💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 05

He who laughs last laughs greenest

That leaves the only question that matters: what is a niche green neobank really worth? The previous chapter left a confusion, the small business mistaken for a unicorn in the making, and only the numbers can settle it. First, they show a real company.

It brings in money, and more and more of it.

Green-Got's accounts, reconstructed

Annual accounts of Domino SAS, 2021 to 2025, appended to the 2024 and 2026 Crowdcube fundraising documents.

In 2021, Green-Got had €666 of revenue27. Funny enough to be worth noting. Four years later, €4.31M21. The growth is real. But it leans more and more towards life insurance, absent until 2024 and already nearly a quarter of revenue in 2025, in other words towards fees and the markets, not towards the account.

Since it isn't profitable, the cash engine isn't the business but the fundraising. Cash jumps with each round, then slowly melts between rounds. That said, with €4.43M invested21, Green-Got isn't on its knees and would have around 24 months of runway. Which, in the end, might raise questions about the 2026 round.

That said, the loss, stable on the face of it, is flattered. These accounts capitalise €1.28M of research and development21, booked on the balance sheet as an investment rather than expensed. Restated, the real 2025 loss is closer to €3.1M.

Even though its founder has said several times that banks' executive committees were afraid of her: at this scale, Green-Got is a minnow. An N26 claims 3M customers, a Crédit Agricole counts them in tens of millions and its balance sheet in hundreds of billions. Green-Got claims about 55,000 accounts and €180M of assets13. A small business, a solid one, but a small business.

Then there's the price it puts on itself. Green-Got values itself at €78.4M pre-money fully diluted, €72.5M undiluted, and sets its share price at €26.21, or 2,621 times its nominal value21.

But is it worth that price?

Three rounds, a rising price, shrinking rights

CFNews, Crowdcube documents from November 2024 and June 2026. Multiple: valuation over revenue for the financial year.

In 2023, the share was worth €9, with Pale Blue Dot signing off on €25M22. Since then, no outsider at all. In November 2024, the share goes to €19.6227, the valuation to ~€50M, and the community pays, with no outside opinion. In June 2026, €26.21 and therefore €78.4M: +34% on the price in 19 months, +57% on the valuation, without any third party coming in to reprice the company since Pale Blue Dot. That's about 18x revenue. That said, across the three rounds, the multiple is easing: 21x in 2023, 21x in 2024, 18x in 2026.

Is that a lot? In absolute terms, yes. 18x is the territory of a Nubank or a Revolut, listed or nearly so, profitable, which nonetheless trade at 5-12x their sales. And when Klarna was showing 45x in 2021, that was the heyday of free money. The sector has since fallen back to 5 or 8x, even if a few outliers pull the average up38.

How many times its revenue

Finro, Nu Holdings, Revolut, Crowdcube documents, Younited.

Surprisingly (or not), you find the same oddity at Bitstack, which recently raised €3.8M on the same Crowdcube last March, at a pre-money valuation of €52M for €2.45M of last audited revenue, or 21x39. All of it to invest not in the company itself, at the time a registered crypto-asset service provider (PSAN) in France and now licensed under MiCA, the EU crypto rules. But in an obscure Delaware company, Bitstack Inc., via a British SPV, Bitstack Crowd Limited39, keeping investors at arm's length.

But there's a case even closer to Green-Got: its direct competitor.

Helios is Green-Got almost word for word: an account that swears not to fund oil, true believers rallied around the mission, a fundraising trajectory that rings a bell. In April 2022, the company raises €9M from impact investors: Racine2, the fund of the MGEN, a French mutual health insurer, run by Serena and makesense, RAISE Seed for Good and business angels. Co-created in March 2020 with 20,000 people, it claimed 50,000 a year later40.

Here again, retail was tapped, via Tudigo, a French crowdfunding platform41. A glossy document touts three pillars, cleaning up deposits, spending and investment, and a crystal-clear promise: make banking an ecological act. The numbers are dizzying. Median scenario, 454K active accounts and €30M of revenue, up to 889K accounts and €68M at the top end. The potential valuation on display climbs to €238M, the multiple promised to the investor, 6x42.

Helios: the deck's promise, and the price paid

Helios fundraising presentation, Tudigo, 2023; Younited 2025 annual report, note 5.1.

The future will tell the opposite story.

True, Helios's growth is real: revenue almost triples over three financial years, €424K in 2022, €568K in 2023, €1.18M in 2024. But losses stay stuck at around €2.3M-€2.4M a year. Equity melts, €4.09M then €3.88M then €1.42M, and cash follows the same slope, €4.3M in 2022, €338K at the end of 2023, €518K at the end of 202443. The promised €15M round never happened: rates went back up and consumer fintechs stopped making anyone dream.

The chartered accountant's report on Helios's 2023 accounts: €567,590.81 of revenue, a loss of €2.33M.

The verdict comes on 28 July 2025. The ex-unicorn Younited, which broke its horn on the stock market, buys 100% of Helios44. Joyful LinkedIn posts rain down. Tudigo says nothing… because the platform learns about the exit live. The Tudigo shareholders' agreement included a drag-along clause, the same one already seen at Sugru: the majority accepts the offer and the minority is forced to follow. The vehicle of the 1,200 had no say. And nobody even thought of warning them.

“Acquired by Younited”.

Beneath the confetti and the air kisses, a number.

And even then. €0.98M in cash and the rest, €6.10M, in its own shares44. Even a Primonial fund manager would grasp that this is rather far from the promised €238M, and that, coming in below the total amount raised, the deal can't really be a good one.

Younited describes the deal as a “bargain purchase”, a knock-down buy, and books a gain of €3.8M the very same day, the gap between the price paid… and the value of the net assets, €10.9M. Well, in reality there was obviously nothing but software (€15M) and customers (€1.8M), minus €2M of debt44.

In the same document, Helios is described as being in “financial distress”. In short: no cash left, and unable to raise.

Note 5.1 of Younited's 2025 annual report: €0.98M in cash, €6.10M in shares, a gain of €3.81M, and a company bought “in a financial distress situation”.

Each Helios share is swapped for a lifetime supply of washing powder 10.56 Younited shares, based on a price of €10.80. Except that €10.80 never existed: Younited, which ended its first trading session in Paris at €9.50 in January 202545, was peaking at around €10.5 at signing. So the reference price given to the sellers is higher than the stock's recent high.

Younited share price on Boursier.com, with the high for the period.

And the buyer doesn't even rely on its own share price to set that reference: it declares it unreliable, for lack of a sufficiently active market44.

The Tudigo community had put in €2.20M for 19,334 Helios shares bought at €114.03. So it comes out with 204,134 Younited shares, counted on that €10.80 basis, which is exactly its original stake: no gain and no loss on paper on the day. Except that Younited pays in shares it issues for the occasion, free paper, which could never be sold at €10.80. At €7.50 in January 2026, the position falls to €1.53M. At about €6 in summer 2026, to €1.25M. Nearly half the stake gone up in smoke. And no way out to limit the damage: 80% of the shares were locked up until January 2026, and the remaining 20% serve as a guarantee for the buyer, 10% over 2 years, 10% over 3. Not exactly cause for sloppy kisses on LinkedIn.

What became of the Tudigo community's €2.20M

Younited 2025 annual report, note 5.1; Zero Bullshit.

The price Younited itself puts on its shares

In its 2025 annual report, Younited puts the share-based part of the payment at €6.10M, for 925,910 shares issued44. That's €6.59 a share, not €10.80. Lacking a stock market price it considered reliable, the buyer valued its own shares with a model discounting its future dividends.

Applied to the 204,134 shares received by the Tudigo investors, that price gives about €1.35M. On the very day of the swap, in the books of the one paying, the €2.20M stake was already worth only a little over 60% of that.

The moral fits in one line. Whoever has the cash picks up the carcass; the crowd is left holding the bag. Younited had the cash, took the code and the punters for next to nothing, and booked an accounting profit the same day. The believers had paid for the build. And Serena, a shareholder via Racine2, calls the deal an “exit”46, to do as the big boys do and win over future LPs (the investors in its funds). Off the record, everyone knows. But whatever you do, don't say it.

“This exit marks an important step”: Serena's post when the takeover was announced.

The same day, a post by a Serena partner.

The two founders have since turned the page, one into marketing at GreenGo, an eco-travel platform, the other to Younited, the buyer, before leaving again a few months ago.

What Helios changes is not that it foretells Green-Got's fate. Green-Got in 2026 is a better company: 4x the revenue, 2x the revenue per customer, €78 against €37 a year, and above all money in the drawer to get through the winter in the warm. So obviously, you can't reduce Green-Got to the €7M of a Younited clearance sale.

But it does give a few pointers for valuing a fintech in a tiny niche market. And some food for thought about the promises of crowdequity.