Harvest is obviously not to blame for being hacked, and you can understand Sonia Fendler’s point when she suggests, between the lines, that anyone can be hacked.
Fair enough.
But the flippant words and the inconsistent communication look problematic and very amateurish given the consequences for their clients. And even for their employees, whose passports, payslips, children’s school reports and tax returns are now out in the wild.
If I opened this newsletter with a long introduction on Harvest, it’s because that history is probably not unrelated to the problem. This is an old group that grew fast by buying other companies, probably with poorly compatible IT systems, and for which security, without being entirely ignored or secondary, does not seem to have been an absolute priority.
And yet what is finance, if not trust? If people pour money into current accounts and regulated savings accounts, it’s because they believe in the system. If they prefer capital-guaranteed life insurance funds, or products loaded with fees, it’s because they trust the intermediaries, the bankers, the fund managers and so on.
That trust is what Harvest has just shattered, very violently. Obviously by suffering a large-scale hack, which could still get worse, since the hackers may still hold data that hasn’t been sold or revealed. But above all through disastrous, opaque communication towards its clients.
The company is probably not at risk of financial trouble in the very short term, given its level of EBITDA. But the question of its future arises.
How can anyone imagine IFAs continuing to trust Harvest after this, even if there aren’t many alternatives, when one of its rare responses was to offer a free period… while the product wasn’t available? Especially once they have all had to inform their own clients, as the CNIL’s rules require.
How can anyone imagine the institutions, fund managers and other big insurers, especially those whose names have come out in the press, carrying on working with it in the short term? Not because Harvest is a bad company, or provides bad services. But for fear of guilt by association.
All the more so since, on top of the IFA trade bodies that have announced they are considering legal action, 3 big insurers confirmed to me off the record that they have instructed lawyers to assess their losses with a view to suing Harvest.
A collapse of the company in the medium term remains unlikely. Especially as some products, such as Quantalys, are fairly far removed from all this, and low-risk. But clearly, the fallout is going to be extremely violent, both in lost clients and in the provisions Harvest will have to set aside for the lawsuits to come (even though that obviously implies no guilt or liability whatsoever) and for the investigations by the various regulators.
Among those regulators is, of course, the ACPR, France’s banking and insurance supervisor, since under PSD224, Harvest is licensed as an AISP25 to aggregate savers’ transactions. The very same transactions that turn up by the bucketload, sometimes fully identifiable (identity, product, amount, date), in the leaked files.
And this just as DORA26, 3 years after its adoption, came into force on 17 January, imposing a complete regulatory framework on ICT risk management for the financial sector. While nothing at this stage shows that Harvest had failed to comply with DORA, and while, what’s more, several security and emergency procedures were indeed in place, this leak is a serious failure.
It also exposes the limits of some big organisations. Because the point here is not to claim that the various entities named don’t care, and never did anything to protect the data. That’s false. But what these failures show is that whatever is decided at the top, in an executive committee or an M&A deal, which ends up in a PowerPoint sent to managers who will in turn explain it to the people on the ground, doesn’t work. Or not always. Or not well.
Everyone who has worked in finance or insurance knows this… and so does everyone else, obviously. Who has never had a confidential file lingering on their work computer when it should have been destroyed? Or run full data extracts that should have been partial? Or brought home, then stored, work files on their personal computer? And I don’t exempt myself.
Conversely, companies that impose ultra-strict management of work data, blocking plenty of access and websites, irritate employees who can no longer check their email, look at their holiday booking, or download the non-approved software they need. And that grates.
Still, none of this is new.
And in the end, a company does what it likes with its own data. It alone is responsible, and it alone is hit, if its patents, its code, its applications or its figures get out.
But that isn’t the case when you are responsible for other people’s data.
So no, the Harvest affair isn’t just a ransomware attack.
The Harvest affair isn’t just a leak.
It is above all the failure of a system.
Given the formal notice sent by its lawyers after the first revelations, Harvest was not approached for comment, but will be entitled to a statutory right of reply if it wishes.
When contacted, the ACPR did not respond.
The CNIL confirmed that it had recorded a data breach notification from the company, but said it could not share any further details, the case being under investigation.