been told from Primopierre's side: what it raises, what it buys, what it explains. Except that in every transaction, there is someone on the other side. And an investor's first question isn't what the building is worth. It's why the person opposite is in such a hurry to sell it.
In 2017, the seller is called Lone Star. It picked up Cœur Défense on the way out of court, after buying a large chunk of the case's debt, and sells it 3 and a half years later €500M above its purchase price. An American fund coming out of insolvency proceedings with a gain like that has only one thing to sell: the timing. On the other side, a French trio buys.
In 2018, the seller is called Naropa.
Deed of sale of Trieo, 31 May 2018: the price paid by each of Primonial's three vehicles.
Behind the brand is the Fernández Fermoselle family, from Valladolid, who pulled off one of the finest bits of market timing of the Spanish bubble: floating their property company Parquesol on the stock market in April 2006 at a market capitalisation of around €900M, three times a valuation that was 3 years old, then selling the whole lot straight after to a Galician builder. Nearly €1bn pocketed a few months before the bust30. The proceeds went straight back into bricks and mortar, on the other side of the Pyrenees: in July 2007, at the exact top of the French cycle this time, Naropa bought from Bouygues Immobilier 16,450 m² of offices in the Seine Ouest district of Issy, including the developer's own future headquarters, for €155M31. The same mistake as Lehman, the same year, a few kilometres further south. The buildings were held in French property companies, the units owned from the family's Luxembourg holding company32, management entrusted to CBRE33, the debt and family advances piled up, and the family waited for the sun to come back. It never did. 11 years later, the company that owned Trieo showed negative net assets of €23.3M: the units were worth nothing.
Then, in the spring of 2018, the exit door opened. On it, a brass plate spelling out the letters Primonial. Three of its vehicles, the SC Capimmo (60%), the OPCI Preimium (20%) and Primopierre (20%), bought all the units of the 2 Issy companies. For Galeo & Dueo, the first, the price of the units was set at €54M, on an agreed value for the buildings of €153M34.
Deed of sale of Galeo & Dueo, 30 May 2018: €54.7M for all the units.
For Trieo, the second, the price for all the units was €100. One hundred euros. Pocket money. In return, €23.1M of accumulated losses were wiped off and the buyers recapitalised to the tune of €33.1M29. And in both deeds, the same clause, the only one that counts:
The current-account advances granted to the company are, according to the deeds, paid and repaid in full that same day, a moment after ownership of the units passes to the buyers.
Deeds of sale of the units, 30 and 31 May 2018
Because obviously, if all of this is worth nothing, it's because Primonial takes over, and pays, the debt.
How much? 5 months before the sale, Naropa Properties Luxembourg was carrying €179M of loans: €49.6M on the first company + €12.1M of capitalised interest, €91.7M on the second + €26M of interest, all at Euribor +250 basis points35. Interest the family was charging itself and capitalising year after year. Same filing, another line: a €14.5M write-back of impairment revalued the shares of the first company, and that year's profit was almost entirely made of it35. A façade never gets a better coat of paint than in the year of the sale.
€100 for the units, €179.5M of claims alongside
What Primonial's three vehicles pay for the units
What the family holding company had lent to the two companies
Claims of Naropa Properties Luxembourg on the last balance sheet filed before the sale. The deeds stipulate full repayment of the advances on the day of the sale; the amount repaid that day is not published. Same scale for both columns: Trieo's €100 is not visible.
Deeds of sale of the units, registry of the Paris commercial court, 30 and 31 May 2018; 2017 annual accounts of Naropa Properties Luxembourg.
In reality, Preimium and Capimmo paid the sellers a €10M deposit under the preliminary agreement. On top of the 100 euros. So how much did Primopierre really put down in total?
Hardly enough to repay the €179.5M of claims the Luxembourg company was owed the previous year. Because overall, Naropa's French adventure remains a losing one, the holding company shows €265M of subscribed capital for €94M of losses carried forward35. Primonial simply made it possible to mop up the debts.
Enough to cast itself as Lone Star? Not really. The bargain lasted 17 months. At the end of 2019, the buyers put another €3.7M into Trieo's pot, at €45.46 per unit36.
To Primopierre's members, the deal was told a little differently. The 2018 annual report presents 3 office buildings delivered in 2010, 100% let, in an area it describes as genuinely booming20. Naropa appears nowhere. Not a line about the underwater seller, the units going for pocket money, the losses wiped off that very morning or the claims repaid.
7 months after the purchase, the market value of the Galeo & Dueo stake had already fallen below the price paid20.
And this detail, like Naropa, is not just an anecdote: it's the method, seen under the microscope. Two sellers, two opposite situations, one thing in common. Lone Star came out a winner, Naropa came out a loser, but both got out, in one piece, at the moment of their choosing. And in both cases, Primopierre was left holding the building. Each time, it was a bad deal. Each time the reason was the same, and no KID tells you so: when everyone wants to get out, retail investors serve as the liquidity.
Edissimmo, Génépierre, Accimmo Pierre, Rivoli Avenir Patrimoine, Épargne Foncière, Laffitte Pierre: all the big Paris-region office SCPIs of the same generation have the same record, unit price cuts of -18 to -34%. So Primopierre is not an accident, it's a model. It's not a string of management accidents, it's a design failure: raising money on a massive scale to buy Paris-region offices at the top of a rate cycle could never end well.
The industry's argument is to reply that everybody suffered. That's false, and the counter-examples are raising more money today than Primopierre did at the height of its glory. In 2025, Transitions Europe raised €560M, Corum Origin €532M, Iroko Zen €530M, with financial occupancy rates of 95%+. Iroko and Remake can plead the luck of the vintage, born too late to buy before the crisis. Not Corum Origin, launched in 2012, whose track record is comparable. But perhaps the difference lies in a sentence from a fund manager, uttered before the crisis.
Iroko buys rabbit hutches, a fund manager once sneered.
Behind the contempt, a model: Zen holds 173 assets for €1.4bn of capitalisation, €8M apiece, with 41 purchases in 2025 alone. Remake Live, €13.1M per asset. Corum Origin, €22.7M. Primopierre, at the end of 2020, in the middle of its giant fundraising: €45M per asset22, double that of Immorente, Rivoli Avenir Patrimoine or Épargne Foncière. Buying small and many costs teams and time. Buying big only costs a signature.
Average size of an asset, in €M
Order of magnitude: capitalisation divided by the number of assets. Primopierre, end of 2020: €3.3bn for 73 assets.
Primopierre 2020 annual report for Primopierre.
Average price of Primopierre's acquisitions, by year (€M)
For each year, the average acquisition price excluding costs of the buildings bought, for Primopierre's share. No acquisitions after 2022.
Primopierre annual reports 2009 to 2022.
See all the KPIs on the Zero Bullshit website (in French)
So much for what Primopierre shares with its peers. If it fell lower than they did, it's because of a chain of events all its own. Especially as the three-vehicle Naropa buyout was no coincidence. The pattern comes back deal after deal: Preimium alongside Primopierre on Shift, on Gambetta, on Bloom. Which raises the question of diversification when so many funds share the same assets. And so of a risk that is even more concentrated, on even bigger properties.
The height of the madness is Cœur Défense. Out of the 1M units, Primopierre took 88,948, or 8.86%, and paid out €72M9. But alongside it sits Primovie (13.4%). Same standard at Amundi: OPCImmo (20%), Edissimmo (10.7%), Rivoli Avenir Patrimoine (8.8%), Génépierre (5%). And at Crédit Agricole Assurances, Amundi's little sister: Predica (30%), Spirica (3.3%).
Two SCPIs, or the same tower twice
Filings of Heart of La Défense, minutes of the meeting of 30 October 2017, registry of the Paris commercial court.
When the tower turns, it doesn't bring down one fund, it brings down 8 at once. And the saver who thought they were diversifying by holding 2 different SCPIs was, without knowing it, holding the same building 2 times over.
And history moves fast. A year later, at the first year-end: the stake was valued at €64.7M, -12.6%20. The rest has already been told here (in French). In 2020, the SCI showed €85M of losses and the stake was worth no more than €54.4M. Primopierre left €8.9M of current-account advances in it.
Primopierre pushed every flaw of the model further than the others: the biggest tickets, buying second-hand from those heading for the exit, co-investing in a closed loop, the tower. The market turned for everyone, but not quite in the same way.
So much so that the AMF got involved. On 28 February 2024, the management company signed a settlement agreement with the AMF37. Among the problems: 2 asset allocations between the OPCI Preim ISR and Primopierre, without convincing evidence to justify the split chosen. Granted, it's not a sanction. But the warning is real.
Today the stake bought from the Spaniards is worth €2.8M in Primopierre's accounts, for €19.6M of shares and €19.1M of advances committed38. The Fernández Fermoselle family, for its part, was repaid on the day of the sale. It is worth €380M today39. 50 more than at the time of the sale. All of Primonial's vehicles are going to make the opposite journey.