But the story goes well beyond Green-Got: crowdequity is problematic by nature. And the proof fits in a fun little game. Say you've got the best company in the world, and you want to raise money. You ask Claude for the best possible pitch deck. Magic: everyone wants to invest in you as if you had a blockchain startup in 2022. What do you do? And why would you choose crowdfunding?
The answer is the same for everyone. First you take the offers from Andreessen Horowitz, Accel, Founders Fund, the global top tier. Or at a push the second division, Tiger or Menlo, which is already a pretty decent division. If you're in France, you'll go and knock, like everyone else, on the door of the friendly uncle of French startups for your standard €100K cheque, and you'll be tempted to do business with Alven, Cathay or some big industrial group passing by. Otherwise you drop down a division, to XAnge, Breega or Elaia, then down another notch, to Serena, 360 or Newfund.
That's our ranking, it's worth what it's worth (no complaint emails, please), which is not much, but you get the idea. So why on earth would you bother raising from retail, convincing a community yourself, on a platform that gorges itself on fees21, on limited terms, from people who bring you nothing but their money, when the teams at Partech have already backed Alan, ManoMano and Pennylane, and the ones at Axeleo may have come a cropper on Prello and Bifrost but know your sector and have already signed some nice exits? Someone who opens a distributor's door for you or pairs you up with another startup for a deal is not to be sniffed at. Crowdcube and Lita can't do that. It isn't their job.
So that was a long road to a short answer, but it had to be said: the answer is D, because you've got no choice.
That's probably what pushed Galeon, which we've already covered here (in French), to go back to its community with an equity round a few days ago, after scraping together barely €1M of the €8M sought in its bond raise in January. Even though its boss was strutting about in a white coat a few months earlier, explaining that he didn't want to raise money and had turned down offers from institutional investors. Reality: nobody wants to fund it. Like most of the deals that end up on crowdfunding.
Besides, for anyone raising money, retail has one virtue: it doesn't understand much. So it isn't a pain in the arse. Doesn't ask too many questions. And doesn't know what it's supposed to know either.
Picture 2023. The Swedish VC Pale Blue Dot, true to its green thesis, led a round for Green-Got at a valuation of around €25M22. Before signing, it got a data room: detailed accounts, contracts, metrics, projections. OK, truth be told, we don't know. But in most cases, that's how it works. A pile of documents unreadable to ordinary mortals, but which give those who can read them a precise view of the company. Thanks to those documents, it negotiated the price and set its conditions.
In the same round, the individuals who came in via Crowdcube got none of that23. And Green-Got, which prides itself on transparency, doesn't file its accounts with the commercial court registry, France's equivalent of Companies House. Nothing since 202124. So the retail investor put money blind into a company they knew nothing about, apart from a few rising curves.
True, the accounts exist, tucked into an appendix of the Crowdcube document. But they aren't audited. At the bottom of the page, the firm that prepared them says so itself: it carried out a compilation engagement (“mission de présentation”)25. The French term sounds reassuring, it suggests neatly ordered figures. It means the opposite: neither an audit nor a review, nobody independent has checked these numbers. They're plausible, not guaranteed.
The chartered accountant's report on Green-Got's 2025 accounts, appended to the June 2026 fundraising document: “ni un audit ni un examen limité” [neither an audit nor a limited review].
Nor is the price the same depending on who's buying. The fund negotiates it, the retail investor takes it. On Crowdcube, the valuation isn't up for discussion: it's the figure the founder has set, and you pay that figure or you walk away. In fact, the head of a rival platform puts it bluntly:
Crowdcube, in his words, doesn't negotiate a single valuation.
Head of a rival platform26
The fund would have pushed it down. The retail investor signs at €26.21 a share because it says 26.21.
The cap table shows the rest to the naked eye. The early investors, holders of Seed shares, have warrants known as “BSA Rachet”, a mechanism that lets them buy shares at €9 if the company raises at a lower price27. Insurance against dilution. The retail investor who came in at €26.21 has nothing of the sort. If the next round is cheaper, the pro resets, the retail investor gets diluted.
The “Rachet” warrants on the Seed shares, at an exercise price of €9, in the notes to Green-Got's 2023 accounts.
Above all, the rights attached to the shares erode from one round to the next. In November 2024, the shares sold to the public still carried a liquidation preference: if the company was sold, they got their money back before ordinary shareholders27. In June 2026, at €26.21, that preference has gone, and the document spells it out: the shares in this round “ne bénéficient d'aucune préférence de liquidation” [carry no liquidation preference]21. The retail investor pays more for fewer rights.
November 2024: if the company is sold, the Seed and Post-Seed shares get their purchase price back first.
June 2026: the Series A shares sold to the public no longer carry any preference.
A quarter of the capital, and no seat at the table
Added together, the three rounds make the crowd a heavyweight shareholder. Zero Bullshit's calculation from the amount and price of each round: about 211,000 shares in 2023 (€1.9M at €9), 265,000 in 2024 (€5.2M at €19.62) and 305,000 in 2026 (€8M at €26.21). That's nearly 781,000 shares, out of about 3.07 million once the June 2026 round closed21. Roughly a quarter of the capital.
These shares aren't in their names: they're held by Crowdcube Nominees, on their behalf. And the company's strategic committee brings together “les investisseurs principaux et les fondateurs” [the main investors and the founders]21. Not the crowd.
Matera, the proptech, raised on the very same Crowdcube in 2023: €2M from 947 individuals28. Its investors received class B preference shares, paid first in the event of a sale, ahead of the founders and employees, until they recover their stake. So a community round can protect the retail investor better than the founders themselves.
The same move changes nature depending on the company's health. Marketing when the brand doesn't need cash, like Qonto, €5M right after a €486M Series D29. A survival bridge when it's out of breath, from Galeon (in French) to Daan Tech (in French). And an exit already botched when the pros have left and the community boards last, like Masteos, €1.5M six months after €40M of venture capital, just before property tipped over (in French).
The same move, five natures. Turn the cards over.
MoneyVox, Zero Bullshit, Crowdfund Insider.
We've seen this film before, on the very platform Green-Got chose. In 2017, Sugru, a British mouldable repair glue adored by its customers, opens its capital on Crowdcube: 2,515 backers who came in as fans more than investors, at a valuation above £33M. A year later, it's sold to the German group Tesa for £7.6M, down 90%, the decision taken among the big shareholders, the only ones holding the class of shares that allowed them to force it on the others30. The fan who came to save their favourite brand got neither a return nor a say.
And that's the real hole. No platform publishes what becomes of the companies it has funded, or how many backers got their money back. They all display the total raised and the number of investors, never the survival rate or the returns. Crowdcube says only 14% of the companies it has funded have failed, without saying what became of the others31, or how many are struggling, and what little research has managed to measure rested on a handful of gems, Revolut above all, without which the average collapses32. So the backer signs without the only number that matters. Not the valuation, not the percentage sold. Their odds.
None of this is illegal. But the method and the asymmetry raise questions when the move is repeated, and when the investment rests more on faith than on reason.
Four days to think it over, 52 minutes to sign
On a crowdfunding offer, EU law gives non-sophisticated investors a four-calendar-day cooling-off period, during which they can cancel without giving a reason. The Green-Got fundraising document points this out on its very first page21.
The round, meanwhile, was wrapped up in 52 minutes. The countdown, the announced record, the tranche reserved for existing shareholders: the whole show pushes you to subscribe before you think. The cooling-off period only starts once you've subscribed.
