💥 Zero Bullshit
Epilogue

The layer cake of chaos

Everyone will form their own opinion of this case. Tudigo and Bricks speak without hesitation of fraud regarding Laurent Villa’s fundraisings. And indeed, several facts show that the truth was at times arranged, doctored or downright disguised, as in the case of the fake lease we discussed in the first episode.

Unfortunately, it isn’t the only case of its kind. At Tudigo, the Antheos and AL Construction files look just as dubious. And there are a substantial number of cases of wrongdoing by project owners across many platforms.

But responsibility cannot be limited to project owners alone.

I haven’t been able to cover all the structuring problems at Tudigo, there are so many of them. Consider, for example, that the SPVs holding the bonds still haven’t declared themselves insolvent after more than a year, or even two for some, even though they are bond issuers, and therefore carry liabilities they cannot meet.

At Koregraf, the collapse brought to light several particularly problematic files that could engage the liability of its former executives. It’s no accident that the platforms up for sale can’t find a buyer. Like Lumo, which was nonetheless fairly serious about its deals, which went silent, and whose portfolio, sold for a symbolic €1, is being transferred to Enerfip.

EDIT 12 August 2025, 12.03pm: corrected information on the transfer of Lumo to Enerfip.

More broadly, while there is no question of making the platforms responsible for all losses (guaranteed 10% returns don’t exist), the widespread misunderstanding among retail investors, combined with shaky processes, raises serious questions.

After more than two years of dissecting crowdfunding, its assets, its deals and its legislation, I have reached the obvious conclusion that it must be overhauled, and urgently. Because while workshops and other meetings take place among well-informed people, hundreds of thousands of retail clients are being fleeced. I explained a few months ago that I estimated the ultimate losses (in fine) from crowdfunding (in French) at around a billion euros once all the 2018-2023 deals have been unwound.

So, since I know that among the 112K subscribers to this newsletter, several work at the AMF, at the ACPR (France’s banking and insurance supervisor), in the National Assembly (France’s lower house of parliament), at institutional investors and at platforms, I’ll take the opportunity to put forward my 10 ideas for reform.

Obviously, the French regulator doesn’t have a free hand on a text it inherits from ESMA. But laws are never set in stone, and France’s opinion counts.

1️⃣ Separate regulations

Since the PSFP was launched, intermediaries and the AMF have been circling the issue, trying to work out how to fit blivets into Penrose squares.

  • On one side, fractional property investment, which is nothing other than a single-asset SCPI (a French real estate investment fund), where the platform has to find a way to finance through perpetual bonds an asset it isn’t allowed to own but has to operate, without using the banned royalties.
  • On the other, crowdfunding, for which the PSFP bond model was designed, where the platform is the intermediary between a borrower and a lender.
  • And in the middle, crowdequity, which somehow finds itself stuck between the two, even though its financial instrument has nothing in common with them, it is highly complex, and its deals are often the ones nobody wanted in venture capital.

The old licences were issued by the ACPR, and therefore listed on ORIAS (the French register of financial intermediaries), while the new PSFP licence is issued by the AMF, and therefore only listed on its website.

This purely administrative logic makes no sense to investors, nor even to wealth managers who, until recently, didn’t understand why a licensed platform had been removed from ORIAS.

How is a retail investor supposed to cope?

As for crowdequity, having defended it for a long time, I think it should no longer be allowed for retail investors under these conditions. The deals presented by the platforms are generally the ones nobody wanted, the information is patchy, the asset class too complex and the marketing too aggressive. After several years, we have seen a huge number of bitter failures and no major success. Given that the platforms have never published their real results (and you can see why), we have to ask whether there is any point in leaving the floodgates open.

  • Define specific regulation for fractional property investment.
  • Restrict retail access to private equity.

2️⃣ Performance indicators

Several players today boast of having the most precise indicators on the market, defined by Financement Participatif France, the French crowdfunding trade body, now part of France Fintech. Spoiler: nobody cares.

  • You don’t go to a lawyer to have the criminal code explained to you.
    You don’t go to a mechanic to understand what a head gasket does.
    You don’t go to a doctor to dissect how taurine metabolises magnesium.

Nobody cares. What we want is an answer.

The indicators, which platforms declare and update as they see fit, were never designed for investors but for the platforms and for E&Y, which produces its annual barometer. Knowing that 11% of loans taken out in 2021 are less than 6 months late is of no interest to an investor. Nor is the average of the bonds.

What is needed, in the case of crowdfunding, is to have, clearly, visibly and regularly updated:

  • The real rate of late payment and default;
  • The real IRR based on what has actually been returned to investors.

For fractional property, here again, it’s the Wild Mess:

  • The yield sometimes takes into account a waiting period before income starts and sometimes not, sometimes includes fees and sometimes not, is sometimes calculated from the fundraising, sometimes from when the property is put on the market;
  • The advertised return factors in a market revaluation that rests on no standard and no particular expert valuation, and looks an awful lot like a bidding war.

What the investor needs to know is:

  • From when they will receive their share of the rent;
  • An expected yield net of fees;
  • And that the potential return is never a primary selling point, and that it is presented under several scenarios, as is the case for most AIFs (alternative investment funds).

More generally, indicators must be:

  • Reliable and truthful;
  • Precise and few in number;
  • Standardised and regular;
  • Mandatory and enforceable.

That’s why we need to:

  • Define 2 or 3 common indicators.
  • Make them mandatory, and at regular intervals.

3️⃣ Underlying asset

Even today, and it happens with every default, in every investor group on Facebook or Discord, lots of people think they have invested in property, a term the platforms use and abuse.

The reality, every professional knows it: these platforms finance small and medium-sized companies whose business is property. But the risk isn’t property risk. It is an SME financing risk and an operational risk.

Using terms such as “property investment” tends to create the illusion of lower risk for very real investors.

  • A strict ban on using terms that may give the impression that investors are exposed to or investing in property.

4️⃣ Risks

AMF doctrine is perfectly clear on the obligation to state the risks, in proportion to the benefits. Several asset managers have already been sanctioned and called to order, notably in the well-known sanction against Corum, for breaching these obligations.

How can we accept today, on the pretext that we are dealing with young, innovative and less regulated fintechs, that they bury the risks in the footer while displaying the returns or photos of properties in huge print, sometimes even with words like “guaranteed” or “secured”?

  • Stronger checks and sanctions.

5️⃣ Independence of the bondholders’ representative

It is absolutely unacceptable for bondholders to be represented by the platform, when the platform has been paid by the borrower. It is a huge conflict of interest in which an intermediary is asked to beat up its own client, at its own expense.

The bondholders’ representative must be independent of the platform, have no shareholding conflict of interest, and be a qualified professional, who can be dismissed under conditions clearly set out to investors, who must, moreover, be able to communicate with one another.

  • A strict ban on shareholding conflicts of interest between the PSFP and the bondholders’ representative.

6️⃣ Shared fees

Nobody works for free. No financial intermediary is free. Claiming otherwise is lying. Many platforms have claimed they were free because they don’t charge fees to investors. But it’s still a lie.

Take the example of financing for a €100 project with 10% fees:

  • Either the investor pays €10 in fees, the investment is €110, or the project owner only receives €90;
  • Or the project owner pays €10 in fees, so the investment is €110, or they only receive €90.

In reality, it comes to the same thing in every case: for an identical sum, you get the initial amount minus the fees, which is what actually finances the asset.

So you might as well explain from the outset what the fees are and share them between the project owner and the investor.

  • An obligation to spread fees between investors and issuers.
  • A ban on advertising the platform as free.

7️⃣ Guarantees

Investors must be able to understand that not all guarantees are equal. How many personal guarantees turn out to be insufficient, when security over a property would have made it possible to recover a good part of the funds?

No guarantee should be presented to an investor without a prior audit. How often do we see:

  • Personal guarantees backed by purely self-declared wealth, with no audit and no check for mortgages or guarantees on other projects;
  • GAPDs on recent companies, with no equity or no audited accounts.

These terms give the illusion of investor protection, when sometimes they can never be called or are worthless.

  • Set up a clear framework of understandable guarantees.
  • Mandatory audit of whether guarantees are real, including personal guarantees.

8️⃣ Platform liability

Immunity must not become a business model, and it must be possible to hold platforms liable. The spirit of the European regulation that created the PSFP was to delegate to the platforms the task of assessing projects and siding with investors.

In several dozen cases, major platform failures have occurred:

  • Risk badly assessed;
  • Guarantees never signed or validated;
  • Deals run by people with undetected track records;
  • Faulty due diligence on the project owner’s financial health, etc.

At the end of the line, investors lose their money, get no support, turn to the regulator (which can’t act because that isn’t its role) and nobody ever takes responsibility for the losses.

There is no question of imposing on platforms an obligation to deliver results with no losses: that doesn’t exist. But where there is proven fault, the platforms must be held liable, and the regulator must step in quickly to put an end to the harm.

How can it be that some platforms whose defaults have been soaring for nearly 3 years, on deals where they made serious mistakes, can carry on raising money without a care?

  • Set up a clear, structured complaints and mediation system.
  • Mandatory professional liability insurance covering sufficient amounts.

9️⃣ Transparency

In the three years I have been following crowdfunding closely, I have received more than a dozen refusals from platforms (always the same ones) after asking for further information on a deal being financed.

At what point did we decide it was normal to ask retail investors to put money specifically into a project they know nothing about? As soon as there is a public offering, platforms must publish:

  • The issuer’s name and its SIRET (company registration) number;
  • A description of the project to be financed;
  • The amounts and financial terms;
  • The audits of the issuer’s financial health;
  • The guarantees taken.

This information should also be set out in a readable information document, accessible to all, like the DIS (a short summary document used in France).

Of course, some information is sensitive and confidential. Well, if it mustn’t be known, then let these issuers go and get financing from a bank, an institutional investor, a fund or professional investors.

Why should crowdfunding make it possible to raise tens of millions, sometimes more than a big SME’s IPO, without the same constraints?

That is why filing company accounts was made compulsory. Not to annoy start-ups that prefer to publish the figures that suit them on their blog, picked up by a so-called specialist press that would rather put out an article in a few minutes to sell ads than check whether the information is true.

A company that doesn’t publish its accounts doesn’t allow investors to understand its financial health, and should not be allowed to benefit from a public offering.

Same fight for fintechs and PSFPs, PSANs (French-registered crypto-asset service providers) and the like: failing to file accounts should be grounds for immediate suspension of the licence. We’re talking about people’s money, not a company trying to hide its non-existent margin on its overpriced bikes, which will end up on the scrapheap anyway.

  • Define a list of mandatory information to be displayed freely, without logging in.
  • A ban on raising funds, whatever the financial instrument, if the accounts have not been approved and filed.

🔟 Continuity plan

Several platforms have had to close their doors in recent months. That isn’t abnormal: the market is young. While it is surprising that this wasn’t initially provided for in the European regulation (a mistake since corrected), recent examples show just how badly the continuity plans were managed and prepared.

Every time, it was all done with complete amateurism, with shifting conditions or players popping up in and vanishing from the files.

Continuity plans must be:

  • Clearly published and accessible, at least for the part concerning investors;
  • Funded by the platforms whatever happens;
  • Documented, with fees and service providers clearly stated, and contractual information.

So we need to:

  • Define what must be in continuity plans.
  • Require continuity plans to be published in full.

The authorities must act.
Retail investors cannot go on forever serving as the financial fuse for players who don’t care about the consequences.