By the spring of 2026, nothing Merlin had been promised belongs to him any more. The buildings belong to a Canadian fund, which collects the store's rent. The rest of the rents go to his lenders. And above all, he has become radioactive since the Shein affair.
So he decides to sell the BHV. And he doesn't look very far for a buyer.
The buyer is Karl-Stéphane Cottendin, 31, managing director of the BHV since March 2025, replacing Emmanuelle Claverie-Veysset, ousted 16 months after her appointment. She had spent 17 years at Galeries Lafayette before taking over the store. At the time of the deal, then, he runs the company that is selling. He joined the property company in 2018, after spells at Merrill Lynch and Natixis54, the only bank Merlin had won over on the buildings.
Cottendin sets up the 3 companies meant to carry the project in April 2026, 2 months before the official announcement. Where Merlin lined up several banks and kept most of his companies at Banque Palatine in Lyon, Cottendin makes do with Qonto, an online business bank. No options. No overdraft. No financing.
One question remains. How much?
A valuation puts the operating company at €110M. But the exact terms have stayed secret. A source close to the negotiations, though, explains that Merlin will stay close, and that his group wrote a cheque to get the store off its hands, but above all is said to have committed to backing the project in the future. A resale clause is even said to be in the works.
Because in reality… the company is worth nothing.
What holds up the €110M is not the business. It is a €106.5M claim on the very group that is selling. On its own, it makes up 97% of the value used: the rest, including the right to occupy the building, valued at €69.9M, is swallowed by the liabilities.
The value put on the company that runs the BHV, in €M
As for the business itself, 2 months earlier, before the Paris court of appeal, the store's lawyers were arguing… that it didn't exist55. The argument wasn't rhetorical. It served to fend off court-supervised administration. The same business the store had booked as an asset at €7.8M, on its own projections, 3 years earlier.
And that is the heart of the matter, even if it isn't the heart of the business.
💡 What court-supervised administration would have opened up
A French court does not open administration proceedings because a company is doing badly. It opens them if it finds insolvency: the inability to meet the liabilities that are due with the assets available. A petition therefore forces it to set the 2 columns side by side.
Available assets are what can be mobilised straight away. Case law excludes receivables still to be collected.
And once the proceedings are open, 4 things become possible. Only at that point.
The court can backdate the date of insolvency to as much as 18 months before the judgment. Everything done in that window can then be challenged.
Among the acts targeted: payments made other than in money. Set-off is one of them.
A manager who failed to declare insolvency within 45 days can be banned from running a company.
And the prosecutor can bring charges of fraudulent bankruptcy. Without open proceedings, this offence does not exist.
Let's take it in order.
At the end of 2025, the store has €1.7M in the bank. It owes between €13M and €17M to its suppliers, and €4.4M has already been awarded by the courts. The comparison takes one line. It cannot pay.
Which leaves its defence. €106.5M out the door. More than everything it owes.
Except that the law doesn't ask whether a company is rich. It asks whether it can pay today. And a €106.5M claim on a parent company that an accounting report describes as structurally loss-making cannot be mobilised. Even if it were certain, liquid and fully recoverable, it would change nothing: it is not an available asset.
In other words, the line that makes up 97% of the store's value in the €110M valuation doesn't protect it. It incriminates it.
And a court-appointed administrator would have done what nobody did in 3 years. Demand the money back. An administrator has no choice: the job is to rebuild the debtor's assets. And the group doesn't have that €106.5M. Had the store fallen, the group would have fallen with it.
That is the first reason.
The second is 2 chapters back. €53M of the store's debts to the group were cancelled by set-off, in October 2023, March 2024 and December 2024. Set-off is a form of payment. In insolvency proceedings, with a backdated insolvency date, payments made during that period fall away. The December 2024 one falls within an 18-month window for any proceedings opened up to the summer of 2026.
So court-supervised administration would not just have frozen the debts. It would have reopened how the capital was built. The €58M that Merlin repeated everywhere.
The third reason comes down to a name.
Michel Ohayon is placed under formal investigation for fraudulent bankruptcy in April 2025. That is only possible because his holding company went into court-supervised administration 2 years earlier. Fraudulent bankruptcy presupposes the opening of insolvency proceedings. Without them, the offence does not exist. Whatever the facts.
An unpaid supplier, on the other hand, can get a judgment, send in a bailiff, find an empty account, and start again. That is what they did at least 31 times.
What none of them obtained is the one thing that would have opened the books. Cottendin's takeover keeps them closed. At least for now.
On 16 June, the memo sent to staff, signed by Cottendin and 3 other executives, puts some distance between them and the past.
The memo says they have learned from past mistakes: they ran the store with a property mindset, and forgot the customer.
Memo from management to BHV staff, 16 June 2026.
The same day, Cottendin announces the end of Shein. Then tries to sell his project with slides churned out by the AI Claude.
“Vision commerciale BHV 2027” [BHV 2027 commercial vision], the project presented by the new management.
Except that things don't go to plan. A month after the takeover, the new owners clash with their landlord. The store handed back 18,000m² in one go, and its rent fell from €18M to about €9M a year, with 6 months rent-free. In return, it is due to receive several tens of millions in compensation from Brookfield, which are the foundation for launching the new project. Cottendin says he has received nothing. The payment depends on compliance works the store has not carried out… for lack of funding.
But the store is in a bad way. In the first quarter of 2026, the store does about €10M of turnover, against nearly €50M a year earlier56. Footfall is down 40%, and around 200 labels have left in a year, including Chanel, Dior and Hermès. Boulanger, the electronics retailer on the ground floor, moves over to Brookfield. Of the 40,000m² the teams were running, they handed back 18,000 as soon as the deal with the new owner was struck, and by the spring of 2026 they are left with only a third of the building, about 15,000. Before Covid, the store welcomed nearly 20M visitors a year. There are now only 5M, according to a serving executive.
BHV turnover, in €M
Internal document of SEGM BHV (€242,681K and €170,313K); quarters: text of the issue.
But Shein only came to finish off what neither Merlin nor Ohayon had managed. Printemps, the rival department store, loses €38M in 2024, €42M in 2025, cuts 229 jobs and closes Rennes.
The BHV was starting to slip. Long before Shein, which was supposed to be its revival. And while turnover collapses, the line that was still rising has stopped rising, and the till has emptied at the same pace. €25.9M of cash at the end of 2023, €8.5M at the end of 2024, €1.7M at the end of 2025.
Perhaps if there had still been something to get out of it, Merlin would have kept the store. The Dufours, for their part, sign none of Cottendin's 3 companies, and appear in no press release. Merlin parades a little less, but holds his head high.
He says he owes nobody anything, has stolen nothing, and has nothing to apologise for.
The creditors will be delighted to hear it.