At the end of 2023, Laurent Villa tries to multiply the deals. According to him, it is a way of creating even more value, and therefore of being able to repay investors. To the point that one report lists a surprising number of projects, with promises that are just as surprising, adding up to €73M of value net of debt. To justify all this, the report includes a very strange table.
Report written by one of Laurent Villa’s companies, circulated by Tudigo to its investors
So many deals! Except that, here again… let’s take a closer look at the list.
So we are, and it’s becoming a habit, in a vast charade where a third of the deals aren’t deals at all, others have nothing to do with property dealing, and the rest don’t correspond to anything much that is real.
The rest of the document also claims that Tigliola is expecting:
But to justify all the financing, Villa and Albertini put forward a whole range of sources:
I won’t go back over the Tylia issue, but that’s a lot of money and I can already state that:
Yet in the document, Capicciola / Palombaggia is clearly listed as financed.
And yet, and yet, this project is, to coin a phrase, another fine mess.
At the start of 2024, Laurent Villa does the rounds to finance a set of 17 houses in a hotel residence: 1,405m² in a splendid park in Palombaggia, south-east of Porto-Vecchio, one of the most expensive areas of the island, in the island’s most expensive town.
Laurent Villa explains that he had an offer of €3.75M accepted, for a total project cost of €4.3M.
His idea is to split the estate into individual residences, sell them off one by one and pocket €8.5M at the end.
On the agenda:
In mid-August 2024, the project arrives on Bricks, and is promoted by Argent&Salaire22 with this statement:
the overall investment is estimated at around €5.4M for the acquisition, renovation works and financing costs […], and Laurent Villa undertakes to inject at least €1.2M of equity into the deal, and up to €1.5M if necessary, to ensure the project’s financial solidity.
Four months earlier, the amount was €4.8M. But hey, why not. On Bricks, Villa asks for €2.55M over 2 years, with a first-ranking mortgage on the property and his personal guarantee.
The fundraising explodes and the €2.55M sought ends up reaching €4.2M, almost the initial amount of the project.
At another affiliate-link seller, Objectif Renta23, the mortgage cover gets top marks. When in reality, nothing in the documents makes it possible to determine the market value of the property. Because in reality, you might wonder what all this money is for.
In April, the amount offered to investors looked like this:
Be that as it may, we are indeed looking at €4.5M of total financing. So when Villa raises €4.2M on Bricks, there is every reason to doubt his announced financial commitment:
Laurent Villa undertakes to inject at least €1.2M of equity into the project, with the possibility of increasing this contribution to €1.5M if necessary.
So how can anyone imagine raising several million on Bricks, when he has piled up delays on Tudigo? It isn’t just my question, it’s also what Tudigo… and Bricks are asking themselves.
Well, by putting in €1.75M in cash via FI2R, a Swiss company we’ll come back to, and SCP Albertini MC, a Monaco company owned by Chloé Albertini.
Then add the sale of a flat for just over €900K, the sale of the café Allées de la Liberté for €3.25M, and a Corsican VAT refund of €850K.
And presto, €6.8M pulled out of a hat in time for September.
Better still, the sale of the Corsican villa had supposedly been approved by a bank for €10M, making it possible to repay Tudigo the €3M in arrears.
At least, that’s what Laurent Villa’s teams claim.
Bricks does not question the raise, and the funds are raised in record time. But, according to my information, off the record, tension is rising because the Bricks teams were presented with a fait accompli after the event:
Laurent Villa denies this, and says he clearly gave the information to Bricks:
He calls this false, and says [Cédric O’Neill of Bricks] received the information, in particular through financial intermediaries who can testify to it. He adds that even after the campaign was approved […] [he] wanted to strengthen the security on the deal […] after receiving alarming calls from Tudigo about him.
And indeed, several of the insolvency proceedings had been public for some time. In reality, it seems that, on the one hand, the Tudigo teams had told Bricks about their history with him, because for a few months several projects had stopped paying their debts. Which also prompted many investors to react on several specialist forums:
One of them wrote that crowdfunding was turning into a free-for-all, and asked what exactly AMF regulation was for. 24
That said, while some proceedings were public, it seems Laurent Villa forgot the lawsuits in which his personal guarantee is about to be called. This is also a point that reportedly made Bricks doubtful, because several people were surprised that Villa and Albertini were always guarantors for millions, without anyone really seeing their assets.
Especially since, over the summer, Tudigo repeatedly communicated about Laurent Villa’s ongoing defaults. In July 2024, a few weeks before Laurent Villa arrived on Bricks, for reasons explained in a newsletter, the platform began informing its investors about the 3 series of projects (Corsica, Antibes, Tribeca), saying that the company claimed its situation would allow for more regularity, and then, in bold and underlined, that it was reassuring them about the state of the projects.
It then explained that an audit was under way, linked in particular to the arrival of GOD, which I had written about in a previous issue, and that a more detailed update would follow at the end of the summer:
the management team, it said, had decided to appoint a firm of experts to carry out a full audit of the RX Venture Group, in order to give everyone visibility over the group’s cash flows.
During a video call in September, Tudigo’s representatives are scathing, describing:
More broadly, it seems Bricks is also starting to doubt whether Laurent Villa’s contributions are real, even though they are a commitment meant to de-risk the investment.
The equity in fact becomes a sticking point: the €1.5M supposed to be put in before the funds, now with Bricks, are released, is slow to come. And if it’s taking so long, it’s quite complicatedly because this €3.1M of negotiated equity… is largely financed by another investor. With the situation apparently bogged down, an English fund offers to put in €2.5M, while Tigliola would only contribute €600K.
Whereas at the outset, Laurent Villa was supposed to put in €1.5M and personally buy one of the villas for €2M, his actual contribution shrinks to €600K. Here again, he says he is counting on a VAT refund and a regional subsidy which, he says, will come through at the end of September or in October [2024]. Items he was already mentioning in an earlier file, and also in his investor repayment plan at the end of episode 1.
Except that, according to my information, the fund turned the deal down, and after long weeks of negotiations, Bricks tells its investors on 24 October 2024 that the project is cancelled. Not because the project is bad, but because of Laurent Villa himself, as Bricks writes:
the platform says it was trust in the project owner that had been called into question. It says it had recently received information about his track record, in particular difficulties in honouring his payment commitments on other financing platforms. Although it had tried to strengthen the security by increasing the guarantees and switching from a mortgage to a trust arrangement (a fiducie), it considered it was in its investors’ interest to take preventive measures.
More seriously, since 6 August 2024, Casa Isula has been under safeguard proceedings (a French court-supervised protection from creditors)25, opened while the financing was under way on Bricks. Which means that earlier debts are frozen. According to Bricks, it was never notified of this, although Laurent Villa denies it.
On 31 October 2024, the sale agreement expires. And the sellers sigh.
Because we talk a lot here in figures and abbreviations, but property isn’t just a matter of spreadsheets and yields.
In this case, the Capicciola is also the story of a couple selling for €3.7M in order to buy another house. If Laurent Villa’s offer persuaded them to lower their price a little, it was because they found him a smooth talker, if a bit of a megalomaniac, but above all because he was making an offer with no financing condition. So by 31 October 2024 at the latest, the deal is in the bag and the couple can complete the purchase of their new house.
Except that Laurent Villa goes completely silent.
The couple say he didn’t have the decency to tell them he hadn’t managed it. Nothing at all. He never got in touch again.
Yet for months, he had practically moved in. A manager had been trained on site, investors had come several times. But above all, Laurent Villa had asked the sellers to stop working with the big works councils (the staff committees that book holidays for company employees) who filled their season, so that he could operate freely. Except that by cancelling the project, Villa above all wrecked the couple’s season, leaving them with several completely empty months. All while urgently asking the bank for a bridging loan to finance the other house.
At most they can console themselves with memories of visiting the Tigliola villa, some twenty kilometres north of their estate. Enough to see the water leaks that had brought down nearly 8 metres of plasterboard.
As for Tudigo, the platform will end up obtaining judgments against Laurent Villa’s companies 9 times in July, as I explained in episode 1. A few weeks earlier, the platform was clearly pointing the finger at Villa in response to investors’ complaints:
the platform wrote that the project owner’s failure to show any sign of life for several months, combined with troubling information discovered after the fact (in particular in connection with the purchase of the land), had strengthened its suspicions of possible fraudulent manoeuvres. […]
Faced with these repeated failures, it added, its legal department had taken several firm steps, including filing a criminal complaint against Laurent Villa for acts that could be classified as fraud, and a report to the AMF.