A few months after Casa Isula, and barely a month after the last of the three Tribeca deals, Albertini and Villa are back with a new Tigliola project, on the Cap d’Antibes. A first tranche arrives at the end of 2022. This time we are talking about a €21.5M project, including €8.8M for the land, €7.8M of works and €2.8M of financing costs. All for a sale after 2 years at €35M, and €3M of rent in the meantime. Nice deal.
On Tudigo, the tranches follow one another so fast that there aren’t even any other projects in between.
Screenshot of the Tudigo website
That’s just under €5M in a few months. As with Casa Isula, it is a property company owned by Tigliola Resort, created for the occasion, that will carry the deal: the SAS Tigliola Cap d’Antibes. The Tudigo website shows no marketing documents, but mentions a GAPD (a first-demand guarantee) taken on RX Venture. Except that, according to a document between Laurent Villa and Tudigo, the guarantee is actually taken on RX Invest, a subsidiary of RX Venture, and on Be@liv, Villa’s holding company.
Extract from a Tudigo marketing document
GAPD from RX Invest for Cap d’Antibes
Here again, we have an SAS that isn’t two years old. But to structure the deal, Tudigo sets up an SPV, which isn’t two years old either.
A year earlier, the platform created TBD Immo for these projects. The company has never clearly explained the role of this entity, two-thirds owned by Bulb in Town (the former name of Tudigo, which still operates the brand) and one-third by Jean-Yves Beaupigny’s holding company. This big Bordeaux property investor isn’t just anybody: he is one of the experts showcased in the platform’s marketing documents, supposedly selecting the property deals.
But he is also one of the 20 shareholders of Bulb in Town (1%) through his other holding company, Financière Beaupigny, alongside his son Charles, and Damien Guermonprez, the boss of Lemonway.
In fact, the TBD Immo system is a bit complex, but not stupid. To understand it, we need to look at how bonds work.
[Start of the tedious regulatory bit]
A bond issue is not specific to crowdfunding: French company law has long allowed a joint-stock company to raise money this way, borrowing directly from investors. The company issues securities, the bonds. In exchange, the investor receives fixed interest, paid at regular intervals, and gets their capital back at the end, through repayment at maturity in most cases.
In this type of deal, a bondholders’ representative is appointed to act collectively on behalf of the bondholders. They are supposed to defend their interests, monitor compliance with the contract and step in if there is a problem. There is also usually an intermediary who structures and markets the deal to investors, while acting as the link between them and the final borrower.
The security provided can take several forms: a mortgage, a pledge, or more often a GAPD, a personal guarantee given by a company or an individual, supposed to offer an extra recourse in the event of default.
So why drag the AMF and the PSFP, a status created at European level in 2022, into this? Well, precisely to regulate how deals are offered to the public through a platform.
For the AMF, the idea is to delegate to the platforms so that they protect investors themselves on small projects.
[End of the tedious regulatory bit]
In this case:
This structure has a fun(d)damental problem, because it would allow a very young company to get round the law. Except that in reality… the SPV is the same age, and you really wonder how any of this holds up legally.
Bond contract for the 3rd tranche, signed by Stéphane Vromann, chair of Tudigo, and Laurent P., CFO of Laurent Villa’s companies.
But let’s dwell for a moment on this 4,268m² plot of land which is, it has to be said, rather strange. In November 2015, it is bought by the SCI Cap d’Antibes for €7.13M, from a seller who had acquired it for €3.4M in 2004.
Extract from the 2015 deed of sale
Granted, this is one of the best parts of Antibes, and the plot is 2 to 3 times the size of its neighbours. But the price seems abnormally high compared with the surrounding area.
Extract from Pappers Immobilier. The plot is highlighted.
The €7.13M price is what the current seller paid.
The owner, whose French pied-à-terre is a splendid five-room flat on the quai de Béthune, on the Île Saint-Louis in Paris, bought for €3.5M, is a member of the Al-Marzouq family, one of the richest and most influential families in Kuwait, very active in entertainment, finance and property. The family includes:
Well, the mysterious owner of the Antibes plot is Fawaz, whose name appears in the Paradise Papers for three companies registered in the Cayman Islands in 2006. Several family companies also turn up among the shareholders.
Shareholder register of one of the 3 companies set up in the Cayman Islands
On Tudigo, the deal is presented as the construction of a very high-end villa of 1,785m², to be let in 2025 and sold within 3 to 5 years. The announced timetable is as follows:
All for a margin of €13M and… that’s it. Not the slightest information about the rest of the project. Nothing on the cost of the land, nothing on the cost of construction. According to Laurent Villa, €13M corresponds above all to the construction price. According to a Tudigo document, construction was estimated at €21.5M.
Extract from an internal document, not shown on Tudigo
Laurent Villa’s financing plan was to get €3M from Tudigo, then €10M from… brace yourself. No really, brace yourself harder. I’ll give you one guess:
Raizers.
If I hadn’t got the information from Laurent Villa himself, I wouldn’t have believed it. Because a few days earlier, I had just discovered the default on the Raizers loan, as early as December 2021, which I described in the first episode. Except that:
Approval letter from Raizers, used as part of the Tudigo financing.
EDIT 12 August 2025, 11.05pm: Raizers says the document is a fake.
EDIT 13 August 2025, 8.20am: Raizers’ response added.
Raizers says it told Laurent Villa in October 2022 that it would look at his file once his overdue Tribeca Montparnasse instalment had been paid, which happened in November 2022. It says it then looked at his file in February or March 2023 and turned it down fairly quickly, but that no committee concerning him was held in 2022.
Yes, you read that right.
Granted, Raizers will not end up providing the funds, and according to its boss, the file never even went before a decision committee. Laurent Villa claims the opposite:
According to him, there was no loan in default, but an approved, negotiated deferral of coupons due, which he says is completely different. […] He adds that this was not a financing proposal […] but a final committee approval.
Still, it is this document that reportedly convinced Tudigo that the project could be financed. Which shows the incredible sloppiness of both platforms’ due diligence.
Extract from a presentation between Tigliola and Tudigo, showing a commitment and funds released, with no overall financing
Which, in my very personal but, I think, rather spot-on opinion, ought to engage the liability of the platforms and their executives.
Because, and it could have been a good idea on their part, the Cap d’Antibes financing comes in 6 tranches. Usually, this type of structure is meant to avoid handing a big sum to someone who runs off with it. You give them a first tranche, you check where things stand, then a second, and so on.
So let’s assume Tudigo was taken in on the first and even the second tranche. Before the works even started, the plan was to buy a plot of land for €8M. Two deposits are made with the notary (the French public official who handles property sales), but the property is never bought. And above all, Tigliola never has the funds to complete, which Tudigo cannot fail to know.
At what point did someone think it was a good idea to send funds:
It is all the more problematic because Tudigo had expressly made the €10M financing a condition of its bond contract. At what point did nobody check that the funds were actually there? At what point did someone set 30 April as the date when the deed of sale was due to be signed on 15 February, and Raizers was talking about 20 January?
This negligence is absolutely blatant, once again, with the €812K tranche of April-May 2023. Here is what Tudigo tells investors:
Tudigo confirms without a qualm, and without checking, that the Raizers raise is approved, and that only the deed of sale remains to be signed on 15 February 2023… in other words two months earlier. And a month after Build Up, Laurent Villa’s building company, was placed in receivership12 and at least two restaurants were liquidated (including Maotsumy Toulon13).
Sure enough, the day after Tudigo’s first transfer, €415K does go to the notary. Then €12K on 24 January. Then €415K on 28 March. But the land will never be bought.
This was confirmed to me by an elected official at Antibes town hall and by the local office of the DGFIP, the French tax authority. The plot still belongs to Fawaz Al-Marzouq’s SCI, and the SCI has not changed hands.
When asked, the planning department at Antibes town hall is categorical: it can only find two planning permits for the plot.
According to Laurent Villa, the project is still on:
He says the land is under a preliminary sale agreement with a very substantial deposit, but that given the loss of financing […] the planning permit has lapsed. […] In the end, he says, the land will be bought on better terms, given a difficulty with the permit concerning the pool, and he hopes the works will start in January 2026.
That said, despite the suspension, let’s call it temporary, Tudigo will keep sending funds to the company, tranche after tranche, until the end of 2023.
Especially since… guess what. Why was La Première Brique showing off a few days ago with a “record” raise of €5M14? The same record as ClubFunding in September 202415? Why does Bricks say on its website that it finances projects of between €200K and €5M?
Well, I gave the answer a little earlier: it is written word for word in Regulation 2020/150311, whose first article limits the PSFP to €5M per project owner over a 12-month period16.
So Raizers was legally unable to raise €10M, except through a prospectus, as Blast did for Blast’s raise on Blast, a costly and complex operation that PSFPs don’t usually do. And which would, at the very least, have required checking that it was real since it was unusual, which was never done.
In its Q&A on crowdfunding service providers, ESMA, the EU’s markets regulator17, takes an unambiguous position along these lines.
Q. Should the threshold in Article 1(2)(c) of the regulation apply when a crowdfunding offer is made on several platforms?
A. Yes, says ESMA: the provision in Article 1(2)(c) applies regardless of whether the crowdfunding offer is made on one platform or several.
Which raises another question.
Because Laurent Villa appears 11 times on Tudigo.
Cap d’Antibes on its own already comes to €5.7M. So it is probably no coincidence that the tranche arrives a very long time afterwards, letting 12 months slide by so that he could raise beyond the €5M ceiling.
Comparison of rolling 12-month amounts raised on the platform, with or without the restaurants.
Because indeed, since the Tribeca restaurants are a legally and economically distinct business, the regulation provides that they count as different project owners. A case also covered in the same Q&A:
Q. Can a project owner with several legal entities raise €5M through each entity?
Yes, ESMA answers: each legal entity counts as a separate project owner and the €5M threshold applies to each project owner. However, the projects must be separate and distinct. National competent authorities will examine these structures carefully to make sure they are not artificial arrangements designed to get round the €5M threshold, and will take the economic substance of the projects into account to ensure they are genuinely distinct projects with distinct business purposes.
When the projects are financed by Tudigo, the property goes to Tigliola Resort and the restaurants to RX Invest.
But indeed, the two entities have no shareholding link and have distinct businesses. So you can understand why Tudigo, on this second point, considered them to be two separate entities. Except that in practice, Laurent Villa knows full well that the funds are shared between these entities (and others), and therefore that their economic interests are linked.
Laurent Villa denies this and says he has a cash-pooling agreement between his subsidiaries so as to centralise everything. But it doesn’t stop there. And contrary to what he claims, it is not true that the transfers made during the year are simply squared up when the accounts are closed.
Because at 31 December 2023, here is the list of receivables, in other words the companies that benefited from Tigliola’s money, and which have absolutely no shareholding link with it:
And among the debts, there is €404K from Villa d’Ailleurs, which sits inside Group Clav, again with no link, and €20K from Donabel, an Albertini family SCI.
Still, when the sixth tranche is financed on Tudigo, we witness yet another Tudigo fiasco, with not the slightest due diligence. Obviously not on the project (as explained earlier), but not on the guarantees either. Because in September 2023, RX Industries is placed in receivership18, then liquidated the following month19. Given that RX Industries was the main asset of RX Venture (one of Laurent Villa’s guarantees), how can nobody have reacted? At the same time, another subsidiary, RX Retail, meant to house the restaurants, suffered the same fate20. And the same went for most of the restaurants, notably the holding company Beef House Group, in receivership since February 202321. And yet this was a problem the contract had provided for.
Extract from the bond contract between Tudigo and Tigliola Cap d’Antibes
So where did the money go?
The answer to that question is: into Tudigo’s incompetence. Really. Unambiguously. And here’s how.
Because in July 2023, after 5 tranches, and with the land still not bought, there is nothing left in the kitty.
OK fine, I’m exaggerating, there are 50 bucks left.
OK fine, I’m still exaggerating, there are 50 euros and 59 cents.
And the cash, beyond any doubt, went into Casa Isula.
Of the €15K of share capital at incorporation, €11.5K goes up to Tigliola Resort almost immediately. And it’s an understatement to say these funds were never meant to buy the land. As early as 10 January, €5.4K goes to the architect Claude Sarais. Besides the fact that he only works in southern Corsica, as his website says, his firm confirmed to me without hesitation that these payments corresponded to administrative adjustments… for Casa Isula.
There are also 6 transfers to Be@liv, for nearly €95K, then €5K to Tigliola Resort, and €61K to Casa Isula’s accounts. So that by the end of January 2023, the accounts are empty.
For his part, Laurent Villa defends himself.
Q. Were Antibes funds used for Casa Isula?
A. No, he replies: the funds for Casa Isula are dedicated to Casa Isula. He explains that the group centralises cash in the parent holding companies, which he says is perfectly legal.
Which is possible. And indeed, the bond contract does not explicitly set out the purpose of the financing or where the funds should go. The problem is that this pattern shows up systematically as soon as a Tudigo transfer arrives. Case in point, when the platform sends the March 2023 tranche, a month after the land should have been bought:
Better still, €59K of this raise is used to pay… the coupons, including €19K for Corsica.
Extracts from the accounts of Tigliola Cap d’Antibes
And this little merry-go-round happens every time.
Extracts from the accounts of Tigliola Cap d’Antibes
Plenty of other expenses are puzzling, such as €173 of cushions, €721 of paint, €562 at Zara Home or €218 at Maisons du Monde for a company that hasn’t started any works on its only property.
And that’s not counting a flight of nearly €3,500 on Qatar Airways, or the €125K fees Laurent Villa pays himself as managing director the day after the last Tudigo tranche. Even Laurent Villa’s social security contributions to the CARTI and the CAMTI in Monaco, for €4,500, are paid by the SPV. As are nearly €1,000 for a hotel in Italy and a €150 Uber Eats order.
Admittedly, there are several invoices for building work that look genuine enough, like at Gedimat, a builders’ merchant. Except that, like the other card payments made the same day at Ettori Taddei, the spending takes place in Corsica.
At the end of July, things get tense, because there are no more raises and the funds will soon hit zero. The holding company Be@liv sends €49K to top up the SPV. Casa Isula sends back €11.5K, which makes it possible to pay Tudigo.
Except that it’s over: there is nothing left.
And the findings are extremely harsh:
But hey, at a pinch, as long as the instalments get paid.
🙄