On 18 November 2014, the Paris police financial crimes squad entered the Musée des Lettres et Manuscrits and, at the same time, searched Gérard Lhéritier’s home23. In Aristophil’s premises, investigators discovered the scale of the disaster. Around 130,000 items to inventory, labyrinthine accounts in which, according to the findings of investigators and victims’ associations, some manuscripts appear in several joint-ownership schemes at once. €105M in bank assets seized, €13M in property frozen. During the raids, investigators also seized €155K in cash at Gérard Lhéritier’s villa in Nice. His wealth included a 19m yacht valued at €1.4M, moored at a berth bought for €270K, along with several tens of millions of euros in frozen financial investments2425.
The machine that had been running for years came to a sudden halt.
Beyond the multiple listings, the investigations revealed massive overvaluation and opaque internal resales. On the civil side, these situations fed combined claims for recovery of property (restitution or substitution) and for debts owed (loss of chance or damages)26.
Yet in a letter to clients dated 4 December 2014, management denounced what it called a death sentence arranged before any judgment, claiming that the freezing of its accounts was suffocating the company.
From then on, things moved fast. Gérard Philippot was appointed court administrator on 13 February 2015. Three days later, on 16 February, the Paris commercial court placed the company in receivership (redressement judiciaire, France’s court-supervised rescue procedure)27. Six months later, on 5 August 2015, came compulsory liquidation28. The court appointed Christian Galantaris and Jérôme Cortade as experts to value the collections. The numbers are clear. On one side, around €850M raised from savers. On the other, liabilities of around €1.2bn. In between, a gaping hole.
The technical problem that then arose was dizzying. How do you liquidate tens of thousands of manuscripts, the vast majority of them jointly owned by thousands of people? In theory, every sale would require the unanimous agreement of the co-owners. A practical impossibility that threatened to block any redistribution for years.
From the moment proceedings opened, investors faced a two-pronged procedural choice:
In practice, many had to do both: claim back the item when that was defensible, and declare the debt to cover the gap in value or the losses. All of it ran into two obstacles: the seals (no physical access to the works) and patchy traceability (inventory, titles, multiple listings).
For the joint-ownership agreements (notably Coralys), each case meant bringing the co-owners together to decide:
Absent or non-claiming owners, disagreements over valuations and the sheer number of joint-ownership schemes mechanically slowed down the flow of returns.
In June 2016, a row broke out when the court administrator Monique Legrand entrusted the management of the collections to Patrimoine Écrit, backed by the Lhéritier family and former brokers, a decision that ruffled feathers29.
On 5 October 2016, after a tender, the commercial court finally appointed the auction house Aguttes to handle this headache: inventory, conservation and coordination of the dispersal. A titanic task: in the end, around 6,900 lots would be catalogued and 286 m³ of documents processed. But the legal lock remained shut.
It took until 16 March 2017 for the Paris high court (TGI) to find the solution: an order making sales possible, organising the governance of the joint-ownership schemes and coordinating sales without requiring the unworkable unanimity of the co-owners. The law unlocked what the mechanics had blocked. That same month, Aristophil’s notary, Jérôme Gautry, was placed under formal investigation for complicity in fraudulent commercial practices30.
On 20 December 2017, the first sale took place at Drouot, the Paris auction hall. But the day before, the State announced that Sade’s 120 Days of Sodom scroll and Breton’s Surrealist Manifestos had been classified as National Treasures. More than 900 lots would be claimed or withdrawn as public archives. What was left went under the hammer. Balzac’s manuscript of Ursule Mirouët reached €1.17M including fees. Napoleon’s love letter to Josephine, estimated at €60-80K, climbed to €280K at the hammer. A fine result? Except that in Aristophil’s internal valuations, comparable letters were shown at far higher levels, sometimes above a million. Divided by four, at the very least. Total for the sale: €3.8M31 and 29% unsold.
April 2019 marked a halfway milestone. Under the joint OVA banner (Aguttes, Artcurial, Drouot Estimations and Ader), seven sales were held at Drouot from 1 to 5 April. More than 1,500 lots, with an overall estimate of €10M, were split by theme: Fine Arts (Renoir, Delacroix, Picasso), 19th and 20th-century Literature (Rimbaud, Éluard, Proust), History (Napoleon, Marie-Antoinette, Henri IV, Marat), Postal History of 1870 (balloon mail, “boules de Moulins”) and a Napoleonic Library. Among the highlights: a Rimbaud poem formerly owned by Verlaine (est. €150-200K), a letter by Éluard (€100-150K), a love note from Napoleon to Josephine (€100-120K), and notebooks by Delacroix. Since the first sale in December 2017, 14 sales had already taken place, totalling €30.6M in hammer prices, including 47 pre-emptions by public institutions. A notable volume, but tiny compared with the €850M raised.
This judicial marathon would last until 16 November 2022, the date of the 55th and last official sale. Five years of regular sales, sometimes weekly, mainly at Drouot but also at Aguttes in Neuilly.
The major pieces classified as National Treasures finally found buyers. In 2021, the BnF acquired the Sade manuscript for €4.55M, along with Breton’s Manifestos32. A tidy sum, but one that confirms the gap between the fantasies that were sold and the reality of the market.
Tally of the 55 public sales (2017-2022): around €108M in gross proceeds in total, far from the amounts raised.
And in practice, the hammer price does not go straight to the victims. First come the court costs and the court-appointed officials. Then the custody, conservation and insurance costs: according to one source involved, a rate of 0.43% a year before tax was applied to the joint-ownership schemes from 2018. Then come the auction houses’ commissions. The fees of the experts, of the lawyers. Once everyone has helped themselves, what is left is meagre.
Still, the internal flows reveal how the machine really worked: according to the company’s own figures, in 2012 around 2,000 works were resold for €46M, one third to fund new acquisitions, two thirds to honour payments falling due. The company said that 40% of clients asked for their money at maturity and that 15% reinvested within four months. Figures that, read with hindsight, confirm a logic of robbing Peter to pay Paul.
And all of this was made possible by an astonishing stroke of luck. Lhéritier was France’s biggest ever EuroMillions winner, with €170M in November 201233. Between July 2013 and July 2014, that allowed him to pump €31M back into Aristophil to delay the system’s collapse. Enough to keep the machine fed for a while, but not forever.
And as it happens, the Aristophil affair was not an isolated case. During the same period as the Aristophil sales, Artecosa was dispersing its collection. The manuscripts went for 10-20% of the price paid by investors.
Described as Aristophil’s little cousin, Artecosa had been founded in 2008 by former employees of the parent company, offering the same type of investments with promised returns above 6.25% a year. According to the Lorraine consumer-defence association, it was the same system as Aristophil, only smarter and more devious.
On 13 November 2018, the AMF’s enforcement committee sanctioned Artecosa34. Between 2014 and 2016, 650 clients had invested €25M, through contracts copying Aristophil’s mechanics: joint ownership, a buy-back promise at +7.5% a year after five years. The AMF found serious breaches: misleading communication (supposedly independent appraisals, a bogus bank guarantee, prestigious exhibitions that never took place), failure to file the standard contracts, no inventory and no statutory auditor. Verdict: a 10-year ban on acting as an intermediary in miscellaneous goods, and a €50,000 fine for its manager.
The company was placed under safeguard proceedings (a French court protection from creditors) in January 2018, and its managers were given suspended prison sentences by a criminal court in June 2022, along with a permanent ban on running a company.