Running these companies costs money. And Tudigo charges that money upfront. The reason is simple. A manager looking after an equity fund or a SCPI (a French property investment fund) generates cash flows, so it can pay itself every year, between 5 and 10% of those flows. But when the investment is locked up for a long time, as in private equity or private debt, there are no flows. So the fees are taken in advance, on the way in.
It is a perfectly legal accounting trick. A company can pocket today the price of work it will do next year. Accountants call it deferred income and file it under liabilities: the cash is in the till, and in exchange the company owes the work.
But to get its licence, Tudigo had made a specific commitment. The programme of operations is the document a platform writes itself and files with the AMF.
Extract from Tudigo’s programme of operations, sent to the AMF. The paragraph concerns the equity SPVs.
In February 2025, more than a year after the licence was granted, the compliance officer notes that this part has not yet been dealt with, and that the entity meant to handle it is still being registered. The only run-off management in place covers the bonds, and it does not work, because some of the flows still go through a different payment provider from the one planned.
So the entity does not exist. The obligation does, and it has a number on it. On 31 December 2025, Tudigo owed €1,472,141 of work: mostly monitoring the investments throughout 2026, already paid for. More than everything the platform earned from its recurring revenue in a year.
Promise kept or not, this became Tudigo’s survival strategy. In 2022, when the platform was still called Bulb in Town and made money, this upfront income came to €64K, or 1.5% of revenue25. In 2024, fundraising starts to fall and the figure reaches €900K. 13%5. In 2025, fundraising halves and it is 36%. Put simply, the more fundraising collapsed, the more Tudigo lived on services from an ever more uncertain future.
The less you raise, the more you live on advances
Tudigo’s accounts, pieced together by Zero Bullshit. 2023: share not published.
Which leaves the question of what became of that money. The accounts tell us.
Tudigo’s accounts, year by year
Pieced together from multiple sources by Zero Bullshit. n/a: figure not published.
2024 is the tipping point. Revenue barely dips, from €7.21M to €6.82M, but average headcount goes from 56 to 66 people, rent and leasing costs are x4.6 their 2022 level, and the bottom line drops from +€898K to -€1.69M. A swing of €2.6M in a single year, on a business that had not changed.
Internal presentation, August 2024.
At the end of the 2025 financial year, then, Tudigo owed its investors nearly €1.5M of management work. Except that there was only €955K left in the bank. 7 months later, when the restructuring opened, it was €7,94822. To be clear: the company will probably disappear and so will not manage the SPVs, and the cash collected to do that management has vanished.
Because the cash went up in smoke in fixed costs. In 2024, rent and leasing come to €1.13M, including €427K for the head office rent alone and €19.5K for a registered-address service, and Tudigo left the landlord a deposit of €247K: 7 months of rent, when the norm is around 3. That head office, at 37 rue Thiac in Bordeaux, belongs to the founders, who bought it in June 2023 through a property company (SCI) owned 45% each through their holding companies2627. So Tudigo pays its rent to its own bosses, and ends up leaving them an unpaid bill of €234K when the restructuring opens.
The partners in the SCI that owns the offices. Alco and Agephor are the holding companies of Laing and Vromman.
The other big chunk of spending, as so often, is salaries. 33 people. €1.4M a year before social charges. A payroll and headcount that are very surprising for an outfit losing so much money. Especially since 15 of those 33 contracts were signed in the 12 months before the company declared itself insolvent. Including 8 since 1 January: a dealflow manager on 4 May, a CRM manager on the 5th, an investment associate on 16 June, an analyst on 6 July. Three weeks before the filing. When it was already obvious that the company had run out of cash.
And that it had already burned through, on a massive scale, the cash set aside for the SPVs.
Which leaves the two who cost the most. In March 2026, the shareholders’ meeting finally looks at what the founders paid themselves. Vromman’s pay, €157.5K for 2024, is approved. Laing’s, €170K for his role as managing director, is rejected unanimously by the votes cast5.
That refusal says something precise: the money went out, but no one ever approved that it should. And that has a cost, because unapproved pay is not tax-deductible. The 2025 tax return therefore adds €240,176 back to taxable profit, under a heading for unapproved managing director pay for 2024/2025. Two years of salary paid out with no proper decision behind them.
For 2025, the same meeting sets €120K gross for each of the two, and makes payment subject to one condition5:
Material evidence, the resolution requires, that the company officers are committed full time and continuously to running the company and managing its teams.
Shareholders asking their bosses to prove that they work.
Except that in 2026, Vromman’s salary rises to €130K, €182K once employer costs are included. That is €10K more than the last amount voted, at a company whose equity had just fallen to minus €2.7M.
No cheap populism, just a comparison. €130K is the median salary of the 200 tech CEOs who answered The Galion Project, but look at the detail and it matches companies that have raised far more money than Tudigo, with more staff and more revenue. It is also the top of the range for loss-making startups.
When Masteos collapsed, Thierry Vignal told us here (in French) how he and his co-founder had cut their salaries several times when cash ran short. Tudigo did the opposite. With the money investors had paid for the management of their vehicles.