In 2025, then, some suppliers end up winning in court. They get enforceable judgments, they send in the bailiffs. The bank accounts of Merlin's companies are overdrawn or closed.
In the summer of 2025, one of them has a precautionary attachment carried out at 5 banks at once: BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Banque Palatine, Crédit Lyonnais and Crédit Agricole. Of the €395,992 claimed, 4 attachments come back empty. The fifth finds €201,12250 in an account lying around at Crédit Lyonnais. The coffers are empty. A few weeks before Shein.
In reality, the money is elsewhere. How? Well, that may be the whole story.
At the end of 2023, barely 7 weeks after the takeover, the store had moved nearly €30M out to its new owners.
💡 The 2 current accounts
A shareholder current account is not a bank account. It is a balance-sheet line that records who owes what to whom, inside the group. When one company advances money to another, or sends its cash up the chain, that is where it goes.
In this case, there are 2.
The store owes the group. These are the advances of 2023 and 2024. They will never be repaid: they are converted into shares. The debt disappears from the store's liabilities and reappears in its capital. Nothing comes in, nothing goes out, the line just changes its name. This is set-off.
The group owes the store. This is the cash taken at the tills every day, and sent up the chain. Nobody converts that into anything. It piles up, year after year, and it is still there on the day the store is sold.
2023 annual accounts of SEGM BHV, statement of receivables (page 16): €29,985,346 on the “Groupe et associés” [Group and associates] line, 7 weeks after the takeover.
The BHV was bought for €2 by a man it is already lending €30M to. €101M at the end of 2024. €106.5M at the end of 2025.
Internal document setting out the figures of SEGM BHV, the company that runs the BHV in Paris.
What the store has in the bank, and what the group owes it, in €M
2023 annual accounts of SEGM BHV (€29,985,346 “Groupe et associés”) and internal document of SEGM BHV (€101,201K and €106,509K, cash of €8,491K and €1,717K).
€71M over a full year, or nearly €6M a month on average. Then €5.5M over the whole of the following year.
2025 is the year the store's turnover falls by 30%. When brands leave by the dozen. When the group stops paying its bondholders, as we will see in the 2nd episode.
The problem is the orders of magnitude. In 2024, the store makes €1.67M, it has €8.5M of cash, but more than €100M out the door.
Even worse in 2025: €1.7M in the till. €106.5M out the door. That is enormous for this store.
Whereas in February 2026 the BHV owed between €13M and €17M to its suppliers and around €4.4M in court awards for unpaid bills, with a debt of about €70M being restructured in the summer of 2026.
In reality, the store was not short of money to pay its suppliers. It had enough to pay them all. But the dosh was elsewhere.
Which brings us to another of Merlin's recurring approximations. In December 2024, asked about the suppliers he isn't paying, Merlin replies19:
He says he put €38M of his group's fresh money into the BHV's capital, and asks what interest he would have, after putting in that much, in deliberately holding back payments to suppliers.
He says the same thing to Bourdin 18 months later, but with €20M more13:
To reassure the brands, telling them that payment times were long but that they would be paid, he says the company was overcapitalised: he put €58M of cash into the BHV's capital.
Both figures are true. But you still have to understand them. The €58M is the store's share capital, at 2 dates: it starts at €10K and reaches €58.01M at the end of 2024, in 4 operations.
Except that capital is not necessarily money received.
💡 The 2 ways to pay for shares
When a company increases its capital, whoever receives the shares has to pay for them. There are 2 ways of doing it, and they have nothing in common.
In cash. A transfer lands in the company's account, and the bank issues a certificate confirming the money is there. The cash position goes up.
By set-off. The subscriber already holds a claim on the company, because it lent or advanced money earlier. Instead of a transfer, the claim is cancelled in exchange for the shares. The debt leaves the liabilities, the capital rises by the same amount, and not a single euro moves.
This is not an interpretation: a deed that mentions set-off is saying there was no transfer.
So let's take the 4 operations51:
The €58M of cash said to have gone into the BHV's capital
The €38M of December 2024, thrown out before France's national representatives, are the first 2 set-offs. Bourdin's €58M is the total of all 4. Of that total, 91% never came in. And the €5M itself doesn't come out of his pocket: it comes from a capital increase decided the same month in the parent company.
One question remains, and it's the right one. These wiped-out claims must have come from somewhere. If the group had really advanced €30M to the store in 2023 before converting it into shares in 2024, it really would have put in €30M, at another date and in another form.
Except that the subscribing company was created in April 2023 with €10K of capital. 6 months later, it holds a certain, liquid and due claim of at least €8M on the store52. It did not have €8M to advance. Yet 20 months after it was created, its capital reaches €120M. At the same moment, the store is owed €30M by the group.
The guarantee offered to unpaid suppliers was money that never came in.
So the group wipes out what the store owes it by converting it into capital, while the store lets €106.5M of claims on the group run on. On one side it gets settled, on the other it piles up.
In other words, exactly the 2018 method.
And the set-off trick predates the store. On 2 May 2022, SEGM INVESTISSEMENTS, the shell set up 2 months earlier to take over the 7 Galeries Lafayette stores, raises its capital to €4.6M. Payable in cash, or by set-off against claims on the company. It will be set-off, entirely: the holding company for €2M, Jean-Paul Dufour for €2M, YESON for €688K. Not a euro comes in. A €4.59M debt disappears from the liabilities and reappears as capital.
8 months after it was created, the company that voted the €500K fee loses €434K.
The 20% it doesn't buy stays with Galeries Lafayette, which only sells it in December 2024. For 2 and a half years, the seller is a shareholder in the company that runs what it sold.
The €9M of cash the shell was missing is advanced by the parent company, in May 2022. On 3 October that year, the parent raises €21.5M from private investors. That €21.5M is the subject of the next issue.
5 years before the BHV, in the group's first companies, the money was already flowing in that direction.
💡 What the law allows between companies in the same group
A subsidiary can lend to its parent. This is an intra-group cash agreement, permitted between companies linked by shareholdings. Since 1985, French case law has attached 3 conditions to it.
1. A real, structured group with a coherent economic policy.
2. Something in return, which does not upset the balance of commitments.
3. Support that does not exceed the financial means of the company providing it.
The group plainly meets the first 2. It exists, it is structured, and lending is part of the corporate purpose of several of its companies, under the wording “le crédit interentreprises aux PME et aux sociétés liées” [inter-company credit to SMEs and related companies]. As for something in return, it is invoiced: €128,542 of interest in 2023.
That leaves the third, and it is the one judges look at first. Support that does not exceed the financial means of the company providing it. At the end of 2025, the store had lent its owner 62x what it had left in the bank. And meanwhile, it was paying its suppliers at 331.6 days.
Where does this money go, once sent up the chain?
Into a sort of clearing house. At the end of 2023, the parent company holds €77M of claims on its subsidiaries and owes them €48.9M. One floor down, the intermediate holding company has the same profile: €63.5M of claims against €47.1M of debts. And at the property dealer, €8M of claims on the group make up 92% of its assets. 3 companies, 3 floors, the same pattern: the money never stops anywhere, it circulates.
Several subsidiaries only stay standing thanks to a commitment from the parent company, even when they make money. And they get billed: head office takes €1.14M a year in fees from the company that employs the staff. In the same movement, it lends it €7.4M.
The problem is that not everyone is fooled, especially among the financial partners.
In January 2025, Merlin declares that every entity in the group is profitable, the BHV included53, and the group hails what it calls a historic return to profitability. The year he is talking about actually closes with losses in at least 5 companies, including €9.1M at the property company and €1.7M at the parent holding company. Merlin cannot be unaware of it: an accounting report explains that Groupe SGM is structurally loss-making.
The group's accounting report: it states that the department store business taken over by the group in 2022 and 2023 is structurally loss-making.
In June 2025, in exchange for a bank refinancing, the group pledges its entire property portfolio, the borrower's bank account, the shares of its main property company, and the rents themselves, assigned to the banks by deed. It is Arkea and the Caisse d'Épargne Grand Est that step in with €96M over 15 years, making it possible in particular to repay the €84.6M still owed on the Luxembourg loan and €1M of state-guaranteed Covid loans. For the occasion, the group merges two property companies to bring the 6 sites under one company. But above all, the lenders insisted on collecting the rents directly, so they will no longer feed into the group.