In 2015, the dusty burger chain Quick entered talks with Burger King, which wanted to expand in France. The deal was eventually taken over by Bertrand, the French restaurant group, when it took charge of BK’s development in France; it agreed to take on the bulk of the €600M of debt, with a fairly simple strategy:
And, even if nobody said so at first, get rid of the rest soon afterwards. So it came as no surprise that Quick was put back up for sale in 2020 by Lazard, and that HIG Capital put down €240M for the 107 chip shacks in the summer of 2021. And that is where Hakim would have liked to step in.
But before moving on, let’s take a moment to talk numbers. A €240M valuation is twice the valuation Benotmane claims for Nabab. All for about 160 restaurants with average turnover of €2M, so, roughly, €300M-€350M of turnover across the restaurants. According to a reliable source, it was running at around €330M in 2022, which seems consistent.
According to several market studies, a kebab shop turns over between €130K and €300K. A range consistent with this P&L of the Nabab in Tours.
So to turn over €125M48 or €210M49, you would need between 600 and 1,100 restaurants doing €200K each. Even taking the Les Échos figure of more than 200 outlets, and imagining that they all beat the target, at €500K, that only makes €110M. Given that franchisees’ accounts point more to €150K to €250K, and that no more than 40 to 50 restaurants have ever been found operating at the same time, we are probably looking at between €6M and €13M of turnover, which is already nice, but that’s all the restaurants added together. Whereas the franchise itself takes less than 10% of that in royalties.
That would still mean Quick was worth twice Benotmane’s group, with turnover that, in the best case of a year that in fact never happened, would be three to four times lower, with less attractive sites and a less recognised brand.
Yet more obvious proof that the sale never took place.
Benotmane, for his part, had a plan all worked out for Quick:
His aim, he says, was to make it the number 1 halal burger brand in the world.50
But obviously, he is far from even an outsider in a battle of giants. Or of Giants, like Quick’s signature burger, and like the internal code name of Lazard’s process. And it was in fact through Lazard, which had initially represented him, that he got onto the deal. But Rothschild, to whom Bertrand had given the mandate, handed it to Lazard, and Benotmane had himself represented by Société Générale.
The first exchanges went well, and Benotmane made it through to the second round of negotiations. But that’s where things got tricky: because real money has to be put on the table.
On several occasions, Benotmane has claimed to have worked with BlackRock on this acquisition.51
They went to see loads of very well-known funds, he says, even BlackRock, and he says he still has letters of intent from BlackRock today, which he has kept.
He finally posted this document, dated June 2021, a few days ago.
Except that at no point is it a letter of commitment, in which BlackRock would say it was going for a deal and an amount: it is an NDA, a confidentiality agreement in which he simply undertakes not to disclose information. Including… the NDA itself.
In the same podcast, he says he approached Mubadala, Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund. Whereas in the Les Échos profile quoted at the start, the story was that he had Mubadala alongside him on the bid.
Asked about it, a long-standing Mubadala executive in Abu Dhabi is categorical:
Mubadala has been active in France for about ten years, he says, but restaurants have never been part of its investment thesis, and it was never involved in the Quick deal, still less with Hakim Benotmane.
But Benotmane says he put in €80M of equity to go and raise €150M of debt, before launching into a pseudo-financial tirade. Except that all of it is hot air.
Here is the real LOI (letter of intent), sent by Benotmane through Ketary Food, which belongs to him:
And if he doesn’t want to post it, unlike other documents, it’s because the story doesn’t really work in his favour. Like when he says he is the sole shareholder and manager of Groupe FBH and of all the restaurants, including the Nabab ones.
So the offer is put at €230M:
So there is no mention whatsoever of BlackRock. And contrary to what he claims,52 he wasn’t ready to put in €25M, but €15M.
By his own account, Quick was eventually sold for €237M, and he failed because his partners refused to add a measly seven million.
In reality, and this won’t surprise you, the story is much simpler.
When the process got under way, KPMG began an audit of Quick costing just under €80K. Except that Lazard, for its part, had the greatest difficulty getting the documents it had asked Benotmane for. Especially when it came to proving the €15M of available cash. Which, obviously, he didn’t have. And which he tried to “value” through an accounting fiddle in his holding company, which obviously didn’t fool the professionals. Result: Bertrand threw out his offer fairly quickly.
Even so, a lot of people were mobilised on this deal, including Crédit Agricole, ready to join his bid on behalf of one of its clients, and even the fried-chicken giant KFC. Oddly enough, Benotmane never mentions them.
It has to be said that it went very badly.
Initially, the idea was a deal based on lease-management with the chain. Interested, its executives wanted to see with their own eyes the concept Benotmane had sold and packaged so well. And what followed looks like one of those dire French comedies that go straight to streaming.
Because the Nabab and Tacos King outlets were neither managed nor consistent in any way. During the store tour with the KFC teams, equipment was delivered just before the visit to make it look as if it had really been there. Everything was rigged to dress up the bride, as one of the participants put it.
Before KFC even had time to make up its mind, a manager Benotmane had hired called the brand just before leaving the company and told them it was all fake.
Not enough to put him off.
In 2024, he would try again, even though the chain wasn’t for sale, claiming he could match an offer of a billion with the help of a Qatari fund.
His email signature now states that he makes more than a billion in revenue.