That last company is one of the reasons for Luko’s rapid collapse.
In October 2021, Unkle raised funds1. Barely a few weeks later, the board announced that a sale to Luko was on the cards. A term sheet was signed on 18 January the following year, then an agreement on 15 March stipulating that:
Luko tried to raise €100M at the end of 2022, and failed. So on 1 April this year, the shares became bonds.
Unable to meet its debts, Luko was therefore forced to file for accelerated safeguard proceedings, a French court-supervised restructuring. Because those debts are colossal: €45.5M according to Luko last June.
It is in fact €57M2 today, according to the information I have.
In rank 1 are 2 creditors holding secured loans:
And that is a problem: Triple Point forced Luko to pledge its business goodwill, its brands, the holding company’s bank accounts, shares in Luko Cover and receivables tied to policyholders’ contracts.
BNPP, for its part, only has security over the goodwill.
Until Triple Point gets what it is owed, the company cannot be transferred as it stands.
Trouble is, this €25.8M claim was valued at €36M over the summer. Worse: after the summer, BNP went on the offensive to get its €800K back and challenged the merits of the safeguard plan.
Did that rattle Admiral enough to call off the deal? Nobody close to the case was willing to confirm or deny anything.
Either way, the other creditors, the so-called chirographic creditors (French legalese I adore), meaning those with no security, are a bit sore about it (case in point: me).
In rank 2 (€8.2M):
In rank 3 (€2.2M):
In rank 4 (€10.9M):