In the left-hand corner, Patrick Lenoël, whose name keeps turning up like a bad penny in the hushed little world of property asset management. An ENA graduate, a tax technician, an architect of OPCIs (French open-ended property funds that mix buildings with liquid assets), he has spent thirty years moving between the big names of the Paris market: BNP Paribas, Paref, UFFI, Fiducial.
With a postgraduate degree in mathematical economics in his pocket, he starts at the finance ministry as a senior civil servant. At the ENA, he rubs shoulders with the future big names of finance. The class before his, Henri-François d’Aguesseau (1982), includes Jean-Marie Messier, future boss of Vivendi, Pierre Mariani, who will chair Dexia until it blows up, and Xavier Larnaudie-Eiffel, who will end up on the management board of CNP Assurances. The class after, Louise Michel (1984), sees Guillaume Pepy (future boss of the SNCF, the state railway), François Villeroy de Galhau (future governor of the Banque de France, after a spell at the consumer lender Cetelem) and Philippe Wahl (who will run La Poste, the postal service). Networks that count. Connections that will come in handy.
Extract from the Journal Officiel, France’s official gazette, of 25 June 1983
In 1989, he moves to Crédit du Nord. Not just any bank: since 1971, it has been a subsidiary of Paribas, which bought it after merging with the Banque de l’Union Parisienne. As special adviser to the chairman, then head of planning and management control, Lenoël is on familiar ground. In 1993, he officially moves to the parent, Paribas, as head of research and control in the property finance department. Not really a change of employer, more a change of floor in the same empire. Property, already.
In 1996, Lenoël takes over Antin Gérance, the SCPI subsidiary of Paribas, and four years later becomes chairman of the management board of Vendôme Gestion, the SCPI subsidiary on the BNP side. His mission: merge Vendôme Gestion (BNP) with Antin Gérance (Paribas) to create Antin Vendôme in December 2000. A merger on paper, but in practice each side keeps its own SCPIs: Antin with its 95% of Paris-region office buildings, Vendôme with a portfolio better spread between Paris and the regions. Fifteen SCPIs in all, FRF 13bn of assets. Lenoël at the controls, already dreaming of investments of FRF 100M apiece. He put it down to the weakness of the competition at that size of asset8.
Meanwhile, he becomes vice-chairman of the ASPIM, the trade body for French property fund managers, a post he will hold for years, and he was still a board member in 2016. In that role, he finds himself at the heart of a big battle in 2005: OPCIs are arriving and people are predicting the death of SCPIs. Lenoël, on the front line, campaigns for “modernisation”.
The business, he argues, is property investment and management, but for years the ASPIM has fought to give management companies more flexibility. Right now an SCPI cannot buy a building through an SCI. That lock is about to go, and in his view that is a good thing.
SCIs, unlisted property-holding companies (whose problems I explained here (in French) and here (in French)), will bring nothing but guaranteed opacity for investors, who will no longer see where their money goes.
He also sells the liquidity of OPCIs:
The cash reserve, he promises, will let the OPCI buy back units from a private seller at short notice, probably in less than a month.
Except that this mandatory 10% of cash will eat into returns. And the quarterly valuation, meant to get closer to the real value of the portfolio? An extra cost that will also become a regulatory obligation for SCPIs.
Against him, the chairman of the APPSCPI9, Jean-Jacques Bonfil-Praire, fought hard, in vain.
This reform, he charges, is pushed by certain professionals who control the ASPIM, which lives off fees taken from the SCPIs’ pockets. […] SCPIs belong to their unitholders, not to the management companies.
In the end, Bonfil-Praire’s fight will save the SCPI, and the two structures will coexist to this day.
When he takes his bow in 2006, the manager has become BNP Paribas REIM, a machine with €2bn under management and 10 major vehicles. Along the way, Lenoël has carved out a speciality: tax. In 2004, he is the first to launch a Robien SCPI (named after a French buy-to-let tax break) at Antin Vendôme, promising savers they could write off 8% of their investment for five years, then 2.5% for four years10. Fundraising was a resounding success. Performance, much less so, resting almost entirely on the tax break. All while the same people campaign to cut state spending and taxes.
That said, Lenoël doesn’t really leave the ship, he just moves up a deck: head of institutional relations at BNP Paribas Immobilier from 2006 to 2007. A gilded cupboard? Or a gentle sidelining? Either way, he doesn’t hang around.
In March 2008, he lands at Paref as head of business development, on €95K a year, with no option to buy into the capital. A mercenary, not a partner. On the menu: three in-house SCPIs and several OPCIs to set up, including Vivapierre, a vehicle dedicated to tourism and leisure property, stuffed with Belambra holiday villages like a foie gras goose.
Less than two years later, in November 2010, Lenoël lands the chairmanship of UFFI REAM11, a grande dame of French property founded in 1933. Out goes Frédéric Puzin, who had tried to turn things round since 2007 and will leave to found Corum in 2011.
💡 UFFI’s troubled past
The parent company is going through Boeing 737 Max levels of turbulence. Urbania, the UFFI group’s property management arm, has just blown up in mid-flight. The financial merry-go-round set up by Michel Moubayed since 1996 collapsed with the 2008 crisis. The mechanism? A sleight of hand with so-called mirror accounts: the banks lent Urbania the equivalent of the €330M of co-owners’ funds it held for the buildings it managed, money Moubayed used to fund his acquisitions. When those funds drop to €260M in 2009, Société Générale demands €40M in cash. Panic on board. Total debt: €440M. Commercial court, a complaint for breach of trust, the threat of liquidation hanging over 480,000 homes and 2,000 staff. In September 2010, two months before Lenoël arrives at UFFI REAM, Urbania is sold by the court to the fund IPE.
Michel Moubayed, the historic founder of Urbania, a Lebanese-French architect who had bought UFFI from Crédit Lyonnais for a token €1 in 1980, will die two years later after a long illness. Exit the architect of the empire and his €440M merry-go-round.
The splashback hits the whole group. UFFI REAM, the SCPI management subsidiary, stays afloat but is looking for a buyer. Controlled by UFFI Participations (in the hands of the Laurad group via the funds Sinequanon and Hoche Partners, plus Omnium Finance), it manages €1bn of assets, 17 SCPIs and 30,000 unitholders. Heavyweight on paper. But with the Urbania scandal in the background, its image is in tatters.
Under Patrick Lenoël’s reign, a strange and discreet incident will take place, which I already told in an earlier newsletter (in French), and which made history in the annals of collective fund management.
Because the manager’s portfolio reads like a jumble-sale inventory. First, a string of residential SCPIs: Logipierre 1, 2, 3 and the whole gang. Tax-break antiques from the 1970s, never wound up, vegetating with returns of 2% at most. Take Logipierre 1, born in 1978: never more than 2% a year. But, by the miracle of the property bubble, a ten-year IRR that shoots past 10% in the mid-2010s. Who do we thank? The ECB and its free money.
Then there are the two millstones: Cifocoma 1 and Cifocoma 2, supposed to invest in retail premises. That is where it turns sour. According to several investors of the time and two members of the supervisory boards, hardly radical lefties, the mood curdles. Patrick Lenoël is in the sights of several influential investors.
Enter Hélène Karsenty, secretary of the APPSCPI, the association of short-changed savers, and the terror of fund managers in three-piece suits. This strong-minded woman, who knows her files the way a cab driver knows the back streets, takes the chair of the supervisory board of Cifocoma 2. Charles Coulon does the same for Cifocoma 1. The barbarians are at the gate.
Lenoël starts sweating under his white collar. Understandably: Karsenty is fresh from trench warfare with BNP REIM. Elected chair of the supervisory board of Capiforce Pierre, she led the revolt for months. Her stroke of genius? Getting the articles changed in February 2011 so that the management company’s mandate could be renewed, or not, every year. A perfect trap.
On 4 June 2012, BNP Paribas REIM meets its Waterloo: at the general meeting, it is thrown out after 17 years in charge. The figures are damning: 80.26% of the votes for Paref Gestion, 19.74% for the incumbent. A public humiliation. As Hélène Karsenty, chair of the supervisory board of Capiforce Pierre, explains.
To her, it is a considerable event in the world of SCPIs, because it is the first time that a vote of the investors has clearly, and entirely lawfully, decided to part ways with its manager.
Because it bears repeating, in case some have forgotten it in the wood-panelled salons of asset management: a manager works for the investors. The vehicle is not his personal toy. He takes his fees for a service, full stop.
One reason for the conflict is that UFFI is up for sale. Common knowledge. Several close witnesses, inside the company or outside it, describe a firm that, without cooking its books of course, makes sure to dress up the bride.
The managers, one of them says, were buying crap so they could then show off good management.
December 2011. Fiducial scoops the pot and becomes sole shareholder of UFFI REAM. Fiducial Gérance, which until then managed only Buroboutic, a €330M SCPI, suddenly finds itself with an XXL portfolio. Two years later, the entities merge for good under the Fiducial banner, and Lenoël becomes chairman of the management board of the new unified structure.
But history repeats itself. In June 2015, Atlantique Pierre 1, an SCPI managed by Fiducial since 2012, gets the chop: 91% of investors vote to fire the manager. Paref Gestion picks up the mandate. The long-standing investors have bitter memories: their units fell from €350.75 at the end of 2011 to €210 in 2015. The price of inertia.
For Cifocoma 1 and 2, same tune. Karsenty and Charles Coulon at the head of the SBs12: the pressure mounts, the accounts are picked over, the acquisitions challenged. Fiducial is out, Sofidy takes over the management, before being replaced itself by Paref a few years later.
The same Paref which, as fate would have it, will face the wrath of its own supervisory board over Novapierre Allemagne. And, irony of ironies, Capiforce Pierre, won so triumphantly in 2012, will slip from its grasp in 2020: 89% of investors will vote for... Fiducial Gérance. And it will end up merged with Atlantique Pierre in 2024. What goes around comes around.
But by then, Lenoël had left the ship. A seven-year stretch described as “Senior Advisor freelance” between 2017 and 2024. Seven years advising whom, doing what?
Not exactly a riddle wrapped in an enigma.