But let’s go back a little to Tudigo, which will finance three of Laurent Villa’s restaurants in the second half of 2022:
For Montparnasse, Villa announces €675K from RX Retail in a shareholder current account, and offers a first-demand guarantee (GAPD) on RX Green Venture.
The Tribeca Montparnasse raise on Tudigo.
And the timing is pretty strange: it is October 2022, and Laurent Villa is looking for €750K to fund €1.4M of works (by his account), supposed to have been finished 18 months earlier, for a restaurant supposed to have opened more than a year before, even though for two years he has never had access to the bare shell.
Better still: to show how solid the group is, one slide lists all the restaurants. You have to wonder who signed off on announcing an opening at the end of 2022 for a restaurant whose works, not yet started, are still being financed in October 2022…
The group’s presentation in the Tudigo documentation.
In the same vein, Tudigo reassures its investors by explaining that the group has already completed 5 bond raises for €3.1M, with 0 delays and 0 defaults. Presumably, this refers to:
And all this apparently without checking the actual health of the restaurants, or being able to get into them. Just as Tudigo seems to have no trouble displaying a forecast of €4.6M in turnover over 12 months in 2023, which would require opening within two months even though the works have not started. That figure is also far below the €7.6M announced on Raizers. All this for a so-called SAS Tribeca Montparnasse, a company that never existed, and which lets Tudigo give it, on a scale from 1 (very risky) to 4 (low risk), a nice light green colour corresponding to 3.
To finish convincing you that the platform couldn’t care less about either the investors or the project, the risk slide overflows, and nobody seems to have noticed that the “Situation financière” [Financial situation] line is not even legible. Even though it was probably the single most important point…
The risk slide, in the Tudigo documentation.
That said, the very question of feasibility arises. Because when the file reached Raizers, the plan was:
You might already be surprised that so much money was spent when the works never even began. Laurent Villa explains that he had to order equipment, pay fees, and so on. Fair enough. But what happened between the end of 2020, when the €2M arrives, and the end of 2022? In other words:
Why is the budget still not closed, notably through the SquareStones raise?
What changed enough in the negotiations with Altarea to justify that, at this precise date, the works could begin, when nothing had happened for two years?
Especially since, in the meantime, the RX Industries project has crashed.
The idea behind RX Industries is to centralise production, so that the restaurant in town X gets the same bread or the same desserts as the one in town Y, standardising the experience and rationalising tastes. A first production line opens, then a second, smaller one, and the purpose of financing this new project is to bring the two together in a single factory. RX Industries notably obtains €200K of funding from the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur regional council, which mentions a total cost of €6.2M for the project.
The regional council’s repayable advance to RX Industries.
Four units are rented from Valimmo, a local property company and asset manager regulated by the AMF, France’s financial markets regulator, which owns a great many units in the area. Contrary to what investors and the regional council are told, it is not RX Industries that signs the lease, but BeefHouse Group, the restaurants’ holding company. A very strange choice, since it puts the burden on Group Clav (the older restaurants) instead of on the RX Venture / RX Industries branch, which carries the new project and received the money. Of the four units rented, only one will end up being fitted out.
But as early as April 2022, the first arrears appear. The landlord sues BeefHouse Group, which agrees at the September 2022 hearing to leave the premises and forfeit its deposit, in exchange for the arrears being written off.
This failure strains the negotiations with the Swiss pool. Because throughout the summer of 2022, Laurent Villa is negotiating hard, while the investors have put only €3.4M into the first tranche, originally planned at €5M. They are surprised that the opening planned for Q2 2022 (and even 2021 for Raizers) has not happened, that the works still have not started, and they even object to the Tudigo financings, which they find far too expensive (12% against 7% for their convertible bonds).
Worse: in October 2022, as RX Venture is wrapping up its raises on Tudigo, the interest owed to the SquareStones investors is not paid. And it never will be again.
Which inevitably raises the following question:
Since the Swiss pool was not going to put in any more money;
Since the structures were already in trouble;
Since relations with Altarea had soured;
Since the shell had not been handed over;
Since the works could not move forward;
Why raise money on Tudigo?
And since none of the three Tudigo projects came to anything, where did the money go?
Because the companies’ bank statements in early 2023, barely a few months after the raises for works that were clearly never done, show that the Marseille restaurant no longer holds the Tudigo money.
In red, 2 of the 3 companies financed by Tudigo, showing that the money is no longer in the accounts of Tribeca Marseille