It was around this time that Villa launched BeefHouse, a name that spares me explaining the concept. The first restaurant opens on the Gambetta market square in Cannes, a few hundred metres from the famous Croisette. To get started, he teams up with Chloé Albertini, then later with her brother Vincent; Chloé is the daughter of Marcel Albertini, a very fashionable Cannes restaurateur, and soon becomes his partner.
Over time, more restaurants open. A second one on the Cours Saleya in Nice in 2013, then a third in 2015 in Marseille, in premises let by Hammerson, in the heart of the Les Terrasses du port shopping centre. Then Lille, Toulon, Cagnes-sur-Mer.
In 2015, while still banned from running companies in France, Laurent Villa sets up a holding company in Luxembourg, Group Clav, to centralise his stakes, notably in the restaurants. Chloé Albertini takes 15% the following year.
Until 2019, the businesses seem to be ticking over. Of the ten or so companies whose accounts I was able to see, most were in the red, but I could not check all 25, especially since most of them never filed accounts. For his part, Laurent Villa says the group was profitable when looked at as a whole.
One thing does stand out, though: every single company stops filing accounts after 2019. Yet all of them had been broadly clean, year after year. Then suddenly, nothing. No more filings, no more figures. Even when he raises money on platforms, all we get are forecasts.
During Covid, Laurent Villa makes several TV appearances4, which he is very proud to remind me of, to talk about the plight of restaurants. He even signs an op-ed in the business daily Les Échos5 questioning (like many) the strange law closing restaurants. Yet he does not give up. Better (or worse?), he keeps opening restaurants, under three separate brands:
Coming out of Covid, it is mainly the third one he bets on. Yet, off the record, several signals suggest things are not going very well.
But before we move on, we need to spend two minutes understanding how Laurent Villa’s companies are structured, because it is a bit complicated. And not necessarily innocent.
To keep things simple (and keep a bit of suspense), I have kept only the restaurant side and set aside the property side, which will be the subject of a future newsletter. Let’s say there are a few names to remember:
It is in 2015 that the architecture starts to set. On one side of the border, restaurants opened one after another. On the other, a more refined mechanism: an IP Box, or Patent Box, or magic box, depending on your level of cynicism.
The principle is crystal clear, almost poetic: you isolate the intellectual property in a dedicated structure, here BHI Finance, and all the operating companies pay it royalties to use the brands. A BeefHouse without the House is just beef.
In the jargon, this is called “operating under a trademark licence”. In practice, it is a pipe that sends money up to a company with a pampered tax status. The royalties are deductible in France and lightly taxed in Luxembourg. And everyone looks the other way as long as it looks clean.
Until 2016, the Grand Duchy was a well-known cash motorway for multinationals. Amazon booked its European sales there, Ferrero its Nutella, Skype its calls, not through declared IP Boxes but through neatly tied tax rulings. Same game.
The real Luxembourg IP Box was reformed in 2018 under pressure from the OECD and its BEPS project. It allowed IP income to be taxed at an effective rate of 5.2%. Today, you have to prove real economic substance and local R&D activity, and comply with the nexus approach, meaning strict proportionality between activity and tax advantage. Not impossible to set up, but tougher than the vintage schemes of the 2010s.
Other countries are still in the game. The United Kingdom offers a Patent Box at 10%, Belgium goes down to 6.8%, and Switzerland lets its cantons tinker with exemptions of up to 90% on qualifying income.
But it is not just about rates. What matters is the narrative. Luxembourg remains a well-rehearsed stage for telling the tax authorities a credible story: an intangible asset, a company that exploits it, well-drafted contracts, and flows that look like something other than a dividend pump.
The fact remains that the brands are bought for €650K, and the restaurants will have to pay BHI €35K plus 4% of their turnover a year. And while according to Laurent Villa the IP Box was never put in place, the figures say otherwise.
The trademark licence agreements signed with BHI Finance.
Olivier Tugaut will lead the debt raises to fund the expansion, for a salary of just over €8K a month and a nice BMW R GS as a company motorbike. Later on, Group Clav will pay Antobella (a Tugaut company) €1,500 a month for administrative management, and from 2020, pay L’Arche de Néo (a Tugaut holding company in Luxembourg) €1,700 for an office that is never used, since Laurent Villa and his partner live in Cannes.
When it is set up, the €33K share capital is split equally between the three Luxembourg holding companies of Olivier Tugaut (Neo Capital, Tugaut’s other holding company), Jean-Christophe B. (Bayet Properties) and Laurent Villa (Group Clav).
A first raise, called 2015.03, of €3M in debt is launched, and Tugaut puts in €2M.
The 2015.03 bonds of BHI Finance.
Jean-Christophe B., who also runs several restaurants, leaves fairly quickly, leaving Olivier Tugaut (via Neo Capital and L’Arche de Néo) and Laurent Villa with equal stakes of 45% each, with Natixis holding the rest.
Cap table of BHI Finance in 2016. The first three boxes are signed by Olivier Tugaut.
A new series is issued at the end of 2015 for €10M, in bonds paying an annual 10% coupon over 7 years, to a dozen or so small investors, such as Christian M., who becomes a director, or Jean D., a doctor about to retire, who invest between €125K and €375K.
Then another series is launched in 2017 on the same terms, with repayment due in 2023, attracting half a dozen investors who put in €2.1M.
In the meantime, M Capital is also said to have invested €2M to €3M. And year after year, the debt soars without BHI being able to repay. Especially as launching the restaurants does not generate revenue quickly. At the end of 2016, every restaurant is in the red:
But never mind. Thanks to the IP Box system, BHI makes €224K in profit. And that is mainly down to the royalties from the three chains:
While nobody disputes that restaurants suffered badly from Covid, and from the changes in behaviour that followed, it turns out that the group’s difficulties actually started a little earlier.
Take the BeefHouse Lyon. Probably to fund the opening, the company borrows €400K from Lyonnaise de Banque, a local bank of the CIC group, followed by €920K from BNP.
This is 2017, so the terms are easy: 1.34% over 5 years, with a 6-month grace period. A year later, the bank closes the company’s account after a €15K overdraft, and calls in the loan in February 2019, demanding the remaining €391K immediately. BeefHouse Group, as guarantor, is sued by the bank for €406K, including the overdraft, but the holding company argues Covid, yada yada. In December 2020, the court rejects its request, which the court of appeal confirms in February 20226. Because twice, BeefHouse Group asks for more time without clearly explaining how the holding company intends to pay, especially so many years later.
But hey, failures happen.
In May 2019, BHI Finance is declared bankrupt by a Luxembourg court7. Asked about it, Laurent Villa first denies it, then, faced with a more detailed question, explains that the bankruptcy was overturned.
Ruling of the Luxembourg court of appeal, November 2019.
According to a Luxembourg judicial source, the bankruptcy concerned a claim of €1M+ in unpaid social security contributions and was indeed revoked in 2020. Yet Laurent Villa assures me that the company has still not been liquidated, and that it is no longer bankrupt following that decision.
That is factually untrue.
The company has been bankrupt again since May 2025, and has not published accounts for 5 years. And it is being liquidated.
Entry in the Luxembourg register of the bankruptcy of BHI Finance, 2025.
While it was not possible to obtain an exact statement of the claims, it is highly likely that more than €6M has gone up in smoke. According to a 2017 creditor, the 2018 and 2019 coupons were paid, but the 2020 one only by half, and no payment has been made since. The same investor says Laurent Villa told him that BHI had been liquidated in March 2023, but that, as a man of his word, he was offering to transfer the debt to RX Venture, through an agreement the investor would sign. And of which… he never heard another word. This testimony was in fact sent to the court in Grasse in the summer of 2025, to support a complaint against Laurent Villa.
Laurent Villa’s offer to the investor and creditor of BHI Finance in 2022, initially turned down.
The fact remains that for years, BHI’s value keeps falling while its debt keeps rising, and the value of its stakes in the restaurants collapses until 2019. In other words, before Covid, a year before Raizers, two years before SquareStones, three before Tudigo (the crowdfunding platforms that come next), some of the restaurants were already in very bad shape.
Admittedly, and this is why I started with the organisation chart, this only concerns some of the restaurants. But it gives a first indication.
Reconstructed balance sheets of BHI Finance, 2016 to 2020
The accounts of BHI Finance, year by year
Reconstructed balance sheets of BHI Finance, 2016 to 2020. Chart: Zero Bullshit.
Still, between the two lockdowns of 2020, Laurent Villa asks Olivier Tugaut to help with a plan to restructure the group and reduce its debt, notably by repaying the senior and junior debt of BHI Finance. But very quickly, Tugaut announces he wants to sell his shares, and at the end of the year resigns from all his roles, his permanent contract as well as his seat on the board. Followed by Christian M. And it is hard to see how the company could pull through, given the state of the balance sheets since it was created. Equity was positive only in the first year, and it has been a rout ever since.
At the time of the split, in 2020, there was therefore €6.1M left on the bonds raised, and about €4M owed to shareholders, mainly to Olivier Tugaut. Which Villa bluntly says he does not want to repay, after their falling-out.
A year after leaving, Olivier Tugaut asks BHI for his €2M and his €850K in interest, three times during 2022, for Neo Capital and L’Arche de Néo, due at the end of 2022. Except there is nothing left in the till, obviously. Tugaut knows it. In April 2023, a law firm takes action, adding the collection costs, which brings the amount to €3.2M.
So what is happening on the other side of the restaurants, at Clav?
Well, broadly: the same thing, in the same proportions and over the same period.
Reconstructed balance sheets of Group Clav, 2015 to 2020.
The accounts of Group Clav, year by year
Reconstructed balance sheets of Group Clav, 2015 to 2020. Chart: Zero Bullshit.
And if liabilities explode in 2019, it is because Group Clav raises €6M in bonds. Except that the Luxembourg holding company is in trouble too. At the end of 2018, Clav grants Laurent Villa a €200K loan over 12 years. That is not common, but not illegal either. That said, the question of a conflict of interest inevitably arises, since Laurent Villa is both signatory and beneficiary, the second signatory is his partner, and the third their lawyer. All the more so as the company takes no security whatsoever, and offers particularly relaxed repayment terms.
Financially, it is a disaster and unpaid bills pile up, to the point that several bailiffs visit the offices. In November 2021, the Luxembourg State carries out a seizure for forced sale to clear more than €50K in tax debts… but no assets are found.
Admittedly, BHI does not own the restaurants directly and lives off the royalties, but the debt served those restaurants, which inevitably suggests that the business was already going very badly. Which Clav’s accounts seem to confirm.
And things are not about to get better.