Everyone will form their own opinion of this case. Tudigo and Bricks speak without hesitation of fraud regarding Laurent Villa’s fundraisings. And indeed, several facts show that the truth was at times arranged, doctored or downright disguised, as in the case of the fake lease we discussed in the first episode.
Unfortunately, it isn’t the only case of its kind. At Tudigo, the Antheos and AL Construction files look just as dubious. And there are a substantial number of cases of wrongdoing by project owners across many platforms.
But responsibility cannot be limited to project owners alone.
I haven’t been able to cover all the structuring problems at Tudigo, there are so many of them. Consider, for example, that the SPVs holding the bonds still haven’t declared themselves insolvent after more than a year, or even two for some, even though they are bond issuers, and therefore carry liabilities they cannot meet.
At Koregraf, the collapse brought to light several particularly problematic files that could engage the liability of its former executives. It’s no accident that the platforms up for sale can’t find a buyer. Like Lumo, which was nonetheless fairly serious about its deals, which went silent, and whose portfolio, sold for a symbolic €1, is being transferred to Enerfip.
EDIT 12 August 2025, 12.03pm: corrected information on the transfer of Lumo to Enerfip.
More broadly, while there is no question of making the platforms responsible for all losses (guaranteed 10% returns don’t exist), the widespread misunderstanding among retail investors, combined with shaky processes, raises serious questions.
After more than two years of dissecting crowdfunding, its assets, its deals and its legislation, I have reached the obvious conclusion that it must be overhauled, and urgently. Because while workshops and other meetings take place among well-informed people, hundreds of thousands of retail clients are being fleeced. I explained a few months ago that I estimated the ultimate losses (in fine) from crowdfunding (in French) at around a billion euros once all the 2018-2023 deals have been unwound.
So, since I know that among the 112K subscribers to this newsletter, several work at the AMF, at the ACPR (France’s banking and insurance supervisor), in the National Assembly (France’s lower house of parliament), at institutional investors and at platforms, I’ll take the opportunity to put forward my 10 ideas for reform.
Obviously, the French regulator doesn’t have a free hand on a text it inherits from ESMA. But laws are never set in stone, and France’s opinion counts.
Since the PSFP was launched, intermediaries and the AMF have been circling the issue, trying to work out how to fit blivets into Penrose squares.
The old licences were issued by the ACPR, and therefore listed on ORIAS (the French register of financial intermediaries), while the new PSFP licence is issued by the AMF, and therefore only listed on its website.
This purely administrative logic makes no sense to investors, nor even to wealth managers who, until recently, didn’t understand why a licensed platform had been removed from ORIAS.
How is a retail investor supposed to cope?
As for crowdequity, having defended it for a long time, I think it should no longer be allowed for retail investors under these conditions. The deals presented by the platforms are generally the ones nobody wanted, the information is patchy, the asset class too complex and the marketing too aggressive. After several years, we have seen a huge number of bitter failures and no major success. Given that the platforms have never published their real results (and you can see why), we have to ask whether there is any point in leaving the floodgates open.
Several players today boast of having the most precise indicators on the market, defined by Financement Participatif France, the French crowdfunding trade body, now part of France Fintech. Spoiler: nobody cares.
Nobody cares. What we want is an answer.
The indicators, which platforms declare and update as they see fit, were never designed for investors but for the platforms and for E&Y, which produces its annual barometer. Knowing that 11% of loans taken out in 2021 are less than 6 months late is of no interest to an investor. Nor is the average of the bonds.
What is needed, in the case of crowdfunding, is to have, clearly, visibly and regularly updated:
For fractional property, here again, it’s the Wild Mess:
What the investor needs to know is:
More generally, indicators must be:
That’s why we need to:
Even today, and it happens with every default, in every investor group on Facebook or Discord, lots of people think they have invested in property, a term the platforms use and abuse.
The reality, every professional knows it: these platforms finance small and medium-sized companies whose business is property. But the risk isn’t property risk. It is an SME financing risk and an operational risk.
Using terms such as “property investment” tends to create the illusion of lower risk for very real investors.
AMF doctrine is perfectly clear on the obligation to state the risks, in proportion to the benefits. Several asset managers have already been sanctioned and called to order, notably in the well-known sanction against Corum, for breaching these obligations.
How can we accept today, on the pretext that we are dealing with young, innovative and less regulated fintechs, that they bury the risks in the footer while displaying the returns or photos of properties in huge print, sometimes even with words like “guaranteed” or “secured”?
It is absolutely unacceptable for bondholders to be represented by the platform, when the platform has been paid by the borrower. It is a huge conflict of interest in which an intermediary is asked to beat up its own client, at its own expense.
The bondholders’ representative must be independent of the platform, have no shareholding conflict of interest, and be a qualified professional, who can be dismissed under conditions clearly set out to investors, who must, moreover, be able to communicate with one another.
Nobody works for free. No financial intermediary is free. Claiming otherwise is lying. Many platforms have claimed they were free because they don’t charge fees to investors. But it’s still a lie.
Take the example of financing for a €100 project with 10% fees:
In reality, it comes to the same thing in every case: for an identical sum, you get the initial amount minus the fees, which is what actually finances the asset.
So you might as well explain from the outset what the fees are and share them between the project owner and the investor.
Investors must be able to understand that not all guarantees are equal. How many personal guarantees turn out to be insufficient, when security over a property would have made it possible to recover a good part of the funds?
No guarantee should be presented to an investor without a prior audit. How often do we see:
These terms give the illusion of investor protection, when sometimes they can never be called or are worthless.
Immunity must not become a business model, and it must be possible to hold platforms liable. The spirit of the European regulation that created the PSFP was to delegate to the platforms the task of assessing projects and siding with investors.
In several dozen cases, major platform failures have occurred:
At the end of the line, investors lose their money, get no support, turn to the regulator (which can’t act because that isn’t its role) and nobody ever takes responsibility for the losses.
There is no question of imposing on platforms an obligation to deliver results with no losses: that doesn’t exist. But where there is proven fault, the platforms must be held liable, and the regulator must step in quickly to put an end to the harm.
How can it be that some platforms whose defaults have been soaring for nearly 3 years, on deals where they made serious mistakes, can carry on raising money without a care?
In the three years I have been following crowdfunding closely, I have received more than a dozen refusals from platforms (always the same ones) after asking for further information on a deal being financed.
At what point did we decide it was normal to ask retail investors to put money specifically into a project they know nothing about? As soon as there is a public offering, platforms must publish:
This information should also be set out in a readable information document, accessible to all, like the DIS (a short summary document used in France).
Of course, some information is sensitive and confidential. Well, if it mustn’t be known, then let these issuers go and get financing from a bank, an institutional investor, a fund or professional investors.
Why should crowdfunding make it possible to raise tens of millions, sometimes more than a big SME’s IPO, without the same constraints?
That is why filing company accounts was made compulsory. Not to annoy start-ups that prefer to publish the figures that suit them on their blog, picked up by a so-called specialist press that would rather put out an article in a few minutes to sell ads than check whether the information is true.
A company that doesn’t publish its accounts doesn’t allow investors to understand its financial health, and should not be allowed to benefit from a public offering.
Same fight for fintechs and PSFPs, PSANs (French-registered crypto-asset service providers) and the like: failing to file accounts should be grounds for immediate suspension of the licence. We’re talking about people’s money, not a company trying to hide its non-existent margin on its overpriced bikes, which will end up on the scrapheap anyway.
Several platforms have had to close their doors in recent months. That isn’t abnormal: the market is young. While it is surprising that this wasn’t initially provided for in the European regulation (a mistake since corrected), recent examples show just how badly the continuity plans were managed and prepared.
Every time, it was all done with complete amateurism, with shifting conditions or players popping up in and vanishing from the files.
Continuity plans must be:
So we need to:
The authorities must act.
Retail investors cannot go on forever serving as the financial fuse for players who don’t care about the consequences.