💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 04

Surely you can’t be serious?

Were the bosses aware of it? Thierry Vignal describes a kind of helplessness bordering on amateurism.

He says he knew nothing about any of it. It was his first company. He was back from London and had never done a start-up. He had been a bank analyst. He had helped mates buy flats in Rouen, Le Havre and Lille. Life was good. He was with his mate Gégé, the king of plasterboard.

Maxime Hanquier concedes that start-up founders are on the whole poorly trained, especially in running companies and in the laws that govern them. And probably in what raising money really entails.

Because once you’ve done it, you have to grow. And every start-up ends up caught in a kind of whirlwind.

  • As soon as you have one big fund on board, the others follow with their eyes shut;
  • The more money you raise, the more people want to give you;
  • The more money you have, the more you burn;
  • The more you burn, the more artificial growth you make;
  • The more growth you make, the more cash gets thrown at you, and so on.

This race against the runway hardly seems compatible with building a long-term strategy.

Nobody takes a step back, says Thierry Vignal. Once you’re locked into a trajectory, you have a board every month, you keep moving, head down, staring at KPIs.

Which may explain some surprising strategic blunders.

While everyone is “Uberising” the market with bogus freelancers, and IAD is blowing up the market with self-employed agents who cost it nothing, Masteos… goes the other way!

With some fifty sales staff in the field, on permanent contracts, plus in-house staff for the renovation works, plumbers for instance. A false sense of control that costs a fortune.

It’s no accident, Thierry Vignal explains, that outside the big construction groups there is no national company doing renovation works: it is essentially a local trade, managed locally, with no opportunity to scale.

All its competitors confirm it. So do several employees.

Masteos ended up with as many as 100 builders, and 20 people in HR to manage everyone.

At 4pm, Thierry Vignal recalls, they would leave to do cash-in-hand jobs on the side. And every other day they were a COVID contact case. He says it without bitterness, taking the responsibility on himself.

The same hiring problems show up at head office, where several employees from that time talk about senior people with “strategy” profiles and rarely any operational staff to put the strategy into practice.

But every employee interviewed describes the same pleasant atmosphere.

One of them says he was pleasantly surprised by how kind people were. The spirit was good, and everyone was trying to do their job.

But many mention the management’s lack of vision. Two of them sum it up with a line they attribute to Maxime Hanquier:

In substance: he doesn’t know, which is why he hires people who do.

A fine show of humility about the trade itself, but the absence of clear direction ends up creating political wars between C-level executives who each have their own vision.

The trouble is, all of this costs a lot.

With hindsight, Maxime Hanquier concedes, the DST round was a mistake. It was used to hire people only to lay them off afterwards.

A hire costs, all in, between €15K and €20K. Masteos made 300 of them. Except it laid off just as many… at a similar cost. A €10M operation for nothing, salaries excluded, that nobody apparently saw coming.

But nobody among the funds had the slightest experience in property. And more broadly: how many VCs have ever run a business themselves?

Neither Daphni, nor DST, nor any board member saw the problem.

Nor did Thierry Vignal, who was busy doing the rounds of TV studios.