💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 06

Booster shot

The Chambéry affair59 shows the same gap between story and reality. In October 2024, the Savoie-Belley GHT (CH Métropole Savoie, the hospital based in Chambéry) launches a tender to renew its EPR in SaaS mode, to be rolled out across six hospitals. It’s the GHT geographically closest to Galeon’s head office in Annecy (around 80 km). It’s also a considerable contract: 7,000 users, 57 million documents to migrate, 4,000 letter templates, 1,000 diaries to configure, and a potential duration of 10 years.

Galeon applies. Its application is rejected on 4 December 2024, along with those of two other companies (Nexus Optim and Axigate SA). Only five candidates out of all the applicants are allowed to submit a bid.

On 20 January 2025, Galeon announces it is challenging the tender in court. The announcement takes the form of a press release written by Matthieu Gueniffey, Galeon’s managing director, published as is on DSIH, the leading news site for health IT. It isn’t a piece of journalism. It’s the company’s word, presented as news. And it will do the same again in January when the crowdfunding is launched.

The press release denounces an unfair selection procedure that, it says, effectively shuts out young innovative companies in favour of the market’s established players. Its central claim: that 80% of the score is based on the volume of revenue and global headcount. Galeon, it adds, is not claiming any damages and asserts its right to present its innovative solution to care workers. The rhetoric is David versus Goliath.

The news is also republished via an ad on CNEWS, a French TV news channel.

On 20 February 2025, the Grenoble administrative court rejects the claim in its entirety. Gueniffey responds on DSIH on 18 March, calling it a black day for innovation and for French sovereignty.

Except that reading the court order tells a radically different story from the press releases.

  • The criteria are NOT “80% revenue and headcount”. The actual grid has three blocks and fifteen sub-criteria: economic and financial capacity (40%, seven sub-criteria including EPR R&D 5% and EPR vendor profitability 10%), professional and technical capacity (40%, six sub-criteria including dedicated EPR staff 10% and EPR R&D 10%), and quality certifications and labels (20%). EPR-specific R&D alone accounts for 25% of the total. The court concludes that the criteria are objective and non-discriminatory, and proportionate to the subject of the contract.
  • The figure Galeon never mentions: €287,849. The ruling reveals (point 8) that the revenue Galeon declared for 2023 for its EPR business was €287,849. The assessment grid described Galeon as a very small and heavily loss-making EPR vendor.
  • The contract is objectively out of reach. The court sets out the requirements, then concludes that the contract is not about supplying standard software. A GHT EPR contract with Softway Medical (1,100 employees, €150M in revenue) mobilises dozens of consultants over several years. Handing this contract to a company with 10-19 employees and €288K of EPR revenue would be a major risk for a public hospital.

Galeon’s approach is in no way illegal. It’s actually rather typical of the job I did for a few years: wrap up the problem, offer another perspective, reach a different conclusion. Duly noted.

But this double verdict, from a hospital buyer and then from a court, raises the question of Galeon’s very ability to exist in a market that has seemed beyond its reach for years. Which, obviously, every professional investor would have seen. And obviously did see, hence the absence of any fund in the capital.

The problem is that you can’t market a financial product the way you’d sell a T-shirt or a car.

Granted, no figure is really false. The DIS doesn’t lie. What it does is leave things out.

And Article L. 412-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code requires information given to the public to be accurate, clear and not misleading. The line between lawful omission and misleading information is drawn by the AMF. Except that the AMF doesn’t approve the DIS. It receives it, it files it. Nobody checks.

No more than those who are paid to relay it, and who don’t hesitate to say problematic things, like Pley, who drops this between two smiles:

Instead of your Livret A, France’s tax-free savings account, which must be around 1% now, he can’t remember, you put your money here, Pley says, and it’s 8%.

A risk also completely absent from the Atlantis site, whose home page devotes not a single character to possible losses or to the illiquidity of the investment.

And not a line either about a strange clause in the DIS.

The clause says that bondholders authorise in advance any transfer of the Issuer’s shares to a holding company, notably one governed by Swiss law, as part of a group reorganisation, as long as the current partners keep control.

First of all, if it’s there, it’s no accident: a transaction is planned. And, once again, it isn’t illegal, nor unprecedented. But frankly it’s not common, especially for such a small company.

In practice, it means bondholders are funding a company ultra-centralised on one person, who will probably house it in a Swiss holding company, with no guarantee whatsoever that (all) the assets, notably the cash, will stay in the subsidiary, rather than value being shifted out (IP, software, licences, management fees, etc.).

Just one more oddity.