From 2023, letters and other attempts at an amicable settlement turn into legal action. The group of SquareStones investors wins a summary ruling in October 2023. RX Venture, after trying a few procedural points, argues that the convertible bonds are not yet either repayable or convertible, and are therefore not overdue. But the judge orders RX Venture to pay the costs and to repay €3.7M without delay.
RX Venture appeals, hoping to challenge the obligation to pay. But the creditors short-circuit this strategy by invoking Article 524 of the French Code of Civil Procedure: no pay, no play.
The Aix-en-Provence court of appeal sides with them in June 2024 and even refuses to examine RX Venture’s arguments, saying that as long as the sum is not paid, it will not hear the appeal. The appeal is struck out, in other words thrown out before it is even heard.
The pool even tries to have the company forcibly liquidated, but the courts refuse since the debt is still disputed by RX Venture: that will have to wait for a ruling on the merits (and on the funds).
Still, armed with an enforceable title, the creditors try to seize money directly from the accounts. Except there is nothing left:
RX Industries is immediately declared insolvent, with €1.5M of liabilities… and €0 of assets. We then learn that its 2023 turnover was €282K. Same for RX Retail: €382K of liabilities, €0 of assets, 2023 turnover of €139K.
Then most of the operating companies go under, such as Tribeca Cap 3000 (November 2023), which leaves €2.4M of debt against €0 of assets, after a petition for receivership… filed by an employee who was no longer being paid. Or BeefHouse Toulon, which leaves its 25 employees in the lurch with €2M of liabilities and only €11K in cash.
It was not possible to establish the exact state of the liabilities, since the companies’ debts are mixed up with the groups’, where investors’ claims (sometimes) appear lumped together with rent. At the very least, we get:
Who is waiting for their money
That is probably €20M to €30M in total.
Several times, Laurent Villa explained to me that he disputes some of these debts:
Even so, he also says he wants to agree a settlement to repay the crowdfunding creditors, but that the platforms prevent him from talking to them directly. Because indeed, as I explained in the newsletter over which Villa sued me, the platforms jealously guard their contact with investors since they represent the body of bondholders, and are therefore in charge of litigation, even though they are originally paid by the borrower. Which is an obvious conflict of interest, and we now see every week, in other files, why that is a problem.
This repayment would include the €6M of retail investors’ bonds in BHI, plus Raizers and Tudigo, roughly €10M. But with what money, since all the companies just mentioned are empty, and his personal wealth clearly cannot cover such a sum?
Well, through two bold assumptions:
While the first is highly uncertain, given everything explained above and the unpredictability of any court case, the second will be covered at great length in the second episode, on the property side. And it is hardly more certain.
All the more so as, in light of past events, several proceedings have been launched. At the end of 2024, the SquareStones shareholders file a complaint as civil parties, and another criminal complaint, against Laurent Villa and his companies, because they were never repaid and believe the money was used for purposes other than the RX Industries factory and the Tribeca Montparnasse restaurant. Their aim is clear: to make Laurent Villa personally liable and obtain an extension of the insolvency proceedings to him, so as to be repaid more widely than from companies with nothing left in them.
Laurent Villa openly accuses the SquareStones investors of wanting to grab his company on the cheap, saying they are qualified investors who knew what they were doing and had carried out all the necessary audits.
In the second half of 2025 alone, at least three rulings are expected in proceedings brought by or against Laurent Villa, in the Swiss pool case alone.
On the Tudigo side, after mediation between April and October 2024, proceedings were launched, joined with the property strand, and the platform announced that it had filed a complaint against Laurent Villa and reported him to the AMF, France’s financial markets regulator. Asked for comment, Tudigo says the disputes have already led to court rulings against him. And it adds:
As in any complex fraud case, according to the platform, the conduct was concealed by sophisticated means, including forged documents, undetectable ex ante despite enhanced due diligence.
And indeed, on 8 July this year, Laurent Villa’s companies were ordered to pay nine times in cases brought by Tudigo, after a hearing they did not attend:
That is €7.4M.
As for Raizers, in January 2025 the platform asked a judge for permission to seize assets from the two guarantors, Villa and Albertini, and says it wants to call in… its first-demand guarantee (GAPD) on Group Clav. One may well wonder why the GAPD comes up more than two years after the default, and how the platform hopes to recover a single euro from an empty shell in receivership.
In his defence, Laurent Villa cites the Talon report, named after François Talon, the chartered accountant appointed by the Cannes commercial court to audit the group in December 2023, and delivered in September 2024. According to him, this report found no wrongdoing whatsoever and, on the contrary, proves over 386 pages that his management was sound and his accounts properly kept.
When I ask him whether I can read it, he first tells me it is a shambles to read, that I should ask his lawyers, but that he will send me a summary written by a lawyer.
Except that the summary I receive… is signed by Laurent Villa.
He asks me to inform my readers of what the Talon report contains, adding that if I do not, it will confirm my wish to harm him personally in response to his defamation suit against me.
Since that was our deal for him to agree to talk to me, here are the most significant extracts, in substance22:
His group, he writes, was never placed in receivership; this financial and legal strategy allowed it to withstand market difficulties. […]
According to him, the expert report highlights a great many important points […]:
His management is not to be called into question […]
There was never any personal enrichment of any kind on his part […]
The PGE loans were in no way diverted […]
[…] The CECAZ, for its part, did take advantage of the PGE loans to repay its own short-term credit lines […]
He wants, through Rx Venture, to repay the Tudigo loans […] [and those made] through other intermediaries, across the whole legal perimeter of the Be@Liv group, Groupe Clav and BHI.