Let's go back one last time to 17 June 2026, and to the 5,286. Everyone remembers the record. But the story is what they became by clicking. Not investors: nobody here read the accounts or negotiated. Not donors: a donor knows they won't see their money again. Not customers: you don't consume a share. A new figure, poorer than all three, someone who carries a venture capitalist's risk without a single one of their tools.
And none of it is illegal. When Bricks sold royalties to individuals, the AMF, France's financial markets regulator, stepped in and drew a line47. When a company sells its equity to its community via a licensed platform, the asymmetry remains permitted: the data room for the fund, the brochure for the crowd, the price set by the seller. The fact that companies, regulated ones at that, never thought of filing their accounts at the registry is apparently a perfectly legal offence. The regulator knows how to act. Here, it chooses to let it happen. And, once again, the story goes far beyond the example of Green-Got.
That's what happens every time you hear ‘retailisation’ (if it's a guy in a suit talking) or ‘democratisation’ (if it's a guy in a hoodie with his logo on it). The same story repeats. Always.
The rich, the bankers, boo hoo. They have access to this. They're hiding that from you.
And I'm going to let you blah blah blah.
Reality hides a whole jumble of different terms, products that have nothing to do with each other, Niagara Falls of fees, and other delights tucked away in a PDF 43 clicks from the homepage.
The reality is that the big asset manager can't be bothered with 50,000 investors when it could have just 1,000. So at best, it's a slice of a fund stuck inside another fund (or tokenised, as they say these days) stuffed to the gills with fees. Or else retail simply serves as exit liquidity for institutions or insiders.
The classic example is the famous 12.4% a year over 10 years, supposedly private equity's average annual performance. It's true. A figure net of fees and carried interest, measured by France Invest, the French private equity industry body, and EY at the end of 202448. Except that it's an average. And investing deal by deal, you have no chance of benefiting from the law of large numbers. Returns follow a power law: about 60% of funded startups fail, 5% generate most of the gains, and the positions that return less than one times the money lose 81% on average. To have any hope of catching a winner, you need at least several dozen deals, 50 to 80 for an early-stage fund49. At €1K-€5K a ticket, ‘diversifying’ would therefore mean putting in €50K to €400K per cycle.
Out of 100 funded startups
How much does it take to ‘diversify’?
The theory also holds for quite a few VC funds, which are in fact FCPIs, French tax-advantaged innovation funds, an asset class whose average performance is below inflation, and even downright negative once you strip out the tax break50.
But for someone looking at all this from a great distance, who reads Les Échos, France's leading business daily, now and then (when they'd do better to read Zero Bullshit), who has no fucking idea what a SICAV (a French mutual fund) is, investing is a fuzzy thing. One where their decisions are swayed by all sorts of irrational stuff.
A cute little fox.
Baby shark, doo doo doo doo doo doo.
Or the memory of a glass in which they could read their age.
The problem is that in a few years, the wooden card could turn out to be a wooden nickel.