💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 03

The mithril coat

The 2% that was supposed to fund the vehicles’ defence in a dispute is going to be sorely missed. Because there have been disputes, because the market turned, and also because several due diligences were patchy. Or downright negligent.

The cases that follow are bond deals: the investors lent money, they are not shareholders.

In 2023, the vehicle Tudi Holding 25 lends to one of Laurent Villa’s companies for a property project on the Cap d’Antibes, on the French Riviera. Not once: 6 successive tranches, for nearly €5M in all on this project alone, as Zero Bullshit mentioned in mid-2025 (in French)18, then analysed at length a few months later (in French)16. Villa stands as personal guarantor, jointly, severally and indivisibly. Interest stops being paid in 2024, and the first tranche falls due on 8 February 2025 without its €1.11M being repaid. The freezing orders on the guarantor’s accounts, in March 2025, come up empty. In short: there isn’t a penny left.

What Tudigo knew, and had put in writing. Its own anomaly report on the Cap d’Antibes issue finds that the vehicle alone carries all the debt issued, despite the guarantees, and is therefore insolvent within the meaning of the Commercial Code. What worries the report is the risk to the platform: the guarantees must be called in as soon as possible, it says, to be in a position to honour its own debts.

To this day, the insolvency has still not been declared to the commercial court.

Extract from the anomaly report.

In response to the non-payment, the vehicle attacks on 2 fronts. Against the guarantor companies first: on 8 July 2025, 9 judgments are handed down, for €7.4M in all, in favour of Tudigo and of its subsidiary acting as bondholders’ representative. Some of the companies sued do not even turn up at the hearing. That said, and for reasons already told here: the accounts are empty (in French)15.

Against the personal guarantor next. On 22 January 2026, the summary judge of the Cannes commercial court declares that it has no jurisdiction and sends the investors away to bring their claim elsewhere. The reason: the guarantee deed states neither a date nor a clearly stipulated term of commitment28. The vehicle is ordered to pay costs and €2,000 to the man it was suing. So there are neither assets to seize nor an enforceable guarantee: the only guarantee still standing rested on a deed with no date on it, and the 2% for legal defence paid for a ruling against the vehicle.

Extract from the judgment in Tudi Holding 25 v Laurent Villa.

In short: well and truly stitched up

For the 2 or 3 at the back of the class (or of the fund) who haven’t been keeping up, here are the previous episodes:

  • Tudigo lent to the companies of Laurent Villa, who was banned from managing a company for 7 years in 2014, and by its own admission the platform had not spotted it (the court ruled this was not defamatory, so we are saying it again29);
  • Tudigo let an SCI, the property company behind the Corsican villa, issue bonds, even though the law reserves them for joint-stock companies that have existed for two years30;
  • Tudigo kept lending to him even though his Cannes restaurant was liquidated in March 2022, and his Marseille one followed in June 2023 (also ruled not defamatory29);
  • Tudigo funded Antibes tranche after tranche, nearly €5M, without noticing that the land had never been bought16;
  • Tudigo made the Antibes funds conditional on a €10M financing package that never materialised, but sent the funds anyway16;
  • Tudigo took guarantees from empty companies: Seven, liquidated less than a year later, and RX Venture, with €1,030 in the bank against €3.7M of bonds at the end of 202231, already ordered in Cannes to repay €3.4M32 when Tudigo was describing it as still active33;
  • In May 2023, Tudigo presented Villa as a borrower who was up to date on all his repayments, in a note stating that no independent check had been carried out, and whose warning was copied from another deal34.

So, that seems like a lot… Enough, at any rate, for a report to have been made to Tracfin, France’s financial intelligence unit, which, according to Zero Bullshit’s information, is said to have taken an interest in the case. But that is not the only problem.

In early 2025, Tudigo’s compliance officer lists 14 bond vehicles set up the same way: the platform is their sole shareholder, and each carries all the debt it has issued, for €17.17M in all. 8 are in trouble, for €14.1M spread across 22 tranches. The list also includes Anthélios, €2.3M, in compulsory liquidation and in mediation before the AMF, and a Mayers Réalités tranche, €1.76M, in court-supervised restructuring. The compliance officer draws the same conclusion: these vehicles could end up insolvent. Nothing will be done.

Asked about it at the time, Vromman spoke of unproven and truncated internal assumptions, deliberately used for malicious purposes18.

Which is not entirely wrong, since at the time Tudigo was split into two warring camps. But the files couldn’t care less about the infighting. Or worse: it is an opening.

On 5 February 2025, the property developer Réalités is placed in court-supervised restructuring35. The next day, an internal estimate puts Tudigo’s exposure at €12.9M including its subsidiaries, of which €6.5M sits in vehicles that the platform owns, chairs, and whose bondholders it represents. A year later, Réalités came out of restructuring with a plan36. Its subsidiary Bird had issued 7 bond lines on Tudigo, €8.56M at face value. The plan does not repay them.

Réalités restructuring plan.

For every €100, €93 is converted into shares or written off, and €7 will be repaid (if the plan holds) between 2027 and 203637. The shares, for their part, are issued at €0.07 on a stock that trades at around €0.40, but changes hands a few hundred shares a day: Bird’s crowdfunding bonds alone could produce nearly 800M new shares, for a company that has about 5M38. In other words, the paper exists, the market to sell it does not.

What the plan does with €100 of Bird bonds

Draft restructuring plan of Bird AM, approved on 18 February 2026.

That said, Tudigo is not the only platform caught up in this. Bird borrowed through eight of them, for €67.7M at face value, all treated the same way by the plan.

Crowdfunding platforms’ exposure to Réalités, at face value

Supersize it, please: large fries, Coke, caramel sundae.

The same lack of safeguards on Brique House, according to internal exchanges within management. In February 2025, a third tranche is opened for a company in conciliation, a pre-insolvency procedure, and therefore in difficulty and not eligible for platform funding. The agreement, signed by Vromman with no external legal review and without the investment committee’s approval, commits Tudigo to refinancing, and the documents given to investors say nothing about the company’s situation. About €1.1M was raised.

Internal communication at Tudigo.

And it is not the first time a deal has rested on a promise with nothing behind it. On AL Construction, the deck given to investors announced secured revenue of €10M and a risk rating of 2.7. The company defaulted on its very first payment.

In February 2025, the compliance officer reopens the file and discovers what had not been checked: everything is fake, from the bank statements to the founder’s criminal record. And here again, the guarantees were never signed, nor were the general terms, nor the extension of the subscription period. So some subscriptions may have come in outside the period.

Note by Tudigo’s compliance officer.

Which leaves the question of who pays. And how much. A report commissioned by management puts the risk at €1.4M. Uninsurable. In the 2024 accounts, provisions for risks total €29K5. They rise to €213K at the end of 2025, which is still 6x less than the risk estimated internally.

Which raises another question: who is going to sue whom?

Because in the case of the bonds… it is Tudigo that acts as bondholders’ representative. The family tree is more of a bush.

This is the reverse of what the EU regulation sets up. It delegates to the platform the work the regulator does not do, selecting deals and checking that they comply, and in return requires it to act in its clients’ best interests and to prevent conflicts of interest39. The intermediary is supposed to be on the investors’ side. Here, the same company picks the borrower, drafts the guarantee, collects the commission, chairs the vehicle, represents the creditors and decides whether to go after the mistake it made itself. When savers need defending against the platform, no one defends them.

A small aside: that wording is Zero Bullshit’s, and was recently quoted in a court ruling. But above all it was picked up in an article written by the lawyer Alizée Mabilon on Village de la Justice40, preceded by the claim that the regulator itself sees this status as a form of delegation. Except that this is wrong. It is not the regulator, and the court only quotes Zero Bullshit without ruling on whether the statement is accurate. The answer probably lies in a sentence at the very bottom of the article:

The author states that generative AI was partly used to write the article (to look for ideas and information), but with human proofreading and final sign-off.

Alizée Mabilon’s quotation, then the passage from the Zero Bullshit article.

In this case, then, the representative is called TBD Immo, in other words Tudigo Immobilier, and it is chaired by Tudigo itself41. The one who decides whether to sue, settle or let it go on behalf of the bondholders is therefore the company whose failings are in question. Its shareholder base does not put any more distance between them: 65% for Tudigo, 35% for the holding company of Jean-Yves Beaupigny42, presented to investors as co-founder of Tudigo Immo and a former partner at the firm that presented the platform’s accounts, and also an early shareholder in Bulb in Town. The compliance officer describes it as a situation of obvious conflict of interest.

So the 2% for legal defence funds a claim whose merits are judged by the very party that put the deal together.

Howeveeeeeeer, the problem is not limited to the guarantees. In early 2025, Tudigo raises money for the exoskeleton startup Wandercraft: €4.4M raised by 12 March, for a deal that Laing was then presenting as a “flagship” of the new Tudigo. The investment is sold with a tax argument: JEI status, a French label for young innovative companies, which gives investors an enhanced income tax reduction. According to Laing, the perk was pushed by the origination and analysis teams, he himself refused several times to let it be used in communications, and he only saw the certificate supposed to prove it at the end of February. Yet the argument reached a good many investors, through Tudigo’s sales staff.

2 weeks later, Vromman takes over the deal during the closing. Struck by a doubt, he calls the chartered accountant who produced the document: the accountant had NEVER been engaged on Wandercraft and had signed nothing. The document, Vromman writes, is purely and simply a forgery. The same day, Laing suggests informing the investors who came in for the tax break of their right to withdraw. All the more awkward since, 10 days earlier, the communications about Wandercraft had already been discussed with the AMF.

That said, the most surprising thing is less the forgery… than failing to see the problem. For a company created before 2023, young innovative company status is lost for good in the year it turns 1143. Wandercraft was founded on 8 October 201244. It turned 11 in 2023. By early 2025, it could no longer be a JEI. Certificate or no certificate.

Apparently, nobody spotted the problem.

Nor in the sales communications.

In January 2025, an investor reports a Tudigo sales e-mail to the AMF. It promises a target return of more than 7x and only 149 places, highlights JEIR tax breaks without their conditions, and invites advisers to reserve a place for their clients before the offer is published. Tudigo admits it was sent out without being cleared by compliance. On 20 February 2025, the AMF lets it know that this kind of report would no longer be tolerated. Next time, it’s six of the best.

But that is still not all.

At the end of 2024, Tudigo launched Apollo, a series of fundraises. A few months later, the compliance officer judges the first two to be in breach of the rules: a product the platform’s licence does not allow it to sell, advertised to retail investors, and taken up by more than 150 investors. The executives are forced to react.

At this stage, came the reply, the deal could still be cancelled and the investors repaid.

And the vehicles themselves suffer, along with their clients. The money first: at the end of 2024, a member of the executive committee writes to the executives that bond interest calls and payments are being handled by a work-study trainee without any checks at all, and at the end of January 2025 that the teams are unable to reconstruct the bond cash flows: an audit is launched to establish what was actually paid to investors and to the tax authorities. At that point, no one knows how much the investors have received.

The information next: the reports sent to investors carried the Tudigo brand with no warning even though they repeated the executives’ figures, and the tool used since 2023 showed growth curves in them that were totally random. Or even completely bogus, as Zero Bullshit had reported in the Villa affair, where it was the borrower himself who did his own reporting, based on inconsistent figures. Finally, their data: the bosses of the companies being funded could view and download, from their account, the names, amounts and phone numbers of the investors in the vehicle funding them.

And that is still not yet still not all.

There is one last piece of information. So serious that Zero Bullshit passed it on to Tudigo 2 times. So serious that the decision had been taken not to publish it, because it could compromise the platform itself and a good many of its investors.

The SPVs are simplified joint-stock companies (SAS) with variable capital, governed, their own articles say, by articles L. 231-1 to L. 231-8 of the Commercial Code. Their article 8 provides that the capital may be reduced by taking back the contributions of shareholders who withdraw or are excluded, with a single limit: not going below one euro8. Standard boilerplate, then. But no minimum holding period, no notice period, no approval.

Yet in a company with variable capital, the law provides that each shareholder may withdraw from the company whenever they see fit45, and the Cour de cassation, France’s highest court, restated at the end of 2024 that these rules are mandatory and that withdrawal takes effect immediately46. Whoever leaves therefore instantly stops being a shareholder and becomes a creditor of the vehicle for the return of their contribution.

Which leaves the question of how much, and when. The same ruling distinguishes the withdrawal from the return of the contribution: as long as the minimum capital has not been restored, the departing shareholder cannot get their money back. And neither the law nor the articles say what they get back if the vehicle has lost value. A judge would have to decide.

What is certain is that the vehicle does not have a single euro: its account is empty, its only asset a bundle of unlisted shares. A withdrawal request therefore creates a debt it cannot pay, on an asset it would have to sell to pay it. And that is why such structures normally include a minimum holding period or exit conditions.

To be perfectly clear: a single request is enough, in the early SPVs, to put a vehicle in trouble, and to raise the question of what the departing shareholder would be paid out of. Tudigo’s fix only covered the new SPVs. The old ones were left as they were.

A word to fans of recorded-delivery letters, and to lawyers who like questions with no answers.