💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 02

The Kill

In the summer of 2016, in Thonon-les-Bains, near Lake Geneva, the chairman of a property dealing company files a complaint against his 2 managing directors. They immediately call a shareholders' meeting to remove him. He takes them to court in emergency proceedings6.

The chairman is called Manuel B. The company is called L'Avenue7, and it has 3 shareholders, all 3 of them companies. The first is B.'s property company, registered at the same address. The 2nd is Frédéric Merlin's holding company8. The 3rd belongs to his parents9.

At the end of July, a judge appoints an administrator to call the meeting in B.'s place, and bars him from paying L'Avenue's money to himself or to his property company. In the autumn, he is removed. Nobody replaces him: as long as he remains a shareholder, the articles of association require unanimity.

Cornered, he sells his shares 2 months later. His shareholder loan account is settled at €1.24M, but it will only be repaid as assets are sold: €56K on signing, then after the sale of the 3rd floor of a building in Lyon, then the 2nd, then another property, then a building, then the winding-up of a Paris partnership. The last instalment, €317K, hangs on the winding-up of a small Lyon company that L'Avenue owns 25% of. 10 years later, it still hasn't been wound up.

Frédéric Merlin, for his part, becomes chairman at 25. And this is the company that will become GROUPE SGM, the parent of the group that will own the BHV 7 years later.

He had joined L'Avenue the year before the dispute, straight out of school. At Sciences U Lyon, where he was doing a work-study course in property, his classmates remember a boy who came to class in an Austin Mini, then an Audi A1. One of them recalls10:

Born with a silver spoon in his mouth, she says, yet he never looked down on his friends.

His father, Pascal, runs an industrial SME in the Lyon suburbs and mixes with the cream of local business. He keeps a standing table at Cazenove, a favourite haunt of Lyon property developers, and takes his 2 children to meet industrialists and decision-makers from a very young age, according to Frédéric Berthet, his son's mentor at Omnium, the firm the boy joins at 171.

It is in that same circle that he meets his wife, the daughter of a transport and logistics baron who sits on half a dozen supervisory boards in the region and invests in property through some fifteen companies.

In Lyon, he starts out by bringing deals to other people. Nicolas Gagneux, head of the Lyon developer 6e Sens, has known him since those years11:

He charged ahead, he was ambitious, and he brought his firm a lot of business, Gagneux recalls.

None of this survives in the version he tells. In the official legend, he founds his property company in 2015. All by himself. No B., no shareholder loan account, no buildings sold one by one to repay it. All that is left is the €15K student loan from Crédit Mutuel that supposedly let him and his sister get started.

As for his social background, he tells it 2 ways. Before the French Senate, in January 2026, he grew up in Lyon in a family of entrepreneurs12. 4 months later, to a journalist, in a village near Lyon, in a middle-class setting, with a mother who did not work.

The father joins the empire and stays until his death in 2018. His own company, in Saint-Symphorien-d'Ozon, had been wound up for insufficient assets in February 2013. Merlin would turn it into a line13:

He hired his dad, he said, which is a bit like the model in reverse.

His sister Maryline, 4 years older, becomes deputy managing director after taking the same course and the same work-study placement, at the same company. And his mother Dominique, assistant managing director, also signs for the family's holding partnership, the one that owns half of the group's parent company.

It is the mother who tells the story of the 13-year-old boy who promised her that, when he grew up, he would buy her a car and a Hermès scarf. 21 years later, the same newspaper closes the scene: he takes her away for a weekend in L'Isle-sur-la-Sorgue, in Provence, with the scarf and the car11. The legend, again.

11 months after his appointment, he gives himself the right to borrow. Until then, the chairman could not take out a loan without an extraordinary decision of the shareholders. Now he can, “le tout sans limitation” [all without limit], and he can pledge the company's assets as security14.

Unanimous shareholder decisions of 31 October 2017, signed by Frédéric Merlin and Pascal Merlin: the chairman may take out any loans, all without limit.

And this is where he starts putting in place the method he will stick to for nearly 10 years. Buy a building nobody wants. Fill it. Have it valued. Then borrow, not against what he paid, but against what the valuer wrote down.

So it requires 2 things he doesn't have. Buildings, because a tenant has nothing to get valued. And someone behind him, because a bank doesn't lend to a 25-year-old on the strength of a valuation.

That someone arrives in July 2018. With him, Merlin sets up the company that will end up employing the group's staff. Then the property company, with €1M of capital. His name is Jean-Paul Dufour, and he puts up half the money in both.

A former industrialist living in Belgium, for the weather, obviously, right on the Luxembourg border. In the early 2000s, he is a shareholder in a metalworking shop with just under a hundred staff in Chauffailles, in Burgundy, making parts for construction machinery for Potain and Hitachi. His shares are sold to a listed group from Bordeaux15. His affairs are grouped in YESON16, the family holding company owned by Dufour and his wife, since handed over to their son, Léo17. A family tree that will matter a great deal in the next issue on this affair.

The fact remains that Dufour sits in on Merlin's and the group's most sensitive meetings, in the background, in a Quechua outdoor jacket, sometimes introduced as the group's technical director18.

Frédéric Merlin did not find this Dufour on his own. Merlin's father was in the same line of business, 130 km away, in the southern suburbs of Lyon: steel structures, metalworking, industrial piping. Dufour is a friend of his father's who was around the family long before financing anything19. And the son was his broker, then his deal-finder: knocking on doors to persuade a shopkeeper to sell his business, a lawyer to take bigger offices. All this after proving himself to Dufour by managing to sell him his own property company.

A competitor sums up his importance in one sentence20:

Above all, the competitor says, he got started because he had Jean-Paul Dufour's money.

In 2023, the split is fixed and will not move again. Jean-Paul Dufour gets 42.5% of the empire under construction, and Merlin 42.5% as well. The rest is held by YESON, the holding company now run by Léo.

Merlin 42.5 - 57.5 Dufour.

Who has owned the empire since 2023

Historically, Merlin keeps some power thanks to one specific clause. In the 2 companies founded in July 2018, the original property company and the one that employs the staff, appointing or removing the chairman requires a 2-thirds majority. So nobody can push Merlin out21.

But this clause was not carried over into any of the companies created afterwards22. Not in the property companies of 2021, not in the one that will own the store, not at the top of the cascade. Everywhere there, the chairmanship is decided by simple majority. According to a former associate of the group, this was clearly what the Dufours wanted. In the end, it makes Merlin a minority shareholder in his own group.

Who can remove Merlin as chairman?

Indeed, a financial report produced in the summer of 2024 says it plainly: its business depends on its ability to raise finance and, ultimately, on the financial support of Mr Jean-Paul Dufour.

Financial report produced in the summer of 2024: it cites the confirmed financial support of Mr Jean-Paul Dufour, a shareholder alongside Groupe SGM with 42.5% of most of the group's subsidiaries.

The 2-headed hydra works. While Dufour stays seated at the back of the room, Merlin rolls out his legend, runs the New York marathon, says he used to weigh 165 kilos and is now down to 90, claims a “féroce” [ferocious] willpower23, and arranges meetings at the Bristol, the Paris palace hotel, where the staff call him by name18.

One owns. The other tells the story.

But while Dufour never appears beside Merlin on TV or on posters, what you can see are his signatures. When a bank wants a guarantee, it's his. When a subsidiary runs short of cash, he lends €2M at 3%. When a bank needs convincing, he shows his personal wealth.

In 2020, together with his wife and with Merlin, he personally guarantees a €34M credit facility granted by a Luxembourg bank. The following year, for the same bank, he pledges €15M of his securities portfolio, signs a notarised guarantee of €4.5M and a €2M balancing payment on a property in Tourcoing. YESON, the family holding company, guarantees €1.87M on each of the 2 property companies created in 2021.

Guarantees granted to the Luxembourg bank: a pledge of €15M of Jean-Paul Dufour's securities portfolio, a notarised guarantee of €4.5M, a €2M Tourcoing balancing payment, shares pledged by each shareholder.

These signatures don't cover a single deal, they follow the acquisitions one by one. Each time, one of Merlin's companies borrows to buy, and it is Dufour's wealth that stands behind it. The same wealth, committed several times over.

In October 2022, bonds are issued, backed by the personal guarantees of Merlin and Dufour for half the amount issued. The same names, already committed elsewhere. The subscribers, for their part, read about personal wealth of more than €400M. Not about what is already pledged against it.

With Dufour's money, the Merlin method works. From 2018, Merlin buys declining shopping centres in mid-sized French towns, Lille, Mulhouse, Saint-Nazaire, Roubaix, the ones nobody wants any more, and turns them around. He would sum it up himself: in 6 years, 5 of these centres saw their occupancy rise from 60 to 95%, their value triple and their rents double. Which is factually true. So much so that in 2021, a broker offers him 7 regional Galeries Lafayette stores from the Moulin-Houzé family, buildings and businesses, for €115M.

But in fact this is not the first batch. In early 2018, the Moulin-Houzés had already sold the buildings and the businesses of 22 provincial stores to another buyer. 900 employees, 5% of the group's turnover. A certain Michel Ohayon.

Ohayon buys buildings occupied by retailers, renovates them, moves the brands upmarket and sells after the works to buy another. His model relies on self-financing through debt, notably by delaying payments. A story that seems to delight Merlin.

Then 2020. Covid finished off the town centres. Expensive, poorly served by transport, squeezed between out-of-town retail parks and an e-commerce boom fuelled by months of lockdown.

In reality, the 11 stores the Moulin-Houzés then put back on the market are the crumbs Ohayon didn't want. Merlin signs.

Ohayon himself won't end up very well. 2 years later, his holding company, which then owns 26 stores, goes into court-supervised administration. In February 2024, Galeries Lafayette writes off 70% of its claims on his stores, about €153M, and agrees to have the rest paid over 10 years. Those commitments will not hold. In April 2025, Ohayon is placed under formal investigation for fraudulent bankruptcy, misuse of company assets and organised fraud, which he denies24.

To take over the 7 Galeries Lafayette stores, the duo sets up SEGM Investissements25 in March 2022, with the usual split. An empty shell with no assets and a single mission: buy 80% of the company that runs the stores. BNP lends €11M over 7 years, the parent company advances €9M of cash, and the rest, the 3 shareholders lend to themselves. Along the way, Merlin awards his holding company €500K in fees. Because, well, why not.

Accounts of SEGM Investissements: an €11M loan from BNP, a €9M cash advance, and €500,000 excluding VAT in annual fees for the chairing company for 2022.

The trick then comes back regularly, in one form or another. In October 2025, SGM Immobilier26, which holds the group's property companies, increases its capital by €7.6M by dipping into its own reserves. 2 months later, another €5M, the same way. And L'Avenue, which has meanwhile become Groupe SGM, the parent company, has put aside about €1M of reserves over its entire existence, collects funds from its subsidiaries, and has turned €980K of it into capital, without €1 coming in from outside. The magic of Merlin.

At the end of 2020, the group's property company voluntarily revalues its land and buildings, based on estimates from CBRE and BNP. €76M goes into its equity. Still not a single euro has come in, and the company is worth €76M more.

The property company's 2020 accounts: voluntary revaluation at 31 December 2020 of land and buildings, for €80,934,315, based on estimates from CBRE and BNP.

In the same financial year, at the group's property dealer, an auditor refuses to sign off the accounts without qualification. Demeter Investissements27 has booked in its 2020 turnover the sale of 2 shopping centres, €16.5M, 91% of its business. At 31 December, these sales rest on nothing more than a unilateral promise to sell signed a month earlier. A unilateral promise is no guarantee of a sale, he writes, and the company recognised these transactions too early. But the deeds will be signed 9 months later.

Auditor's report on Demeter Investissements, financial year ended 31 December 2020: the €16.5M of sales rest on a unilateral promise to sell and cannot be booked in that year.

Which leaves a rather startling way of keeping the books. In this group, value never arrives with money. It arrives with an accounting entry.

What is booked, and what comes in