How did Luko hope to meet the April 2023 deadline, when even its rosiest forecast could not produce that kind of money? No idea.
According to several people who followed the negotiation from very early on, the convertible bonds were only offered to make the deal palatable.
As a reminder, the deal was signed in March 2022. Barely 8 months later, in November, Lazard was hired to find investors or sell off part of the assets, notably with the deadline in mind.
And yet Anaxago, the French crowdinvesting platform that raised nearly 15% of the sale amount, was still unaware of the difficulties in early 2023!
Worse: on 3 March 2023, the platform wrote to its investors using Luko’s talking points and figures. And concluded:
That, as things stood, the conditions for the automatic conversion of the convertible bonds had not been met. And that if they were still not met on 1 April 2023 (the maturity date), investors would be consulted on what to do next with the investment: either a cash repayment, which would lock in a gross gain of 40%, or a conversion into shares.
How do you explain that Anaxago was unable to get more concrete information about the situation?
On 17 June, Anaxago said it was surprised that information about a takeover was being circulated on social media.
Come on, guys: how about doing your job? Talks had been going on for weeks, the safeguard proceedings had been filed on 31 May, and the hearing that favoured the sale to Admiral had taken place on… 7 June!
Admiral’s offer had been made on 3 May!
The court-appointed conciliator even stated that all creditors were in favour of the sale, apart from 20% of the bank creditors.
Which raises another question: if more or less everyone knew Luko would not be able to pay, why was the Unkle deal accepted, and above all without any guarantee?
Because it was obvious that Luko could not be profitable. Its break-even point is estimated at €120M in premiums a year, 3x what Luko collected in 2022, which generated revenue of €4M. Figures, once again, that are disputed, but that I stand by.
Among the subsidiaries, Coya posted the highest revenue at €6.1M, against barely €200K in Spain and €500K for Unkle.
The problem is that while the holding company Demain ES did indeed generate €4.1M in revenue, above all it posted a loss of €17M (€2.3M for Unkle, €1.6M for Spain, €1.4M for Coya).
And so that nobody comes along to dispute these figures yet again, here they are, published for the first time:
And the balance sheet:
The problem: the company’s assets are €36M of shareholdings (including €11.1M for Coya and €11.9M for Unkle) and €15M of receivables linked to those shareholdings.
The proceeds of those sales are NOWHERE near €23M. Lazard had valued the disposal at between €9M and €17M. According to my information, the total came in below that range.
That may be the other explanation for the deal’s death. Because if those sales are not enough to repay Triple Point and BNP, then they remain the owners of almost the entire business!