So yes, even though Harvest’s communications have always confined themselves to playing down the scope of the leaks, you could perfectly well reply that it isn’t up to them to decide. Admittedly, the fact that their strategies, chunks of code, accounting documents or highly sensitive information about their employees have leaked is, in a way, their problem.
Yet Harvest repeated it on Friday 11 April: there was supposedly nothing sensitive in the data.
In its statement, Harvest deplored the actions of criminals who also published its exchanges with specialist negotiators, held to buy time and with the approval of the authorities, and noted that its employees’ data had been published, along with other information it described as neither sensitive nor personal, such as a few contracts and draft documents.
But it isn’t up to them to judge how serious the leak is for their clients, as a senior manager at a large group, who is also its DPO, explains to me:
It is our clients’ data that is now out in the wild, he says, and the CNIL, France’s data protection regulator, requires us to warn them; wherever the problem comes from, even if we explain it is down to a supplier, it is us that our clients blame.
Another DPO, at the insurance arm of a large banking group, says much the same.
They told us the data hadn’t been exfiltrated, this DPO says; it took them a while to realise that a file server had been compromised along the way, and even if they did send over the details of the data it held, he would like to be sure they did so for everyone...
Sadly, they didn’t.
Take MAIF, a French mutual insurer, for example: several tens of thousands of notes written by advisers at MSF23 leaked, with very precise wealth information, each time followed by the member’s first and last name.
From the end of February, MAIF, like BPCE or Banque Palatine, had informed customers that their data had leaked, as their obligations require. The CNIL also confirmed to me that it had received notifications, not only from Harvest, but also from several other companies.
The problem is that several files contain remarks that go far beyond wealth information, as these extracts show.
This kind of information, found in the data of several Harvest clients, could clearly lead to sanctions from the CNIL, according to a lawyer I consulted. Especially since a large share of it (at any rate, everything quoted above) is followed by the first and last name of the person concerned.
When contacted, MAIF didn’t dodge the question, confirming that the information was genuine (from a file dating from 2021) and telling me it had carried out an audit showing that these comments were isolated cases, linked to instructions being poorly applied. And it added:
To stop these practices happening again, MAIF says, MSF has for several years put in place a series of awareness and tighter control measures to protect personal data, notably:
Data protection awareness sessions, in particular on the use of free-text comment fields, held for all MSF staff in 2022 and in 2024.
Training on these issues for all employees when they join MSF, then every two years, with particular attention to the use of free-text comment fields and to good practice.
But the most astonishing part… is how MAIF’s answer begins:
These files, MAIF says, were never mentioned by Harvest when it listed the impacts of the cyberattack.
Yes.
You read that right.
After playing down the impact for 2 months, after threatening those who revealed how serious the leaks were, Harvest stated plainly that there was no sensitive information, without ever having checked the data in its own leak. And in the same way that Harvest lied when it said it had contacted all the IFAs concerned (as the dozens of professionals who told me the opposite show), Harvest wasn’t even able to inform its clients about the most serious cases.
Even though, ever since talks with the hackers began, they have had the list of the 813,581 stolen files.