Except the story gets off to a very bad start, just 6 months later. In the meantime, Sonia Fendler has arrived as deputy CEO14. A former Generali executive who also chaired Altixia, she is an expert on IFAs. By all accounts she is a consummate professional, who understands her clients, listens to them, and seems to be universally liked among wealth professionals. When she sends her New Year greetings in January 2025, putting security at the very top of her email, she obviously has no idea what is about to hit her, and the whole company, a few weeks later.
During the night of 26 to 27 February, several problems are detected, and the tools go down one after another. After a quick message to clients to let them know, Harvest’s HR director alerts the whole company.
But according to my information, the attack had begun several days earlier, when the hacking group Run Some Wares exploited a vulnerability in a Mitel VoIP phone system to obtain administrator rights. The flaw had been known since October 2024, and rated 9.8/10 for severity by Mitel15. Our colleagues at MagIT, a French IT trade publication, explained the technical details (here and here, in French), adding along the way that they saw no glaring error of judgement on Harvest’s part.
Nothing in this cursory review, MagIT wrote, points to a company that had neglected the security of its information systems.
According to several matching sources, the device in question was supplied by Waycom. Admittedly, it was no longer in use, and therefore no longer maintained… but it had stayed connected.
And yet Harvest regards Waycom, just like Budget Insight, which handles bank account connections, as one of its two critical suppliers16, because on top of telephony, it supplies the servers that host the applications. As the regulations require, those servers are all in France.
That said, internal control had flagged numerous shortcomings at Waycom (22 in 2022) as Harvest was working towards ISO 27001 certification for its Wealth Platform. But operational risk, notably IT17 risk, is clearly taken into account, and as in most big companies of this kind, a BCP18 and crisis scenarios are in place.
More broadly, the problem was not entirely unknown either to Harvest or to its new owners. Because in 2023, when the sale was decided, an independent audit was commissioned from Oliver Wyman, which clearly highlighted the risk of ransomware19.
That means the backups (copies of data kept for restoring systems when something goes wrong) can be modified or deleted, and that in a ransomware attack, hackers can encrypt or wipe the backups, making it impossible to restore the systems’ data. If I were feeling mischievous, I’d say Harvest now enjoys open access to its backups…
But this isn’t just one security problem among others. Several dozen vulnerabilities were identified, including a high number of critical flaws in Feefty, the structured products platform bought a few months before the audit. In all, 26 critical flaws were open at the time of the audit. Each stayed open for 200 days on average, against 5 to 10 days at most for the industry average.
Finally, the audit pointed to the absence of a SOC20, meaning no automatic detection of suspicious activity on the network or in the databases was in place, nor any centralisation of activity logs. So the company cannot know whether it is under attack, nor investigate after the fact. A SOC was reportedly planned for 2024, though it is impossible to say whether it was set up (or not). This was the cause of 24 incidents during the year, which were only detected through manual monitoring. Raising the risk accordingly.
Overall, the report concludes:
For a SaaS company of this size, the auditors judge its cybersecurity maturity to be low to moderate.