💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 02

The broken compass

In our lovely start-up nation (which probably includes, directly or indirectly, a large share of the soon-to-be 100K (wow) readers of Zero Bullshit), there is one thing we all broadly agree on. To know whether you are doing a good job when you take a decision, you measure before, during and after, so you know where you are heading. It is called an indicator (or a KPI when you are making PowerPoints). Energy renovation has one too… And it is also the biggest problem.

In 2006, a new acronym appeared on the French property landscape: the DPE, or Diagnostic de Performance Énergétique, France’s energy performance certificate. Born in the wake of the Kyoto Protocol and a 2002 European directive on the energy performance of buildings, this technical document, with its coloured labels running from green to red, looked at the time like just another bit of paperwork. But who could have predicted that in less than twenty years this rating would become the epicentre of French energy renovation policy, capable of turning a property from a safe investment into an unlettable energy sieve?

Everyone.

Because a good indicator must be:

  • Universal: everyone (or at least everyone concerned) must use the same one, in the same way;
  • Clear: its calculation rule must let everyone who assesses measure the same thing;
  • Honest/Reliable: as soon as people lie or cheat on an indicator, the tracking is no longer any good;
  • Constant: if the calculation method changes, the baseline is no longer the same, so nothing can be compared any more.

The story of the DPE is one of spectacular metamorphosis… which ignored every single one of these four essential rules. Because from an information document with no legal consequences, it gradually became a regulatory instrument with considerable power. And so everyone (with something to gain) wanted to add their own little touch. The original method, drawn up by the engineering consultancy Tribu Energie, was based on the 1988 thermal regulations, adapted to create what would be called the 3CL method16.

Until 2021, two methods coexisted: the theoretical 3CL calculation and the so-called ‘bill-based’ method, based on the home’s actual consumption. But the major turning point came with the Climate and Resilience Act, which made the DPE legally binding. The assessor is now legally liable, and a tenant or buyer can turn against an owner if the rating is wrong. More decisive still, the law set a timetable for gradually banning the letting of homes rated G (2025), F (2028) and then E (2034). The technical document had become a property guillotine.

This brutal transformation came with a string of adjustments and fixes, showing the difficulties of a system originally designed as a simple indicator but now used as a binding instrument. The latest change? An adjustment of the scales for homes under 40 m², announced in April 2024, which according to the ministry artificially lifts 140K small homes out of the energy sieve category. Is it a bad measure? Let’s just say there is a housing shortage, these are the most sought-after homes, and the calculation did not exactly do them justice. But you can clearly see the problem with the indicator.

More telling still: the waltz of postponed deadlines. Originally set for 1 January 2025, the ban on letting G-rated homes has been the subject of countless announcements of an ‘adapted timetable’ or a ‘postponement for shared buildings’. In October 2024, Prime Minister Michel Barnier was still talking about simplifying the DPE and an adapted timetable, while Valérie Létard, the Housing Minister, said the conditions were not in place to meet that timetable in shared buildings. One cannot deny real life, she told the regional daily La Voix du Nord at the time. And in fact this followed hundreds of statements by politicians wanting to push the timetable back. So much so that you wonder how it held in the end.

But these constant adjustments reveal a structural fragility in the system. More troubling still: analysing the distribution of DPE values reveals a telling statistical phenomenon. There is an abnormal concentration of ratings just below the critical thresholds, particularly between classes D and E, or E and F.

Marked anomalies at the D/E, E/F and F/G rating thresholds17
The dotted red line shows, for illustration, a theoretical counterfactual distribution.

This statistical anomaly suggests that some assessors ‘adjust’ values to bump the properties they rate up an energy class. The phenomenon is marked enough to be noted by the Cour des comptes in its June 2025 report. This clustering around the thresholds is a glaring sign of the system’s inherent unreliability: if the DPE were truly objective, why would we see such a statistical distortion? Incidentally, I ran the data18 through Benford’s law (in French)… and the fraud is blatant.

Recently, a study by the CAE19, a council of economists advising the Prime Minister, delivered a damning finding: before 2021, around 3.9% of DPEs were apparently manipulated to land in a more favourable category. That is 25% more DPEs on the left of the lines. But according to the CAE, 70% of DPEs inspected in 2023 showed anomalies, which, paradoxically, accounts for only 1.7% of the total. That said, the anomalies found by the CAE do not really explain the problem, since the vast majority concern missing information or breaches of the law (contract clauses, invoices, sales practices and so on), while collusion or openly false ratings are almost negligible.

Because at the same time, monthly DPE output nearly tripled between 2018 and 2025, from 120K to 350K a month (because of legal obligations), piling pressure on a sector that struggles to guarantee the reliability of its work. The MaPrimeRénov' leaflet published by the ANAH in 2021 already acknowledged the need for an independent energy audit to qualify for the bonus for lifting a home out of the sieve category, a half-hearted admission that the DPE alone is of limited reliability.

Breakdown of anomalies found in 2023 in the practices of property assessors20

Beyond the manipulation, it is the very relevance of the DPE as the compass for energy renovation that is in question. As early as 2022, the Cour des comptes noted that

the very definition of energy renovation remains vague.

The 2021 flash audit of MaPrimeRénov' highlighted the lack of any mandatory prior assessment to access the grants, a major methodological flaw that undermines the scheme’s effectiveness from its very design. How can renovations be targeted effectively without a reliable initial assessment? Figures confirmed in 2023 by local authorities.

Prior conditions and effectiveness measurement of local grants for energy renovation of privately owned homes21

More fundamentally, as the ONRE acknowledged in 2023, the DPE relies on theoretical or ‘conventional’ energy savings that can differ significantly from actual savings. This gap between theory and practice is explained in particular by what economists call the ‘rebound effect’: once their home is better insulated, occupants tend to turn up the thermostat, eating into the expected savings. The 2024 France Relance report confirms this flaw: the scheme only measures theoretical savings, with no actual post-renovation consumption data at all. More worrying still, the same report reveals that a rigorous causal evaluation was only planned for some time in 2024, when billions of euros had already been poured into the scheme.

The story of the DPE perfectly illustrates the adage that a bad indicator inevitably leads to bad decisions. Originally designed as a simple information tool, it turned, under political pressure, into a regulatory instrument with considerable consequences for France’s housing stock. And the Cour des comptes is scathing (and categorical) in its June 2025 report: in 2021, the government carried out this major transformation of the DPE without grasping the consequences of such decisions. The report adds that the administration carried out no overall impact assessment beforehand.

As usual.

This haste had concrete effects on the rental market. Between mid-2021 and mid-2023, the stock of homes to let reportedly fell by 22% for well-rated homes (A to D), and by 33% for energy sieves (F and G). These withdrawals from the rental market worsened an already tight situation for people looking for a home, just as rising interest rates were shutting out the usual hundreds of thousands of first-time buyers, who stayed in rented housing.

Paradoxically, the never-ending threat of a ban (constantly postponed but never abandoned) has had a concrete effect on the property market. The prospect of energy sieves losing value pushed many owners to sell rather than renovate. According to a poll commissioned by the FNAIM, the estate agents’ federation, in 2022, only 32% of owners of F and G homes chose to renovate, while 26% preferred to sell. In several big cities, the number of energy sieves put up for sale exploded: +74% in Rennes, +72% in Paris, +70% in Nantes between September 2020 and October 2021. And for almost 2 years now, prices have also taken a big hit, partly because of the falling market, but mostly because those who can no longer let and refuse to do the works… sell. As the property site Se Loger explained unequivocally last May:

Well-rated homes (A to D) saw their prices rise by 3.4%, homes rated E dipped slightly (-0.6%), and homes rated F or G fell by 3.5%.

These figures reveal an uncomfortable truth for many professionals, and even for private landlords: postponing the deadline would not have bought more time for the works, it would simply have delayed the wake-up call and the action. It is the regulatory constraints and their effect on prices that got the market moving. The mere existence of a timetable, even a contested one, triggered changes in prices and behaviour. The threat of a ban, more than the ban itself, was the trigger.

The DPE, the compass meant to guide the energy transition of buildings, now seems to disorient as much as it orients. With such an imprecise measuring instrument, there is a real risk of flying blind, investing billions with no guarantee of results, and ultimately missing the target.