💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 04

Vertigo

€231M for Le Valmy, offices in Paris's 20th arrondissement. The deal was signed in the year the whole planet discovered compulsory remote working and the world's offices emptied in 1 week, without anyone knowing for how long. Primopierre invested €491M over 2020, almost all of it in Paris-region offices. M Campus in Meudon, let to Thales, €212M. One more off-plan purchase, with Cinétika. On the other side, €154M of disposals, led by the Okabé and Europrogramme. That said, an acquisition of this size is negotiated months before it is signed, and some of the 2020 commitments probably predate the first lockdown. What remains is the choice that belongs to the manager alone: no pause, no postponement appears in the reports, the machine deployed its full year while its buildings were learning what empty means.

Especially since 2021 did it all again: €484M invested in 7 acquisitions. Sigma in Saint-Ouen, €144M, held directly. Duguesclin in Lyon, Hélios in Villeneuve-d'Ascq. And above all Window, in Puteaux, held through the SCI Hublot Défense at 50%, financed by a shareholder current-account advance of €103.5M. Which always raises the same problem: when an SCI can't finance itself, its shareholders put it on a drip through their current accounts, a repayable advance that piles up outside the capital. At the end of 2021, the advances granted by Primopierre to its SCIs reached €165M, without the members knowing what these black boxes were hiding. Debt, meanwhile, climbed back to €338M23. The portfolio was no longer just being bought: it was being kept alive on a drip. Still without any institutional investor or seller seeming to worry, despite 5 years of negative signals by now.

Primopierre's advances to its SCIs, at year-end (€M)

Current-account advances granted by Primopierre to the SCIs in which it holds units, at 31 December.

Primopierre annual reports 2017 to 2025.

See all the KPIs on the Zero Bullshit website (in French)

Physical occupancy rate, 2011-2025

Physical occupancy rate: occupied space as a share of total space, at year-end. Not published before 2011. The financial occupancy rate, in light colour, for comparison.

Primopierre annual reports 2011 to 2025.

See all the KPIs on the Zero Bullshit website (in French)

Because 10 years of zero rates are an economic anomaly, and an anomaly like that always ends up correcting itself. Not just because of some cycle: because of the same rates story. There are those who, like the boss of Beanstock, the Nostradamus with a broken compass, predict a rate cut every year, get it wrong, and don't realise that it's the problem and not the solution. But there are also all the others, who knew rates would rise again, and so that the market would turn. Because an anomaly like that has two consequences: less leverage available when trouble hits, and obvious asset inflation, of which property is the most blatant proof. The trigger was the war in Ukraine. It could have been Covid. It could have been something else. It was only a matter of time.

The LinkedIn post by the boss of Beanstock.

Viva la revolución

As Covid calmed down during 2021, Altarea leaned over Primonial's cradle (or coffin). A listed group, founded in 1994 by Alain Taravella, a developer through Cogedim, which it bought, an owner of shopping centres and creator of the family villages concept: a property professional, not a fund passing through. What it still lacked was managing other people's savings, Primonial's business. The agreement was signed in July 202124: a €1.9bn valuation, 60% of the capital at first, the rest by 2024. Closing was set for 2 March 2022, time for a reorganisation, the carve-out of employee savings funds, of La Financière de l'Échiquier and so on. Two days before the signing, Altarea pulled out25. The reason given: a dozen documents had allegedly arrived on 25 February26 instead of 22 February. According to several people close to the deal, the only one who took the decision, and the only one who knows the reason, is said to be Alain Taravella himself, in a closed-door meeting with himself.

Because events unfolded rather strangely:

  • On 22 February, Altarea asked Primonial for the documents, just as the press releases were coming out;
  • On 24 February, Altarea publicly welcomed the acquisition;
  • On 25 February the documents arrived, Primonial said the missing items were minor;
  • But during the night, Taravella refused to sign;
  • On 27 February, a video call was held between Taravella and Primonial's board.

Hard to say what was really said. On Altarea's side, a source who attended the debrief of the meeting explains that the discussion was about pushing back the closing by a month, taking 100% immediately, revisiting the scope of La Financière de l'Échiquier and above all scrapping the earn-out. The reason? It was apparently in one of the documents provided, and nobody had really read it.

On Primonial's side, a former executive who was at that meeting gives another version. Taravella apparently dug out minor information to leverage a radical change to the deal: either a drastic price cut, or a plain cancellation.

The rest played out in court. Primonial's shareholders, Bridgepoint, Latour Capital, Sogecap and the partner managers, sued as early as April 2022 and would claim up to €1.2bn. The Paris economic activities court threw out all of the claimants' demands in 202527. The judges held that Primonial had an obligation of result, so Altarea was entitled not to sign after the delay. Responsibility for the failure is shared, nobody gets compensation, neither the sellers nor Altarea.

Had Taravella understood what was coming? No idea. But you could say he had a good nose…

Because despite this cancellation, the summer of 2022 arrived, and with it a 400 basis point rise in a year that nobody had put a date on16. Or that nobody wanted to believe in. In Primopierre's accounts, the turnaround showed up immediately: the market value of the portfolio fell for the first time in the SCPI's history, from 3.41 to €3.17bn, -7%. The physical occupancy rate dropped to 80.0%, with 130,911 m² vacant out of 655,273, spread across 38 assets. The financial rate, for its part, still showed 89.0%: the vacancy was already inside the walls, not yet all in the rents. And yet, the manager kept raising money and deploying its massive inflows: €403M. Le Sensorium at La Madeleine, €124M, off-plan. Gambetta Village through the SCI Nexxt Gambetta. Bloom through the SCI Preim Bloom. On the other side, 6 disposals for €207M, including Pasteur 123 sold to SFL for €73.8M and Murat for €70M. And one discreet move: Le Between, the big ticket of 2016, was contributed in full (100%) to an SCI named Preim Odyssey C, so it simply moved one floor down. The SCIs' shareholder current accounts, meanwhile, doubled: €337M28.

Of course nobody could have said it would all happen in the summer of 2022, or that a 400 basis point rise would turn up within a year. But the consistency of Primonial's choices would take a very violent hit from this market reversal. Even though several distributors, between 2022 and early 2023, refused to see that it was about to collapse.