💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 02

Free money

An SCPI is a simple machine (in French). Savers chip into the pot, a management company buys buildings with the money, and the rents flow back down to the savers, minus the toll. Except for one detail. A detail almost nobody reads in the brochure, and that the sellers don't even bother to advertise any more. The saver in an SCPI is not a customer, but a member. They own units in the company and elect the supervisory board tasked with keeping an eye on the manager. On paper, Primopierre's unitholders are the co-owners of the vehicle and the bosses of whoever is driving it.

The Primopierre machine was born in 2008, at the worst possible moment or the best, depending on which side of the counter you stand, with 2 parents around the cradle: daddy BNP Paribas REIM handled the management, mummy Primonial handled the distribution11. The two companies know each other intimately: the Primonial brand was created within PMA, a subsidiary of BNP Paribas Assurances dedicated to independent distribution12. In 2011, mummy filed for divorce and demanded the keys: Primonial set up its own management company in March, the general meeting of 30 June approved the transfer of management as of 1 July, and the new management company's licence from the AMF, France's financial markets regulator, came through on 16 December13. The annual report for that year even grants two separate discharges, one to BNP Paribas REIM for the first half, one to Primonial REIM for the second14. A move that sheds light on everything that follows: Primopierre was not born at a manager looking for sellers. It was born at a seller that built itself a manager. 3 years later, a fundraiser bought into the maker: Crédit Mutuel Arkéa took joint control of the Primonial group alongside its executives15. We'll come back to that, because what this banker sells elsewhere matters as much as what it buys here.

An OPCI publishes a net asset value continuously and keeps a cash buffer to pay out whoever wants to leave: when property falls, it shows straight away and it gets paid out straight away. An SCPI sets its own unit price, within an authorised corridor around an annual valuation, and only pays out leavers if newcomers turn up. Same walls, two thermometers, and this old war over property funds has already been told in these pages. It's not a structural detail, it's the timetable of the truth: the choice of vehicle decides when the truth shows. By staying an SCPI, Primopierre's members kept the slow thermometer. They don't know it yet, but they have just picked the date of their bad news.

But the real story behind all this isn't Primopierre: it's free money. When the SCPI was born, in the summer of 2008, the ECB's main policy rate peaked at 4.25%16. Then Lehman collapsed and Frankfurt opened the floodgates: 1% from 2009. Trichet did try to normalise in 2011, 2 hikes up to 1.5%, the last gasp before 10 years of free money, which the eurozone crisis wiped out within months. After that, the slope never climbed back: 0.05% in 2014, 0% in 2016, and in June 2014 the deposit rate even turned negative: banks paid to park their cash somewhere safe. So yes, these rates first influence the one at which everybody borrows to buy a house, and, oversimplifying wildly, it's the same for Primonial as for anybody else. But the notion that really matters is the risk premium.

💡 The risk premium, in one minute

Zero Bullshit needs money (say, to pay its liars lawyers), but only has a one-in-two chance of paying it back. You have this money, and a choice between several investments. Let's say a guaranteed investment at 1%, a moderately risky one at 5%, and handing your cash to Zero Bullshit at 10%. None of the three is good or bad. As usual, the return pays for the risk. As usual, anyone who says otherwise is a crook. In the end, the deal doesn't happen. See you 5 years later.

In the meantime, the landscape has changed. The guaranteed investment now pays 3%, the moderately risky one 8%. At what rate will you lend to Zero Bullshit? 5 years ago, our default risk was priced 9 points above the guaranteed rate, 5 points above the moderately risky one. So, logically, today our risk should pay around 12 or 13%. The same risk, paid the same way. Lending to Zero Bullshit hasn't become more dangerous: the whole risk ladder simply had to be reset from the guaranteed rate upwards. As Albert would say: “everything is relative”.

The risk ladder: what each investment has to pay

Zero Bullshit's risk is priced 9 points above the guaranteed rate, 5 points above the moderately risky one.

The guaranteed rate rises to 3%: the whole ladder climbs with it. The same risk, paid the same way.

Example from the text, fictional figures. Click the tabs to switch from one situation to the other.

And the whole market does this calculation, twice over.

  • To invest, first: if central rates fall, government bond yields fall, so the yield on risky investments falls too;
  • To value, next: if buying an office in a given location is a medium risk that has to pay 5% in this context, and the rent it brings in doesn't move, then it's the value of the property that adjusts to keep that 5% stable.

It's very simplistic, there are plenty of other parameters, but that's the gist.

Now run the film forward through the 2010s: the guaranteed rate doesn't rise from 1 to 3%, it falls from 4 to 0%. The whole ladder slides down. Investors accept a lower return for owning the same building, the rent doesn't change overnight, so it's the price of the asset that rises to get back to that return. For the same income, buildings are worth more. Nobody got any better: money just became free. And the appetite for risk grows.

ECB rate, Primopierre inflows and unit price, 2009-2025

ECB main refinancing rate at 31 December. Inflows and unit price in euros of the year, or in constant 2026 euros (French CPI, INSEE) with the button.

European Central Bank; Primopierre annual reports 2009 to 2025.

See all the KPIs on the Zero Bullshit website (in French)

French savers did the same calculation, only shorter. The Livret A, France's state-regulated savings account, was melting away, the capital-guaranteed funds of life insurance policies were running out of steam, and on the other side a property fund was showing 5% backed by bricks and mortar. Primopierre paid out €10.42 per unit in 2011, a 5.46% yield, and the quarterly bulletins spun the story of the day. Inflows responded: €57M in 2010, 172 the following year, then 218, 251, 27617. Every year beat the last, and every record raised a question nobody asked: where is all this money going?

Primopierre's inflows and investments, by year (€M)

The years in red are those in which the SCPI invests more than €100M beyond what it raises. Inflows: subscriptions for the year. Investments: acquisitions for the year, as described in the annual reports.

Primopierre annual reports 2009 to 2025.

See all the KPIs on the Zero Bullshit website (in French)

It goes into buildings, as fast as possible, and speed is not a choice. Money raised but not yet invested sits idle in cash, at rates that had fallen to zero, and every idle euro dilutes the yield paid to members. An SCPI that raises a lot is therefore condemned to spend a lot, or watch the very 5% that brings the money in melt away. The more it succeeds, the more it has to buy. And the less time it has to choose. At the end of 2013, €80.3M was still waiting to be deployed. In 2014, the tide turned: €441M invested for 276 raised, the portfolio passed the billion mark, and the SCPI dipped into its reserves, then into debt17.

The subscription fee drops in when the money comes in. The management fee drops in for as long as the portfolio is held, based on rents and assets that keep swelling. And in 2014, precisely the year the machine went into overdrive, the articles of association gained a disposal fee of 1.25% excl. VAT on the price of every building sold. Paid on the way in: up to 9% excl. VAT of every subscription, issue premium included. Paid along the way: 10% excl. VAT of rental income. And now paid on the way out. None of these lines is illegal, all of them appear in articles voted by the members. That's not the question. The question is: in this list, where is the line that pays for buying well?

314 then €324M raised in 2015 and 2016, 348 then 367 invested, with a course set for central Paris and the first sales of old regional assets. And above all, the tickets got bigger: Le Between, €169M, Nouvel Air, €135M, two buildings that swallowed a whole year of inflows between them. Deploying €300M a year in small lines takes teams and time. A big ticket only takes a signature. Over-investment reached -€287.7M, leverage took over, and the payout slipped quietly, from €10.42 per unit in 2011 to €9.80 in 201617. Nobody was alarmed: the unit price was going up. And nobody was looking at the occupancy rate.