💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 10

Fundraising Without Funds

In reality, between 2020 and 2022, Benotmane knocked on every door trying to find funding. Since he talks well, presents well and has a few press clippings, the doors open. But they shut again as fast as the audits begin.

Because while it is now BG Capital that receives the franchisees’ money, the story itself hasn’t really changed.

Now it is Ketari53 that serves as the hook. This time, the group is presented as a fast-food specialist since 2003, with the brands Nabab Kebab, Tacos King and Poke&Moi. In his presentation to financiers, we discover yet another version of the story, in which the sale becomes the creation of the group.

It was this presentation that led several partners to ask questions about the famous Asian period mentioned at the start. And about the figures, too.

Because several of the funds and brokers who saw the file had also read the articles. And remained sceptical when faced with this slide:

Granted, the turnover only covers the franchise royalties, not the restaurants’ own turnover. But you can fairly easily see that:

  • Franchisees pay around €110K per restaurant;
  • Company-owned restaurants show turnover of around €220K.

A very, very long way from what he has been announcing all over the place, but it does at least show the new organisation, in which FBH, NDM and their little friends have strangely disappeared.

And which would lead to a broadly identical reorganisation, with BG Capital at the top, held via Luxembourg, then one company per brand holding the company-owned restaurants, while Ketary collects the royalties.

Alongside the project, FBH (since it is this company that signs the pitch deck) also puts a value on a tech product called FitFit, which would supposedly handle every aspect of running a restaurant, with a SaaS solution covering 100% of a restaurateur’s digital needs, developed by one Kevin Valfrin. Remember those two names: we’ll come back to them in episode two.

The M&A bank handling the file lost heart fairly quickly in the face of very evasive answers from Benotmane and his team. Because they soon spotted the problem areas.

First, the brand, which had taken a battering. While Benotmane argues that it isn’t tarnished in customers’ eyes, the dozens of franchisees who have jumped ship are starting to make themselves heard.

Next, the business plans, which look very optimistic. The Tours restaurant is presented as the group’s flagship, whereas its results, for almost twenty years now, have fallen far short of the ambitions.

A little later, he told another partner that he had tried to raise more than €12M but had failed because of what he called a very dishonest external accountant, and that he had to dissolve BG Capital, which was supposed to carry the group, in favour of a new company, Norbab & Flo. All while explaining that he was looking for funds to launch a mobile ice-cream business (€800K of turnover per vehicle), a Fit Boxing gym, ten L’Entrecôte restaurants (more on that later) and some twenty other restaurants.

The reality is that the coffers are empty, and that he is surviving on the money he collects in entry fees on his own restaurants. But that would soon no longer be enough to pay the bills.

The same year, he contacted a broker and served up the usual trio: €120M of turnover, a sale in 2014, a move to Asia. This time he added that he had developed about a hundred restaurants, sold in 2019 to the Luckin coffee group.

Luckin, often called China’s Starbucks, has been through a very rough patch since 2020, following an internal accounting fraud exposed by the short seller Carson Block. The company was then taken over and restructured by Centurium Capital, which had gradually built up a stake since its IPO in May 2019.

At my request, a specialist very close to the matter looked into it. He has not only the list of the group’s tens of thousands of cafés, but also the details of the hyper-growth strategy rolled out between 2017 and 2019.

From the list of Luckin cafés

As far as he is concerned, the deal never existed.

From 2017 to 2018, he explains, there was very little M&A, and it was only used to buy very specific and rather expensive sites, outside the big priority cities, and only for a few outlets. From 2019 onwards, the accounts are public, and no such acquisition is ever mentioned.

Fair enough.

In the same email, Benotmane says he made €8M of turnover in 2021 (against more than €200M according to Les Échos) and received an offer valuing the business at €16M from Waterland, which he says wanted to become a shareholder, and which he claims to have negotiated up to €40M.

Waterland could not be reached directly, but a source familiar with the file speaks of a proposal from Benotmane that Waterland never followed up.

Yet again a truth arranged by the man himself.

Except that there are places where you can’t doctor the truth.