How does the Livret A actually work? Because while, as we’ve seen, there’s a social housing story on one side and a rate story on the other, it’s actually not that simple.
The Livret A relies on a more or less well-oiled mechanism, run by several players whose interests sometimes diverge. Any bank that has signed an agreement with the State can offer it. When a customer opens a Livret A, the money deposited is recorded on the bank’s balance sheet, like any other savings product. But unlike ordinary savings accounts, these sums don’t stay entirely in the banks’ hands: most of them are pooled at the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC), which manages and allocates them.
It is the Fonds d’épargne (Savings Fund), a unit inside the CDC, that is specifically in charge of managing the pooled regulated savings. Its main role is to fund public-interest missions such as social housing, the ecological transition and regional development.
Since the 2009 reform, banks keep 40.5% of Livret A and LDDS deposits, while 59.5% is transferred to the CDC, according to a centralisation rate set by the State. In 2023, that meant €370.5bn pooled at the CDC, while €160bn stayed with the banks, which also have obligations as to how it is used, in particular:
It’s actually rather funny. Because when banks talk about the famous real economy, the bakers and hairdressers kind, it is largely made possible by the Livret A. Same goes for the aforementioned point 2 (posh, eh?), which is often trumpeted as a nice offer when… it’s simply an obligation.
The stated aim of the Livret A is therefore to channel savings towards public-interest projects. In theory, the money collected must be pumped back into the economy, mainly by funding social housing, public infrastructure and regional development. But in practice, the picture is far more mixed, and rests on a triumvirate with diverging interests.
While the banks play a part in collecting the funds, it is the CDC that reallocates them. As the right hand of the CEO the State, it is responsible for funding social housing, public infrastructure and regional projects. In theory, this money should circulate and be used to fund long-term loans (20 to 40 years), mainly for social landlords and local authorities. These loans are directly indexed to the Livret A rate, guaranteeing a match between the resources collected and the funding granted. But with interests that inevitably diverge between French savers and social housing developers.
Except that this machine, which I described as more or less well-oiled, has seized up. With the rise in the Livret A rate since 2022, the economics of this funding is collapsing. The higher the Livret A rate climbs, the more expensive CDC loans become, which reduces demand from housing bodies and local authorities. The result: for lack of takers, the CDC is sitting on €100bn to €120bn of idle funds, out of the €370.5bn pooled… while still having to pay interest on them.
Yes, yes, you read that right:
This paradox has several causes:
It’s not only a problem for the CDC, but also for the State. Too high a Livret A rate already penalises the banks by making these savings too expensive for them, while limiting the appeal of riskier products.
Above all, it complicates the management of public finances, by adding to the cost of paying interest on deposits but also to the cost of funding local authorities.
Hence the convoluted manoeuvres to try to contain, or even cut, the Livret A rate, under cover of technical trade-offs. Officially, it’s about striking a balance between saving and funding. In practice, it’s an opaque balancing act in which budget priorities take precedence over the system’s stated logic.
The Livret A is presented as a savings product for ordinary people, but in reality it is first and foremost a fantastic opportunity for the banks. They keep 40.5% of deposits, or around €160bn, which they obviously don’t leave snoozing in a corner. As we’ve seen, these funds go into 3 main categories, but also into government bonds, for example, or various investments that generate comfortable margins.
In other words, they earn interest on savers’ money… without lifting a finger. Because when an SME is financed with Livret A funds, the spread between the Livret A rate and the rate at which the SME borrows is free margin.
This is one of the cheapest sources of funding on the market, far below the rates they offer on other kinds of deposits or have to pay to raise money on the markets.
In return, they are supposed to meet obligations on how these funds are used, notably to finance SMEs, the ecological transition and the social and solidarity economy. But in practice, the monitoring of these commitments remains hazy. The Banque de France is working on tools to better track where the funds go, but for now transparency is still limited. As the CFO of a major bank explains to me.
Many people, he says, imagine that Livret A deposits go into a box that gets opened when the Caisse des Dépôts knocks on the door, and then every time a project needs funding. In fact, the centralised share is regularly calculated to be passed on to the CDC, but the rest goes into overall deposits, not into a specific pot. And since each branch, each local bank and each agency has some leeway on the matter, overall traceability is difficult. A branch in Montluçon, for example, won’t produce eco-loans solely out of its own Livret A deposits.
A difficulty confirmed by a finance executive at a listed bank.
Some people in government departments, he says, fantasise about a world where every line goes into an Excel spreadsheet with a label. That is only the reality when an institution centralises all its operations. Yet at the same time, they are being asked to decentralise and to leave room for manoeuvre at local level.
What is certain is that the banks don’t settle for this windfall landing on their balance sheets. They also receive payment for the centralised share of deposits. In 2020, the CDC paid them €850M in distribution fees for collecting Livret A and LDDS savings.
Every rate rise mechanically squeezes the banks’ margin on these funds, which explains their systematic opposition to any rise that goes too far. The Fédération bancaire française, the French banking federation, has thus lobbied hard to curb any increase in the Livret A rate, fearing that this cheap resource would become more expensive. Conversely, the lower the rate, the more they keep an ultra-competitive source of funding, letting them maximise their returns at savers’ expense. While selling riskier savings products.
Because banks, and asset managers more broadly, love bashing the Livret A. I’ve told the story here several times of how I pushed back against this pitch when I worked at an asset manager whose argument went roughly like this:
On every level, this pitch is crap:
Social housing rests on a fragile balance between growing needs and constrained funding. In 2023, 2.7M households were waiting for social housing: +7.5% vs 2022. Yet social housing output has fallen below 100K homes a year since 2020, with only 82K homes built in 2023, a third less than the target originally set by the State. A few days ago, the government set that target at… 100K8. While that’s higher than what has been built in recent years, it actually matches what was being done before the crisis. Not exactly sky-high ambitions…
For several years, people in the sector have been warning of a gradual collapse in social housing output. Several factors explain this crisis:
Social landlords are calling for a cut in the Livret A rate to ease the cost of their borrowing and revive construction. In September 2024, at the HLM Congress, the annual gathering of France’s social housing bodies, Eric Lombard, then head of the CDC, argued for this cut. The irony: now Economy Minister, he has just signed it off in February 2025.
Despite attempts at reform, the situation remains critical. The Banque des Territoires9 estimates that social housing output could stay stuck below 80K units a year for several years. In the Paris region (Île-de-France), 836K applications for social housing were pending at the end of 2023, twice as many as in 2010.
Faced with this crisis, the government is under pressure to act quickly. Without concrete measures, social housing professionals fear worsening housing poverty and a lasting slowdown in construction. Not exactly a sign the crisis is about to end… Especially as President Macron has never been pro-property (several governments didn’t even have a housing minister; he turned the wealth tax, the ISF, into a tax on property wealth only, the IFI), and neither the far-right RN nor the left-wing LFI and Greens (EELV) are big fans of property owners, which won’t exactly help loosen up the market.