💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 05

X-ray

At the end of 2021, Galeon is worth what its accounts are worth. Balance sheet total: €2.9M. Share capital: €25,000. Net profit: €3. Three. Trade receivables (the invoices issued to hospitals) stand at €41K. Net fixed assets, patents and R&D included: €118K. For a company that has presented itself as a leader in medical AI since it was founded. On the liabilities side, €2.77M of other debts are lying around, most likely the first crypto funds not yet recognised. Starting point.

The ICO in early 2022 brings in ~$15M in crypto. In the accounts, these funds appear as deferred income: €11M in one go. The balance sheet total quadruples, from €2.9M to €12.4M in a year. Not thanks to software sales: trade receivables moved by only €160K. The 2022 notes to the accounts describe the operation plainly, referring to the issue of tokens intended:

In the words of the notes, to be used as a means of payment to acquire, or get early access to, various data distributed by the company Galeon⁴⁰.

The principle of deferred income is money collected in advance for a future service. An annual subscription paid in January: you get the cash, and you spread the recognition of the revenue month by month. Except that here the “future service” is access to a blockchain health ecosystem that never saw the light of day. Or barely.

And the mechanism that follows is simple. Each year, Galeon uses up a slice of that deferred income and books it as revenue. The following table breaks down what Galeon calls its revenue:

From 2022 to 2024, between 92% and 95% of revenue actually comes from the accounting recognition of crypto funds raised in 2022. Not from software sales. And this is where the choice becomes visible: in its own forecast, Galeon separates revenue and ICO income on two distinct lines. It knows. But in the published accounts, the deferred income is buried in the liabilities. In the sales pitch, it’s €5M in revenue. On Legend, it’s growing revenue.

Except that the tank is emptying.

  • €11.1M at the end of 2022;
  • €8.1M at the end of 2023 (as the balance sheet line switches from crypto to currency);
  • €5.9M at the end of 2024.

The forecast confirms it: €0 of ICO income in 2027. By then, Galeon will have to live on its real revenue. And the magic tripling forecast for 2027 (€8.2M) rests on a European expansion still at the stage of mere approaches55. If the expansion doesn’t happen… well, we’ll see.

While the deferred income manufactures the revenue, the crypto-assets manufacture the net profit. Marketable securities (the tokens and cryptocurrencies held by the company) go from zero (2021) to €4.2M (2022), €5.8M (2023), then €10.2M (2024). At the end of 2024, crypto accounts for 76% of total assets. Galeon is no longer a software company with some crypto in its treasury. It’s a crypto portfolio with an EPR business on the side. A medical Saylorisation.

And a paradox jumps out: the $GALEON token has lost 83% since listing, yet the marketable securities on the balance sheet have been multiplied by 2.4 in two years. That’s only possible if the portfolio doesn’t mainly hold $GALEON. The mechanics of an ICO explain it: participants buy the project’s token, but they pay in other cryptocurrencies (BNB, ETH, stablecoins depending on the blockchain used). Galeon therefore receives a basket of crypto-assets, part of which is converted into euros to fund operations (hence the jump in cash to €5.77M in 2022), with the rest kept in the portfolio (the €4.2M of marketable securities that appear the same year).

The accounts confirm it indirectly: the foreign exchange gains line (€4.49M in 2024) reflects the appreciation of assets denominated in foreign currencies. The 2024 bull market (Bitcoin ×2.2, Ethereum ×1.5 between the end of 2023 and the end of 2024) mechanically inflated the value of the portfolio. But while the marketable securities double, the cash melts away: €5.77M → €3.28M → €324K. Crypto inflates the balance sheet, not the bank account. How much is self-held $GALEON, how much is ETH or BNB, how much comes from DeFi operations (staking, yield farming)? Impossible to know.

But in 2024, you can see it with the naked eye. Operating profit halves (€1M vs €2.4M in 2023), because operating costs have exploded to €4M: up 51%, driven by marketing and a payroll that almost doubled in two financial years. Except that the bull market comes along to make up for it all through those €4.49M of exchange gains. These are not realised gains. They are unrealised capital gains. Not cash.

On the other side, financial costs, which we’ll come back to, are exploding too: €3.26M, including €1.62M of interest (×2.2 vs 2023, even though there is no bond debt yet), €679K of crypto exchange losses, and €960K of financial provisions. They are about to vanish from the forecast.

Reported net profit is €2,229,202. It’s the bull market that manufactures it. Without the crypto gains, the result from ordinary activities would be around −€1.5M.

Finally, cash doesn’t lie. Cash at 31 December: €2.73M in 2021, €5.77M in 2022, €3.28M in 2023. Then €324,645 in 2024. A 90% drop in a year. Galeon burns cash despite its “profits”, because those profits aren’t cash: the released deferred income generates no cash (the money was collected and spent back at the ICO), and the crypto gains are unrealised (not sold).

And all of this, along with the seriousness of Galeon’s situation, is admitted in the DIS in a single sentence buried in its risk section: 3 months of working capital as of 7 January 2026. Three months means April. If the issue doesn’t raise enough, the DIS provides, where necessary, for new bond issues.

Meanwhile, on Atlantis, the fundraising tiers are presented as investment promises (hiring, R&D, hospital rollout) that unlock as the money comes in. What is never said is that with €324K in the bank and 3 months of runway, the first millions raised won’t fund R&D. They will fund survival.

Galeon at 31 December 2024 is this: a result manufactured by two non-operating flows (the release of the ICO money plus unrealised crypto gains), and a real software business that tops out at a few hundred thousand euros, as the trade receivables show, by the way. It’s the most revealing line in the balance sheets, and the most ignored in the communications.

Now let’s take the figures Galeon puts in the shop window and set them side by side. 18 hospitals, 3 million patients, 10,000 care workers. If 18 hospitals generate €288K of EPR revenue, that’s ~€16K per hospital per year. Or ~€1,300 a month. For an electronic patient record system. For reference, a GHT EPR contract with a vendor such as Softway Medical or Dedalus runs to hundreds of thousands of euros a year, or even millions.

In January 2025, Galeon took legal action against the tender from the Savoie-Belley GHT (Chambéry), a massive EPR contract (7K users, 57M documents, 6 hospitals, 10 years). The Grenoble administrative court threw out the claim in February 2025. I’ll come back to it in detail. But the figure that comes out of it is the most telling: in its own application file, Galeon declares EPR revenue of €287,849. At €16K per site, that isn’t a hospital’s full EPR. It’s a specialist module (obstetrics, anaesthesia), deployed in a handful of departments. As for the “3 million patients”: on €288K of revenue, that’s less than ten cents per patient.

But the inflated revenue isn’t the worst of it. It’s in the DIS forecast that the gap between what Galeon knows and what it chooses to show becomes widest.

Especially since that same forecast looks very odd on financial costs. Not salaries or running costs (those are properly budgeted in the forecast). Financial costs are what money costs: interest on loans, exchange losses on the crypto held, provisions for impairment of financial assets. Against that, here is what the actual accounts say56:

From €1.6M to €3.3M a year over 2022-2024, and accelerating. The forecast brings them down to €1,063 in 2025. Divided by 3,000. That’s no oversight. Whoever wrote it had the accounts in front of them. The DIS debt schedule57 confirms it: the €32K budgeted for 2026 corresponds exactly to the existing straight bonds (€32,560), and to nothing else. The forecast completely leaves out the €640K a year from the very issue it is in the middle of selling. Yet it’s a line you can work out in thirty seconds (€8M × 8% = €640K), and it appears nowhere. Apply the actual 2024 financial costs (€3.3M) to the 2026 forecast, and the result from ordinary activities goes from +€17K to −€3.2M.

Because once the issue is complete, the potential total bond debt is €12.4M:

On top of that: a Bpifrance PIRDI loan (€200K), a Bpifrance Innovation Loan (€300K), and remaining Société Générale loans (~€10K).

Finally comes the question of repayment if things go wrong, which one of the ads heavily plays down: who gets paid first? Because all these bonds, the ones on offer as well as the qualified investors’, are unsecured. No guarantee, no security, no pledge. In the event of default, secured creditors go first.

A concrete scenario: Galeon defaults in 2029. The assets left after paying preferential and secured creditors come to €2M. The unsecured creditors share that €2M pro rata across €12.6M of claims. Each bondholder gets back 15.8 cents per euro invested. The subscriber who put in €400 gets back €63. −84%.

Which raises the question… of the investors themselves. If the company is so great, if they turned down millions, then why tap retail investors for several times the size of the balance sheet?

The qualified investors (including those in the two €2M issues) probably carried out, or had someone carry out, due diligence, read the balance sheets, understood the deferred income, asked questions. They took their risk with their eyes open. The individual putting in €400 saw Guillaume Pley say that 8% is huge, Matthias Baccino say Galeon was his first commercial partner and that he was very proud of it, and an Atlantis page with gamified gauges. Same ranking. Not the same information. Although, unlike Pley, Baccino does explain some of the risks involved, several times.

Baccino points out that the average yield for companies in Europe is more like 3.5 to 4%, so an 8% yield is high.
He also reminds listeners that a bond is a financial investment in which the risk you take is, obviously, that at the end of the bond [...] the company [...] doesn’t pay you back at all.

But Baccino lets the Galeon boss roll out his pitch unchecked and unchallenged, and so helps make the story credible. It has to be said that the man, who recently left the helm of Trade Republic, the German online broker, is now monetised by Influx, Guillaume Pley’s advertising sales agency. And that he is currently preparing a day of shows in Zénith arenas with the YouTuber Le Préventeur, and with Philippe Boxho, the Belgian forensic pathologist, whose anecdotes, we now learn (nobody saw that coming), are exaggerated or even borrowed58.

The problem is that for years, Galeon has been buying left, right and centre to hammer home its story.